Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, page 44
what they are experiencing. Furthermore, I believe that it is virtually impossible to
distinguish psychogenic amnesia from faking, from malingering since the distinction
between the two hinges on how conscious it is to the person and how willful it is, how
intentional it is. And how conscious somebody is and how willful they‟re being, are
things that in spite of what we may say, we really don‟t have any way of assessing.”
Just because there is so far no empirical validation for the theory of repression is not
alone sufficient reason to discount the concept, yet it does cast some doubt.
Second, critics of repression theory point out that the scientific, and specifically,
the psychological community has not embraced repression theory, and that, in
fact, serious disagreement exists. [T]he existence of consensus (or lack thereof) in
the scientific community is a ...useful measure for this Court to evaluate the
acceptance, and acceptability of a scientific theory.
Finally, critics of repression theory argue that the “refreshing” or “recovery” of
“repressed” memories is more complicated than repression proponents would have
us believe. This argument takes two forms: (1) that memories refreshed with the
assistance of a mental health professional are subject to manipulations reflecting
the biases of the treating professional and (2) that a repressed memory cannot be
retrieved whole and intact from the cold storage of repression. Despite the
defendants attempts to characterize this case as one of assisted or enhanced
memory recovery, this is simply not a situation in which the plaintiffs „memories
have been manipulated by one or more mental health professionals acting in the
guise of treatment. Nonetheless, in crafting a rule we must consider the apparently
very real dangers of iatrogenic (therapist created) memories of sexual child
abuse....
After reviewing the arguments on both sides of the issue, we are unconvinced that
repression exists as a phenomenon separate and apart from the normal process of
forgetting. Because we find these two processes to be indistinguishable
scientifically, it follows that they should be treated the same legally. Therefore we
hold that the mental process of repression of memories of past sexual abuse does
not activate the discovery rule. The plaintiffs‟ suits are thus barred by the statute
of limitations. If the General Assembly should wish to rewrite the law, that is its
prerogative and responsibility.
The Doe opinion contains many serious flaws, only a few of which will be dealt with at this
time. First, the court primarily relies on one article by Pope and Hudson, and one chapter by
Holmes to support its conclusion. Pope and Hudson are members of the Scientific Advisory
Board of the False Memory Syndrome Foundation (FMSF), and so is Holmes. The FMSF
argues against the concept of repression and in favor of the idea that it is easy to implant
false memories. Because most of the major medical and mental health organizations accept
repression, the FMSF Scientific Board at best can be described as a “respectable minority”
under the “two schools of thought” doctrine (Brown et al., 1997 Jones v. Chidester, 1992).
Their view is not the prevailing scientifically accepted view it is the dissenting voice against
the majority position. This point is even more significant when we directly turn to the
Holmes chapter relied upon by the court.
In citing the chapter by Holmes, the court amazingly ignores the other 17 chapters in the
book, all of them written by the field‟s leading researchers in support of the concept of
repression. Thus, the Holmes position does not represent the prevailing scientific view.
Citing Holmes‟s position on repression as the accepted view of memory scientists is the
equivalent of citing Thomas Szasz as proof that psychiatrists in general do not believe in
mental illness. Indeed, had the court read the Holmes chapter, the judges would have
discovered that Holmes himself notes at the very beginning that his severely critical position

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, page 45
is a distinct minority viewpoint in the prevailing scientific community. He writes that when
he asked why he had been invited to participate, he was told that the book was intended to
contain “the entire spectrum of points of view concerning repression and that my view was
certainly „different‟ from those of most of the participants” (J. L. Singer, 1990, p. 85). Thus,
Holmes was honest in acknowledging that his antirepression position was at odds with
mainstream mental health and research thinking, and so it is (Erdelyi, 1996). Gleaves‟s
(1996b) definitive paper on Holmes‟s analysis makes it clear that any reliance on that
analysis for an attack on amnesia for childhood trauma is woefully misplaced.
The Doe court also ignores the obvious point that the reason why it is possible to say that
there is no laboratory proof of repression is because repression cannot be studied in the
laboratory. Ethical codes prohibit the traumatization of human subjects used in
experiments, especially when those subjects are young children and when the experiment
involves their sexual molestation. As Pope and Hudson have noted in their two articles
(1995a, b), the only relevant studies are those that involve actual traumatization of
children. This traumatization cannot be duplicated in the laboratory. Furthermore, it is
rather odd to believe that if something cannot be confirmed in the laboratory, it therefore
does not exist.
The court cites the Pope and Hudson (1995a) article to support the view that no credible
studies exist supporting repression. Yet, ironically, it fails to notice that the article itself
distinguishes between “repression” and “forgetting” by making this distinction one of the
criteria for evaluating the scientific studies. In other words, Pope and Hudson require that
the traumatic events studied be the kind that are not likely to be forgotten. If they are
“forgotten,” then, repression must exist. According to Pope and Hudson (1995b):
The burden of proof rests on those who hypothesize that human beings can
actually expel traumatic memories from consciousness.
This required proof may be simply stated: To reject the null hypothesis and
demonstrate “repression,” one need only exhibit a series of individuals who display
clear and lasting amnesia for known experiences too traumatic to be normally
forgettable. (p. 715)
Indeed, as Pope and Hudson (1995b) themselves correctly point out, to
demonstrate “repression,” one need only exhibit a series of individuals who display
clear and lasting amnesia for known experiences too traumatic to be normally
forgettable. It does not matter whether one terms this phenomenon “repression”
(as we have here), “dissociation,” or “traumatic amnesia.” (p. 715)
Thus, repression, for Pope and Hudson, is lack of recall in precisely those situations where
one would be expected never to forget. Most traumas for most people fall into the category
of Ait was so terrible I will never forget it.” Constant intrusive thoughts and dreams of the
trauma are one of its major consequences. Some traumas, however, like childhood sexual
abuse where the victim is molested and betrayed by a primary caregiver (J. Freyd, 1996),
are so severe that, for some people, repressing recollection of it is essential to survival. Is
this really so surprising? Not to mental health professionals. Janet and Freud were well
aware of repression and dissociative phenomenon a century ago (Brown et al., 1997).
Erickson in 1938 was writing about the psychological and legal dynamics of repression, and
also about “the not unusual legal situation in which a female, after sexual usage, testifies
first against the offending male and then, after a period of suffering, reverses her beliefs
and attitudes to testify sincerely in his behalf” (p. 551). Clinicians have reported memory
loss in patients throughout the century. Even in trauma studies where some memory of the
trauma has remained, a robust finding has been that some victims of all types of