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process, to constitute a critique of the ASCH Guidelines, when neither case involved these
Guidelines, constitutes a defrauding of the reader.
In sum, Karlin (1997) argues against judicial use of the ASCH Guidelines in all cases
because of the two cases he cites, neither of which involved the ASCH Guidelines at all.
From his own report, however, it appears that in both cases the safeguards were not met, in
neither case did a jury decide in favor of pseudomemory, and in one case the safeguards
worked properly because the judge refused admission of testimony where the safeguards
were not followed.
This point is especially important because in every case or illustration cited by Karlin (1997,
1983) or Karlin and Orne (1996), hypnosis was used improperly (serious violations of the
ASCH Guidelines were present). Not one case or illustration they cite has involved strict
adherence to the ASCH Guidelines. If they want to defend a per se exclusion rule, Karlin and
Orne must argue, as they do, that the ASCH Guidelines will not cure the problems they
claim exist when hypnosis is used in a forensic setting. But, most importantly, if they want
to criticize the use of the ASCH Guidelines, they must do so using cases where the
safeguards were carefully followed and injustice still resulted. And even in these latter
cases, where the Guidelines were carefully followed, they must show that distortion or
contamination is inevitably worse compared to other memory retrieval techniques. Karlin
and Orne, and anyone else, will find that the scientific literature fails to support their view.
While Karlin (1997) and Karlin and Orne (1996) limit their criticisms of the ASCH Guidelines,
and, indeed, reject the viability of any set of safeguards, to the forensic setting, it should be
clear that their argument must also extend to the use of hypnosis in clinical settings. In
brief, the Karlin and Orne position must be, at minimum, that hypnosis can never be used
with memory in therapy because there is always the possibility of a real world legal
consequence, and because hypnosis will always distort the emerging memory and will
always destroy the original memory. Several cases have made it clear that the use of
hypnosis in a purely therapeutic context may nevertheless disqualify the patient from later
appearing as a witness in court (Scheflin, 1994b). The patient could then legitimately sue
the therapist for deprivation of legal rights. For this reason, to protect patients and
therapists from the devastating consequences of the per se exclusion rule, I was the first
person to encourage therapists to utilize informed consent forms with patients whenever
hypnosis is used (Scheflin, 1993 Scheflin &Shapiro, 1989).
Beyond the use of hypnosis with memory in therapy, would Karlin and Orne also condemn
the therapeutic use of hypnosis for any purpose? False memory advocates are currently
broadening their attack on therapy by extending and exaggerating their fears about the
dangers of hypnosis. Two evolving lines of argument are being advanced by staunch false
memory advocates, neither of which is supportable in the scientific literature.
First, there is the claim that even when hypnosis is not being utilized directly, its evil effects
occur with techniques that are forms of “disguised” hypnosis. According to Perry (1995),
disguised techniques are prevalent in stage hypnosis shows and have been acquired by
“recovered memory” therapists. “Disguised” hypnosis, according to Perry, is any request for
relaxation, imagination, and so forth. When famed mentalist Kreskin (1977, 1973) said he
used suggestion, not hypnosis, in reality, he was using “disguised” hypnosis. Perry writes
about a student who discussed with her mother whether she should participate in an
hypnosis experiment. On the morning of the experiment, the mother said that maybe the
daughter should not participate because “you might never come out of it.” This acted as a
prehypnotic suggestion and the student had great difficulty coming out of the trance.
Of course, under this grossly expansive view, hypnosis becomes co-extensive with
suggestion. Furthermore, because suggestion is everywhere, for example, in books, in the

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, page 35
media, in conversations, and in therapy, it follows that everything is hypnosis. Does Perry
really believe that the mother “hypnotized” her daughter?5
Perry also points to T. X. Barber‟s views that other processes explain hypnotic phenomena.
Guided imagery, for Perry, is one “disguised” hypnosis technique. Perry argues that the
“recovered memory” therapists picked up these techniques and added to them their “New
Age ideology which argues that insight into the cause of symptoms leads to their
alleviation.” Does Perry doubt that this may be true in some cases?
Thus, under this first expansion of alleged hypnotic dangers, even therapists who do not use
hypnosis are using hypnosis.
The second expansion is as unpersuasive as the first. In two recent articles, Orne and his
associates (Orne, Whitehouse, Dinges, &Orne, 1996 Orne, Whitehouse, Orne, &Dinges,
1996) have argued that low hypnotizables are also at risk from hypnosis. In other words,
hypnotic consequences, especially bad ones, may affect people who, by definition, are not
very responsive to hypnotic suggestion.
Thus, under this second expansion, even those patients who are not very affected by
hypnosis are affected by hypnosis.
Newman and Baumeister (1996) recently theorized about the variables accounting for
reports of UFO abductions, which is one of the main areas false memory advocates list as
illustrative of pseudomemory implantation. They suggested an etiology rooted in a desire to
escape from self-awareness and masochistic fantasies in persons high in fantasy proneness.
Abductees, they suggest, then elaborate on hypnogogic hallucinations through the use of
hypnosis, used with them by a UFO devotee who shares their beliefs and expectations. A
discussion commentary on the paper by Orne and colleagues reinforces Orne‟s (1979) long
held position that “hypnosis provides a license for fantasy” (Orne, Whitehouse, Orne, &
Dinges, 1996, p. 172), but then introduces a new wrinkle to false memory arguments. The
Ornes now take the position, based on retrospective analyses of earlier research (e.g.,
Dinges et al., 1992 Whitehouse, Orne, Orne, &Dinges, 1991), that even medium and low
hypnotizables are vulnerable to contamination from the inherently corrupting influence of
hypnosis --a position that cannot be supported by the bulk of research which shows (1)
that the earlier studies were methodologically flawed, and (2) that other studies
demonstrate that hypnosis does not contaminate the medium and low hypnotizables in the
manner suggested by the Ornes (Brown et al., 1997). For example, Lynn and Kirsch (1996)
debunk Newman and Baumeister‟s (1996) theorizing by noting:
However, they present an unnecessary and exaggerated account of the role of
hypnosis and fantasy proneness. False memories can be created with or without
hypnosis, and the role of hypnosis in their creation is likely to be quite small.
Similarly, the available data suggest that the trait of fantasy proneness is not likely
to be of great importance.... Hypnosis does not reliably produce more false
memories than are produced in a variety of nonhypnotic situations in which
misleading information is conveyed to participants. (p. 151)
Even further, Lynn and Kirsch state that “the role of hypnosis in enhancing confidence in
false memories is also exaggerated” (p. 152) and they strongly criticize the “outdated
view” of hypnosis taken by Newman and Baumeister (1996). Lynn and Kirsch (1996)
presented recent research evidence (Lynn &Pezzo, 1994) supporting the important role of
preexisting, culturally derived beliefs in the formation of UFO scenarios.
The hypotheses of Newman and Baumeister (1996) were also challenged by McLeod,
Corbisier, and Mack (1996). They noted that although hypnosis is often used by UFO
“investigators,” it cannot account for the origin of these accounts because 30% of them are
obtained without hypnosis, and 60%B70% of the information gathered by persons where