Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, page 14
these typical instructions can lead to confusion about the source of memories and additional
confabulation, while legitimizing further memory alteration.
In this case, Joan Borawick experienced 12 to 14 hypnotic sessions in 1988 conducted over
several months by Valerian St. Regis, a lay hypnotist. Her recall during hypnosis involved a
revivification of sexual abuse that was vivid and detailed, as best one can tell from the
available records. St. Regis either allowed or suggested that Ms. Borawick remain amnesic
for these events when not in hypnosis, because he believed the memories recovered in
hypnosis would be “devastating” and would probably surface in time (Borawick v. Shay,
1995, Slip opinion, p. 2).
Several months later, Ms. Borawick recovered very similar memories. Given the similarity,
the court‟s assumption that the two were related seems reasonable to us. However, the
evidence in favor of this assumption is stronger than the common sense grounds on which
the Borawick court presumably based its decision.
According to St. Regis, Ms. Borawick had already demonstrated her ability to manifest
profound and lengthy posthypnotic amnesia in response to his expectations and/or
suggestions she had remained amnesic outside hypnosis over the several months that she
had been treated by him. Seemingly, memories of abuse would emerge during hypnotic
sessions only to be forgotten again until the next time Ms. Borawick was hypnotized and
age-regressed. Thus, during treatment, Ms. Borawick had already demonstrated lengthy,
recoverable posthypnotic amnesia for a time comparable to that between the end of
treatment and final “recovery” of her memories.
Given that the memories recovered months later were essentially identical to those obtained
in hypnosis, we‟re not sure what time frame should create uncertainty about the
relationship between the two sets of memories. However, in our view that period should be
longer than the 5 months or so that in fact separated the hypnosis sessions from much of
Ms. Borawick‟s later recall, as Ms. Borawick had already demonstrated recoverable
posthypnotic amnesia for a similar length of time.
Incidentally, posthypnotic amnesia of this duration, even if directly suggested, is quite rare.
On the other hand, St. Regis clearly expected Ms. Borawick to be capable of it and, if we
credit his deposition, she was. Given the rarity of such amnesia, these data would suggest
that Ms. Borawick‟s memory was unusually responsive to hypnotic influence and that St.
Regis‟s expectations, overtly stated or not, were capable of powerful effects. Ms. Borawick
was referred to St. Regis by his employer/supervisor, a physician who believed that patients
with chronic illnesses, like Ms. Borawick, might well have histories of childhood sexual abuse
(Borawick v. Shay, 1995, Slip Opinion, p. 10). Patients referred to St. Regis by this
physician seemingly recovered such memories quite often (St. Regis, 1993, p. 66). We can
surmise St. Regis held the expectation that this would occur in Ms. Borawick‟s case. When
the “memories” appeared, St. Regis instructed Ms. Borawick to experience lengthy amnesia,
but expected Ms. Borawick to eventually recover them. We should not be surprised when
she did.6
Inherent Incredibility
Another objection to the Second Circuit‟s decision raised by Scheflin (1996) involves the
rationale for excluding Ms. Borawick‟s posthypnotic testimony without an evidentiary
hearing. Professor Scheflin suggests that neither St. Regis‟s lack of academic credentials nor
the absence of minimal safeguards such as the maintenance of records of the hypnotic
sessions should have been “fatal,” especially as Ms. Borawick had evidence that could
“[verify her testimony] by other means” (i.e., the schizophrenic sister‟s letters, noted
above). Additionally, Scheflin (1996) notes that the court considered a “second factor”:

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, page 15
The second factor influencing the Second Circuit to deny Ms. Borawick her pretrial
hearing is the court‟s opinion about: “the inherent incredibility of Borawick‟s
allegations” including rape, ritual abuse, blood drinking, satanic activities, and
other events involving relatives and strangers. The court acknowledges that Ms.
Borawick was denied an opportunity to substantiate her claims with proof, and then
denies her that opportunity. In short, because the court felt the claims were
“incredible,” it denied Ms. Borawick the right to prove they were true. Once again,
this violates the spirit and the purpose of the totality-of-the-circumstances test, as
well as common sense. Even if some of the claims are incredible, others might well
be true. Let Ms. Borawick have her hearing to see what she can prove. (p. 33)
Intense law enforcement interest has failed to find any evidence of a multi generational
satanic cult (cf. Lanning, 1991). As Scheflin notes, common sense is useful here. If blood-
drinking, black-robed Masons engaged in satanic worship featuring ritual child abuse are not
inherently incredible, what is? Do the ritual events have to take place on a flying saucer (cf.
Mack, 1994), or in a past life (cf. Tarazi, 1990), before we can term them absurd? And while
it is logically possible that other aspects of Ms. Borawick‟s account did occur, it makes sense
to us, as it did to the United States District and Circuit Courts, that an account backed by no
physical evidence that includes absurd charges should be given no credence. The Borawick
court noted in this regard that the Shays had some right to be free of the need to respond
to inherently incredible accusations. While we do not know the history of this legal
reasoning, the Court‟s view certainly makes sense.
However, it is disappointing to us that in the future people accused on the basis of
hypnotically created recall will have to endure lengthy pretrial hearings on the basis of
obviously incredible claims. Under the “totality-of-the-circumstances” standard adopted by
the Second Circuit Court, trial courts will have to review each set of hypnotically influenced
memories on a case-by-case basis. The Court made an exception in this case only because
they felt sure that the District Court would decide against admitting Ms. Borawick‟s
testimony when all the circumstances were considered.
Remember that the “treatment” in this case was conducted by a lay hypnotist, who kept no
records of what occurred before, during, or after hypnosis. Additionally, independent
corroboration comprised two “me-too” letters from a hospitalized, schizophrenic relative
who later recanted her accusations. This illustrates the kind of testimony about which
decisions will have to be reached, case by case. In the future, the admissibility of
hypnotically influenced or created memories about blood-drinking, devil-worshiping, child-
abusing Masons will be debated in Federal Courts by expensive experts. Thus, a
“totality-of-the-circumstances” approach can result only in a costly cottage industry of
forensic hypnosis experts, while increasing the likelihood of major miscarriages of justice.7
Will Hypnosis Used in Psychotherapy Result in More Veridical Memories than
Hypnosis Used in the Forensic Context?
As we noted above and in our original paper, traditional psychotherapy involves, among
other things, the creation of a fictive narrative that provides a coherent framework for
therapist and patient to conceptualize a plausible etiology and treatment for psychological
distress (cf. Spence, 1994 Woolfolk, Sass, &Messer, 1988). The created narrative repre-
sents a subjective version of history, not the objective one sought in legal proceedings.
Whether a conversation with Uncle John happened on one‟s fourth birthday, at Christmas
when one was seven, with someone else altogether, or not at all, makes little difference to
the therapeutic value of working through the memory. It is the emotional tone and cognitive
orientations revealed by such memories that make them important therapeutically. To
believe we obtain objective records with such reminiscences is worse than naive.