14 International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 9, 2018
leader to take out education loans and turn the
money over to the cult.
203F
204 Although she likely
was psychologically coerced into committing the
crime, that coercion was no defense.
The prosecution cannot rely on a psychological
coercion theory to support its case either. United
States v. Kozminski set the standard for many
years to come.
204F
205 In that case, the defendants
were charged with holding two mentally-
challenged farm workers in involuntary
servitude.
205F
206 The facts alleged were that the men
worked seven days a week, often seventeen
hours a day, for essentially no pay.
206F
207 The
Government relied primarily upon the theory
that defendants used psychological coercion to
keep the men on the farm.
207F
208 The court held that
the Government could not prove a violation of
the defendants’ constitutional rights based on
this mental coercion alone it also had to prove
that defendants used or threatened to use
physical or legal coercion, which the prosecution
could not do.
208F
209
Successful prosecutions have utilized laws
prohibiting certain illegal behaviors that
religious organizations sometimes engage in as
part of a religious service.
209F
210 For instance,
where a religion included the ingestion of an
illegal substance, peyote, in its ceremonial
rituals, a court (in a decision often referred to as
the “peyote case”) upheld an administrative
204 See id. at 17.
205 United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 933 (1988),
superseded by statute, Victims of Trafficking &Violence
Protection Act of 2000, infra. The Kozminski court held: “Since
the [lower court’s] jury instructions encompassed means of
coercion other than actual or threatened physical or legal coercion,
the instructions may have caused respondents to be convicted for
conduct that does not violate [the statutes]. The convictions must
therefore be reversed.” Kozminksi, 487 U.S. at 933. The
Kozminski decision remained intact until the “TVPA expressly
overturned the Supreme Court’s narrow definition of ‘involuntary
servitude’” Marley S. Weiss, Human Trafficking and Forced
Labor: A Primer, 31 ABA J. LAB. &EMP. L. 1, 31 (2015).
206 Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934.
207 Id. at 935.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 944.
210 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, as recognized in
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277(2011).
decision denying adherents unemployment
benefits when they were terminated for work-
related misconduct based on use of the drug.
210F
211
The freedom of religion protections in the
constitution did not extend to them for engaging
in illegal activity.
211F
212 Behaviors such as stalking
or rape are also avenues for litigation.
212F
213
In response to the “peyote case,” Congress
passed the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”).
213F
214 By
passing RFRA, Congress made it more difficult
to prosecute behavior claimed to be a religious
practice.
214F
215 Under it, courts were obligated to
apply a more rigorous test (known as the
“compelling interest” test) against the
government when it defended laws such as the
peyote restriction.
215F
216 Constitutional scholar
Marci Hamilton claims that RFRA was “the
most far-reaching statute in favor of religious
entities in United States history.”
216F
217 The
problem with this sweeping legislation, she
argued, was that it provided “blind
accommodation ...for dozens of religious
groups—without asking whether disabling every
law in the country might be a mistake.”
217F
218
Hamilton’s larger concern was that certain
religious groups brought harm upon their
members under the guise of religious freedom,
which was not contemplated by our Founding
Fathers, yet was sanctioned by RFRA.
218F
219
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 See Robin A. Boyle, Women, the Law, and Cults: Three
Avenues of Legal Recourse – New Rape Laws, Violence Against
Women Act, and Antistalking Laws, 15 CULTIC STUD. J. (1998).
214 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, bb-1 (2012) [hereinafter RFRA].
215 The “Congressional Findings” of the RFRA stated:
(4) in Employment Div. v. Smith. ..the Supreme Court
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
neutral toward religion and (5) the compelling interest test
as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test
for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests. 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb.
216 See HAMILTON, supra note 176, at 18−21.
217 Id. at 22.
218 Id.
219 See id. at 27−35.
leader to take out education loans and turn the
money over to the cult.
203F
204 Although she likely
was psychologically coerced into committing the
crime, that coercion was no defense.
The prosecution cannot rely on a psychological
coercion theory to support its case either. United
States v. Kozminski set the standard for many
years to come.
204F
205 In that case, the defendants
were charged with holding two mentally-
challenged farm workers in involuntary
servitude.
205F
206 The facts alleged were that the men
worked seven days a week, often seventeen
hours a day, for essentially no pay.
206F
207 The
Government relied primarily upon the theory
that defendants used psychological coercion to
keep the men on the farm.
207F
208 The court held that
the Government could not prove a violation of
the defendants’ constitutional rights based on
this mental coercion alone it also had to prove
that defendants used or threatened to use
physical or legal coercion, which the prosecution
could not do.
208F
209
Successful prosecutions have utilized laws
prohibiting certain illegal behaviors that
religious organizations sometimes engage in as
part of a religious service.
209F
210 For instance,
where a religion included the ingestion of an
illegal substance, peyote, in its ceremonial
rituals, a court (in a decision often referred to as
the “peyote case”) upheld an administrative
204 See id. at 17.
205 United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 933 (1988),
superseded by statute, Victims of Trafficking &Violence
Protection Act of 2000, infra. The Kozminski court held: “Since
the [lower court’s] jury instructions encompassed means of
coercion other than actual or threatened physical or legal coercion,
the instructions may have caused respondents to be convicted for
conduct that does not violate [the statutes]. The convictions must
therefore be reversed.” Kozminksi, 487 U.S. at 933. The
Kozminski decision remained intact until the “TVPA expressly
overturned the Supreme Court’s narrow definition of ‘involuntary
servitude’” Marley S. Weiss, Human Trafficking and Forced
Labor: A Primer, 31 ABA J. LAB. &EMP. L. 1, 31 (2015).
206 Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934.
207 Id. at 935.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 944.
210 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, as recognized in
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277(2011).
decision denying adherents unemployment
benefits when they were terminated for work-
related misconduct based on use of the drug.
210F
211
The freedom of religion protections in the
constitution did not extend to them for engaging
in illegal activity.
211F
212 Behaviors such as stalking
or rape are also avenues for litigation.
212F
213
In response to the “peyote case,” Congress
passed the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”).
213F
214 By
passing RFRA, Congress made it more difficult
to prosecute behavior claimed to be a religious
practice.
214F
215 Under it, courts were obligated to
apply a more rigorous test (known as the
“compelling interest” test) against the
government when it defended laws such as the
peyote restriction.
215F
216 Constitutional scholar
Marci Hamilton claims that RFRA was “the
most far-reaching statute in favor of religious
entities in United States history.”
216F
217 The
problem with this sweeping legislation, she
argued, was that it provided “blind
accommodation ...for dozens of religious
groups—without asking whether disabling every
law in the country might be a mistake.”
217F
218
Hamilton’s larger concern was that certain
religious groups brought harm upon their
members under the guise of religious freedom,
which was not contemplated by our Founding
Fathers, yet was sanctioned by RFRA.
218F
219
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 See Robin A. Boyle, Women, the Law, and Cults: Three
Avenues of Legal Recourse – New Rape Laws, Violence Against
Women Act, and Antistalking Laws, 15 CULTIC STUD. J. (1998).
214 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, bb-1 (2012) [hereinafter RFRA].
215 The “Congressional Findings” of the RFRA stated:
(4) in Employment Div. v. Smith. ..the Supreme Court
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
neutral toward religion and (5) the compelling interest test
as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test
for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests. 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb.
216 See HAMILTON, supra note 176, at 18−21.
217 Id. at 22.
218 Id.
219 See id. at 27−35.
