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Armageddon paradigm) creates a psychologically receptive context for the apocalyptic
fantasies characteristic of many cult organizations in a wide variety of ideological fields.
Flowing from this, we explore the psychological dynamics that allow such apocalyptic
fantasies to gain a serious hold on the imagination of Identity followers. Key ideas looked at
include expectancy effects, uncertainty reduction theory, and the dynamics of stereotyping.
We also consider the possibility that those attracted to organizations heavily influenced by
Identity theology may be able to exert an influence beyond their current small size.
Definitional Issues and the Relevance of Cultic Perspectives
Defining cults has proven problematic for researchers active in the study of this area. Many
descriptive terms commonly employed provoke intense debate (e.g., ―thought-reform,‖
―brain-washing,‖ and ―exit counseling‖), while organizations that are sometimes viewed as
cults (e.g., Amway, the Moonies, Re-evaluation Counseling) vary enormously in their actual
practice (see Langone, 1993, for extended discussion of cultic definitional issues). For
example, the use of criticism/self-criticism sessions has been reported as a key means of
enforcing conformity and submission in political cults (e.g., Lalich, 1992). During such
sessions, cult members assemble to denounce the alleged misdemeanours of their fellows.
Eventually, the members targeted for such attention are compelled to join in the process
themselves, often internalizing its harshest verdicts. Such practices, however, are by no
means universal, and other high activity, undemocratic, and intensely ideologically
committed groups (such as the Committee for a Workers International) have been identified
in which they are absent (Tourish, 1998). Nevertheless, many such groups exhibit sufficient
dysfunctional behaviors to merit inclusion in the pantheon of organizations defined as cultic.
The pursuit of absolute categories may obscure rather than illuminate the study of cultic
organizations. Outside of courtrooms, not every question can be given a straight yes or no
answer yes, this organization is a cult, or no it isn‘t. Organizations can combine elements
of cultic practice with seemingly sensible approaches to everyday life. This means that some
groups that begin with a rational purpose (e.g., to influence the political process) can
regress in a dysfunctional and cultic direction.
Accordingly, cults may best be viewed daily as falling on a continuum. At one end stand
healthy well functioning groups, in which dissent is respected, people participate in decision
making, and members at all times retain a foot in the real world. At the other end we find
totalitarian enclaves in which conformity is prized above all else and people are frequently
manipulated against their will for the greater good of the cult leader. People and
organizations can move back and forth on this continuum depending on events.
Organizations are not necessarily either cults or not cults. They can be both at different
times and in different places.
This approach is particularly useful in reaching an understanding of the extreme political
right. Definitional problems with the term ―extreme right‖ abound (Cox, 1998). The term
has been at various times applied to the populist demagogue Father Coughlan in the 1930s,
Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s, and Barry Goldwater in the 1960s (Hopkins, 1992). In
addition, the right, for the most part, has a more amorphous and fluctuating structure than
the rigid formations found on the Marxist-Leninist extreme left (Tourish &Wohlforth, 2000).
This may be one important reason why so few have attempted to apply a cultic analysis to
the milieu of the right. In this discussion, however, we limit our application of the term to
those influenced by Christian Identity theology, those whose beliefs find organizational
expression in the militia movement, and such semi-fascistic organizations as Posse
Comitatus and Aryan Nations.
We believe that our understanding of the extreme right, as so defined, can be deepened by
the application of a cultic analysis. Most researchers in the field agree that it is what

Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 17
organizations do (e.g., intense activity constant retreats from the outside world the
deception of members a relentless focus on recruitment and raising money) rather than
what they believe that qualifies them to be regarded as cults (Singer &Lalich, 1995). It
would therefore appear that social psychological research which explores group dynamics,
attribution theory, prejudice formation, and stereotyping processes can shed much light on
how extremist belief systems find an organizational expression in high activity groups that
might properly be understood as cults. Hence we may be better positioned to understand
how extremist belief systems often march hand in hand with totalistic forms of organization.
The Armageddon Paradigm
We pay particular attention in this study to what we call ―The Armageddon Paradigm.‖
Originating in the Judeo-Christian tradition, this view has spawned religious cults like the
People‘s Temple (Layton, 1998) the Branch Davidians (Breault and King, 1993), and, most
recently, Aum Shinrikyo (Lifton, 1999). Scores of groups have been identified that adopt
what can be defined as a millennial perspective of imminent doom (see Landes, 2000). All
of them proclaim that The End Time is upon us. This means that most of the world‘s
population will be annihilated, with the exception of the chosen few. On the far left, also,
capitalism is claimed to be in crisis, revolution is imminent, and the elite presently organized
into a vanguard party will soon triumph (see Lalich, 1992 Wohlforth, 1994 and Tourish,
1998, for fuller accounts of this approach). The far right has now adopted its own version of
the Armageddon Paradigm. As Cox (1998) has noted, its cataclysmic reading of the
problems thrown up by modern capitalism can be read as almost Marxist like in their
implications. However, whereas leftists anticipate Armageddon in terms of class insurrection
and warfare, rightists see the End Time in terms of race war, and depict whites (or Aryans)
as the chosen survivors of a racial conflagration.
The Armageddon Paradigm isolates its adherents from the damned mass of humanity, gives
a sense of urgency to their activities, leads to increasing paranoia, and justifies any course
of action its leaders propose. These are fruitful conditions for the emergence of cultic
organizations.
Christian Identity, which forms the theoretical foundation for the approach of many on the
far right, is convinced that Armageddon is imminent, maintains intense suspiciousness
toward all those deemed different, and holds to a belief that a Chosen People have a God-
given role to play in salvaging the world. Survivalism, high levels of activity, internal
gatherings from which outsiders are excluded but in which emotionally charged rituals
reinforce the belief systemthese behaviors, and others, flow naturally from this belief
system. Both the ideology of Christian Identity and the actions to which it gives rise are
immune from the influence of facts, alternative and more credible explanations, and the
possibility of growth and change through experience. A cultic analysis can therefore enrich
our understanding of this important phenomenon.
The Growth of the Right
Within the United States, the politics of hate is currently a major growth industry. According
to the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the Internet housed one hate site at the time of the
Oklahoma bombing in 1995 (Hunt, 1999). By the end of the century, this had risen to 2000.
Some of these were aimed at children under ten. Nor have organizations possessed by
notions of racial superiority merely confined their activities to cyberspace. The Southern
Poverty Law Center has calculated that the total of hate groups within the US is 537, and
growing. Between them, these groups claimed 200,000 members (MSNBC News Release,
1999). The number of neo-Nazi and KKK groups rose by 40% in one year, to 314 (Preston,
1999). Militia groups have also mushroomed, and are reckoned to be active in at least 36
states (Stern, 1996). In passing, it should be noted that the growth of hate is not confined
to the United States. For example, during the late 1990s, Australia saw a large if temporary