Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 120
32. See: Jacques deLisle ―Who's afraid of Falun Gong?‖ Asia Times 10 August 1999. Several people,
including Jacques deLisle of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and professor of law at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, point out that the Communist Party came to power as a
populist organization, with much of its legitimacy based on its support of the masses, particularly
the peasantry. deLisle suggests that Falun Gong may be more ―disconcerting‖ to the CCP than the
pro-democracy dissidents, since pro-democracy movement tended to be students and ―educated
elites‖ while the Falun Gong shows appeal to the ―urban mass base‖ as well as those in
government positions.
33. See: ―Syncretic Sects and Secret Societies: Revival in the 1980s‖ Chinese Sociology and
Anthropology 21, no.4 (Summer 1989) ed. and trans. Robin Munro. For a more recent discussion
of qigong groups as a form of civil society see Evelyne Micollier, ―Qigong groups and Civil Society
in P.R.China.‖ IIAS Newsletter 22 June 2000.
34. This is particularly important in China for several reasons: 1) being ―scientific‖ is a major part of
Marxist, Leninist, Mao Zedong Thought. 2) China is sensitive to being seen as ―backward‖ or
―superstitious‖ and prefers to be seen as modern and scientific. 3) China is trying to educate its
public and modernize itself to be a leading figure in the international world order. Having major
portions of the population believing in ―feudal superstition‖ is seen as detrimental, both internally
and externally. For an excellent article on the issue of superstition and religion in China, see
Stephan Feuchtwang and Wang Ming Ming: ―The Politics of Culture or a Contest of Histories:
Representation of Chinese Popular Religion‖ Dialectical Anthropology 16 no. 3-4 (1991).
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank David Rapoport, professor emeritus of Political Science, UCLA, for
aiding me in gaining full library research access and for his overall support. I also wish to
thank Barend ter Haar for his support and early discussions on this topic, and for his
generous spirit.
An earlier version of this paper was presented to the American Family Foundation Annual
Conference in Seattle, Washington, April 28, 2000.
Patsy Rahn is studying modern and classical Chinese at UCLA in preparation to enter a
graduate program in Chinese studies. She has two book reviews forthcoming in Nova
Religio and is writing a second paper on the Chinese government and the Falun Gong: ―The
Alchemy of a Conflict: The Chinese Government and the Falun Gong.‖
This article is an electronic version of an article originally published in Cultic Studies Journal, 2000, Volume 17,
pages 166-186. Please keep in mind that the pagination of this electronic reprint differs from that of the bound
volume. This fact could affect how you enter bibliographic information in papers that you may write.
32. See: Jacques deLisle ―Who's afraid of Falun Gong?‖ Asia Times 10 August 1999. Several people,
including Jacques deLisle of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and professor of law at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, point out that the Communist Party came to power as a
populist organization, with much of its legitimacy based on its support of the masses, particularly
the peasantry. deLisle suggests that Falun Gong may be more ―disconcerting‖ to the CCP than the
pro-democracy dissidents, since pro-democracy movement tended to be students and ―educated
elites‖ while the Falun Gong shows appeal to the ―urban mass base‖ as well as those in
government positions.
33. See: ―Syncretic Sects and Secret Societies: Revival in the 1980s‖ Chinese Sociology and
Anthropology 21, no.4 (Summer 1989) ed. and trans. Robin Munro. For a more recent discussion
of qigong groups as a form of civil society see Evelyne Micollier, ―Qigong groups and Civil Society
in P.R.China.‖ IIAS Newsletter 22 June 2000.
34. This is particularly important in China for several reasons: 1) being ―scientific‖ is a major part of
Marxist, Leninist, Mao Zedong Thought. 2) China is sensitive to being seen as ―backward‖ or
―superstitious‖ and prefers to be seen as modern and scientific. 3) China is trying to educate its
public and modernize itself to be a leading figure in the international world order. Having major
portions of the population believing in ―feudal superstition‖ is seen as detrimental, both internally
and externally. For an excellent article on the issue of superstition and religion in China, see
Stephan Feuchtwang and Wang Ming Ming: ―The Politics of Culture or a Contest of Histories:
Representation of Chinese Popular Religion‖ Dialectical Anthropology 16 no. 3-4 (1991).
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank David Rapoport, professor emeritus of Political Science, UCLA, for
aiding me in gaining full library research access and for his overall support. I also wish to
thank Barend ter Haar for his support and early discussions on this topic, and for his
generous spirit.
An earlier version of this paper was presented to the American Family Foundation Annual
Conference in Seattle, Washington, April 28, 2000.
Patsy Rahn is studying modern and classical Chinese at UCLA in preparation to enter a
graduate program in Chinese studies. She has two book reviews forthcoming in Nova
Religio and is writing a second paper on the Chinese government and the Falun Gong: ―The
Alchemy of a Conflict: The Chinese Government and the Falun Gong.‖
This article is an electronic version of an article originally published in Cultic Studies Journal, 2000, Volume 17,
pages 166-186. Please keep in mind that the pagination of this electronic reprint differs from that of the bound
volume. This fact could affect how you enter bibliographic information in papers that you may write.
















































































































































