32 International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 9, 2018
In Australia, where the government has
legislated to enable the Commonwealth
Attorney-General to proscribe terrorist
organizations, it is noticeable that most groups
thus far listed as banned terrorist organizations
are underpinned by extremist religious ideology
commonly or popularly described as Islamic
fundamentalism, radical Islam, Islamism, or
Islamic extremism. Robert Manne has argued
that a better term to employ, particularly for
those who have pledged adherence to the Islamic
State, but also to groups such as Al Quaeda
(which does not share the same sectarian
animosity to Shi’a Islam),
419F
2 is Salafi jihadism,
“believers in the revolutionary transformation of
the world through violent means” (Manne, 2016,
p. 159). This movement is “by no means an
exclusively or even principally Saudi or
Wahhabist phenomenon” (Manne, 2016, p. 19)
as
Qutbists (followers of Sayyid Qutb
whose prison writings formed the basis
of the Islamic State ideology see
Manne, 2016, p. 8) in political exile
from the Egyptian regime and Wahhabis
first rubbed shoulders in Saudi Arabia in
the late 1960s and the 1970s. From the
mid-1980s they fought and talked and
argued together in Afghanistan. The
Salafi jihadist movement, which
originated in Egypt during the late
1960s and the 1970s and expanded
during the 1980s in the war against the
Soviet Army in Afghanistan, represents
the fusion of Salafi-inflected Egyptian
revolutionary jihadism and politically
awakened Saudi Wahhabism. (Manne,
2016, pp. 19–20)
Manne cites Wiktorowicz (2005), who divides
Salafis into three basic types: the purists who
don’t engage in the political sphere, the politicos
who engage in politics from the sidelines but
avoid violence, and the jihadis. All are textual
literalists, but it is only the third group “who
2 Indeed, it was the Islamic State “intention of killing all Shi’as and
all members of other supposedly heretical or apostate Muslim sects
that finalised the ideological breach between the Islamic State and
al-Qaeda” (Robert Manne, 2016, p. 159).
believe there is an inescapable religious
obligation to commit one’s life to violent
struggle for the creation of a truly Islamic
world” (Manne, 2016, pp. 17–18). Indeed, for
those religious apologists who like to profess the
idea that terrorism is inspired by economics, or
politics, and that religion is merely used as a
cloak for these underlying motivations, it should
be noted that Manne observes that “for the entire
Salafi jihadist school, the only ideas that
ultimately matter in the struggle for mastery of
the world are those connected to religion”
(Manne, 2016, p. 43 italics added).
420F
3
It was with the intrinsic understanding that
contemporary terrorism is, in the main, inspired
by sincerely held religious or other ideological
beliefs that antiterrorism law in Australia, based
on United Kingdom (UK) precedent, essentially
defines terrorism as threats against the
government or a section of the community “with
the intention of advancing a political, religious
or ideological cause” [Security Legislation
Amendment (terrorism) Act, Section 100 (1)
(Cth), 2002]. The Australian legislation includes
the offences of
engaging in a terrorist act, providing or
receiving training connected with a
terrorist act, possessing things connected
with terrorist acts, collecting or making
documents likely to facilitate terrorist
acts and performing other acts in
preparation for, or planning, terrorist
acts.” These offences attract penalties up
to life imprisonment. (Ruddock, 2004, p.
255)
The UK precedent, upon which terrorism laws in
other Commonwealth nations are based
(including New Zealand, Canada and South
Africa), is the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), in
which the phrase “political, religious or
ideological cause” is first used [Section 101.1
(1) (b)]. This wording is particularly pertinent to
our discussion about cults and terrorism because
the UK legislative clause introduced into
3 From a policy perspective, it is therefore essential that we
understand the theological rationales upon which terrorist actions
are based and justified, something that Manne has explained with
respect to Salafi jihadism in his excellent book.
In Australia, where the government has
legislated to enable the Commonwealth
Attorney-General to proscribe terrorist
organizations, it is noticeable that most groups
thus far listed as banned terrorist organizations
are underpinned by extremist religious ideology
commonly or popularly described as Islamic
fundamentalism, radical Islam, Islamism, or
Islamic extremism. Robert Manne has argued
that a better term to employ, particularly for
those who have pledged adherence to the Islamic
State, but also to groups such as Al Quaeda
(which does not share the same sectarian
animosity to Shi’a Islam),
419F
2 is Salafi jihadism,
“believers in the revolutionary transformation of
the world through violent means” (Manne, 2016,
p. 159). This movement is “by no means an
exclusively or even principally Saudi or
Wahhabist phenomenon” (Manne, 2016, p. 19)
as
Qutbists (followers of Sayyid Qutb
whose prison writings formed the basis
of the Islamic State ideology see
Manne, 2016, p. 8) in political exile
from the Egyptian regime and Wahhabis
first rubbed shoulders in Saudi Arabia in
the late 1960s and the 1970s. From the
mid-1980s they fought and talked and
argued together in Afghanistan. The
Salafi jihadist movement, which
originated in Egypt during the late
1960s and the 1970s and expanded
during the 1980s in the war against the
Soviet Army in Afghanistan, represents
the fusion of Salafi-inflected Egyptian
revolutionary jihadism and politically
awakened Saudi Wahhabism. (Manne,
2016, pp. 19–20)
Manne cites Wiktorowicz (2005), who divides
Salafis into three basic types: the purists who
don’t engage in the political sphere, the politicos
who engage in politics from the sidelines but
avoid violence, and the jihadis. All are textual
literalists, but it is only the third group “who
2 Indeed, it was the Islamic State “intention of killing all Shi’as and
all members of other supposedly heretical or apostate Muslim sects
that finalised the ideological breach between the Islamic State and
al-Qaeda” (Robert Manne, 2016, p. 159).
believe there is an inescapable religious
obligation to commit one’s life to violent
struggle for the creation of a truly Islamic
world” (Manne, 2016, pp. 17–18). Indeed, for
those religious apologists who like to profess the
idea that terrorism is inspired by economics, or
politics, and that religion is merely used as a
cloak for these underlying motivations, it should
be noted that Manne observes that “for the entire
Salafi jihadist school, the only ideas that
ultimately matter in the struggle for mastery of
the world are those connected to religion”
(Manne, 2016, p. 43 italics added).
420F
3
It was with the intrinsic understanding that
contemporary terrorism is, in the main, inspired
by sincerely held religious or other ideological
beliefs that antiterrorism law in Australia, based
on United Kingdom (UK) precedent, essentially
defines terrorism as threats against the
government or a section of the community “with
the intention of advancing a political, religious
or ideological cause” [Security Legislation
Amendment (terrorism) Act, Section 100 (1)
(Cth), 2002]. The Australian legislation includes
the offences of
engaging in a terrorist act, providing or
receiving training connected with a
terrorist act, possessing things connected
with terrorist acts, collecting or making
documents likely to facilitate terrorist
acts and performing other acts in
preparation for, or planning, terrorist
acts.” These offences attract penalties up
to life imprisonment. (Ruddock, 2004, p.
255)
The UK precedent, upon which terrorism laws in
other Commonwealth nations are based
(including New Zealand, Canada and South
Africa), is the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), in
which the phrase “political, religious or
ideological cause” is first used [Section 101.1
(1) (b)]. This wording is particularly pertinent to
our discussion about cults and terrorism because
the UK legislative clause introduced into
3 From a policy perspective, it is therefore essential that we
understand the theological rationales upon which terrorist actions
are based and justified, something that Manne has explained with
respect to Salafi jihadism in his excellent book.
