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claims, particularly religious claims, in the name of expressing selfhood.
(Bromley, in press, pp. 31-32)
The preceding excerpt from Dr. Bromley‘s paper reflects, in my view, the perspective of
many of his colleagues. There are, however, several problems with this perspective. These
problems arise from mischaracterizing the dispute as one involving those with favorable
views of religion (the ―religion coalition‖) and those with implicitly unfavorable views of
religion (the ―mental health coalition‖). In large part, this perspective presumes an obsolete,
Freudian view of mental health, which saw religion as an ―illusion.‖ Much of the criticism of
cultic groups, however, comes from people with strong religious convictions. Moreover, the
conversion-brainwashing dichotomy does not account for concerns about children raised in,
rather than converted to, groups deemed to be abusive. In the final analysis, the criticisms
rest on ethical objections to what some groups do to people, not on psychological
assessments or the presence or absence of ―brainwashing,‖ however that term is defined.
Psychological harm may be an important consequence of the ethical transgressions, but it
usually is not, and in my view ought not be, the ultimate or sole authority for criticism. The
issue, then, is not ―conversion vs. brainwashing,‖ as Dr. Bromley puts it, for ―brainwashing‖
refers to a particular type of conversion (One wouldn‘t speak about a conflict as ―red‖ vs.
―color.‖) in which a person‘s identity change is initiated and/or sustained through unethical
manipulations of a group, manipulations, moreover, that do not necessarily have to reach
the level of ―brainwashing‖ to justify criticism or remedial action.
I agree with Dr. Bromley that the religion coalition (what I have thus far called
―sympathizers‖) defends the ―transcendent authorization‖ claimed by religious
organizations. I believe, however, that what he calls the ―mental health coalition‖ can more
profitably be construed as the ―individual rights coalition,‖ which values individual autonomy
and dignity above the collectivist authority of groups, whether religious, political,
psychotherapeutic, or other. The religion coalition threatens the individual rights coalition
not because it asserts ―a transcendent authorization, which effectively trumps therapeutic
authority,‖ but because the latter sometimes perceives the former as asserting a
transcendent authorization that claims to trump our culture‘s fundamental belief in the
value of individual human rights. To the individual rights coalition, valuing transcendent
authorization over selfhood and individual human rights could ultimately lead to an
acceptance of the more oppressive methods of the Inquisition.
I would expect members of the religion coalition to object--and they would be correct to do
so. In fact, I do not believe that the religion coalition values groups‘ claims of transcendent
authorization over individual human rights. They may, as Dr. Bromley asserts, value claims
of transcendent authorization over therapeutic authority. This, however, is ―shadow-boxing‖
for, as I have said, therapeutic authority isn‘t the core issue ethical propriety is. The
question isn‘t whether or not individuals may submit to a group‘s transcendent claims, but
whether a group uses ethically unacceptable methods to bring about and sustain
submission.
Dr. Bromley contrasts the religion coalition‘s assertion of the individual‘s right to submit to
institutional claims, particularly religious claims, in the name of defending selfhood, with the
individual rights coalition‘s assertion of the individual‘s right to challenge these claims. But
is this really a disagreement or a difference in emphasis? None of my colleagues would
object to an individual‘s right to submit to religious claims, e.g., to take a vow of obedience
in a religious order. Indeed, some of my colleagues have taken such vows. Nor would I
expect any of Dr. Bromley‘s colleagues to object to an individual‘s right to challenge
religious claims. I doubt, for example, that they would defend murder, polygamy, genital
mutilation, child abuse, incest, or slavery simply because a religious groups justifies these
practices through some ―transcendent authorization.‖ Why, then, do they quarrel?

Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 62
They quarrel, I believe, because they make different judgments about the magnitude and
severity of ethical transgressions and resulting harms related to individuals‘ decisions to
submit to or challenge institutional claims, particularly religious claims. The individual rights
coalition believes that the magnitude and severity of ethical transgressions (and the
psychological, medical, and economic harm that sometimes results from these
transgressions) by groups claiming a transcendent authorization is great enough to warrant
criticism and sometimes private or public remedial responses. The religion coalition believes
that the level of ethical transgressions and harm is sufficiently low as to make the search for
―solutions‖ to an at worst minor problem more dangerous than the reputed problem,
especially when solutions call for state intervention.
The Empirical Heart of the Dispute
Contrary to Dr. Bromley‘s fundamental thesis, then, the issue is at heart empirical. The
fundamental questions driving the dispute are:
1. How much unethical (including illegal) behavior is associated with certain new
groups‘ influence over members, prospective members, and the public?
2. How much and what kinds of harm result from such behaviors?
3. How effective are proposed remedies for limiting transgressions and harm?
4. What kinds and amounts of negative consequences (especially unjustified constraints
on religious freedom), whether intended or not, might result from attempts to limit
transgressions and harm?
Some aspects of these questions could, in theory, be investigated through careful and
extensive scientific study carried out over a long period of time. However, as Dr. Bromley
asserts elsewhere in his paper, ―the investigation of religious movement affiliations is an
empirical thorny thicket that does not easily lend itself to empirical resolution‖ (Bromley, in
press, p. 1 for a critical review of empirical studies in this field see Aronoff, Malinoski, &
Lynn, 2000). This is so because:
1. The dependent variables (unethical behaviors, harm, negative consequences) involve
value judgments about which consensus would be difficult to achieve.
(Disagreement about value-laden concepts, however, doesn‘t make research
impossible, e.g., research on child abuse, emotional abuse of women, social
attractiveness.)
2. Even though psychological case studies and judicial, legislative, and media
investigations have documented many instances of harm and some useful scientific
work has been completed (e.g., Malinoski, Langone, &Lynn, 1998), scientifically
assessing the nature, level, and pervasiveness of harm within the general population
of new movements, or even subcategories of that broad category (e.g., controversial
new movements), would take many years and far more resources than society is
currently willing to commit to this issue.
In the absence of definitive empirical data, members of the two coalitions arrive at different
judgments concerning what, if anything, should be done about the (alleged) problem, their
judgments, in large part, reflecting how much credibility they attribute to the many case
reports, legal or governmental investigations, and scientific studies. The dispute becomes
politicized because too many people in both coalitions act (with regard to the fundamental
questions listed above) as though they know, when in actuality they opine. Because
neither coalition can legitimately claim the unqualified support of science (although both
have triedsee in this issue Amitrani &Di Marzio‘s, 2000, article on the APA and
―brainwashing‖), neither camp can easily persuade even the rational and balanced members
of the other camp to change their opinions about these fundamental questions. (This does