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The situation becomes compounded when a group of social scientists who
have been similarly vilified get together and exchange their experiences at
SSSR meetings or elsewhere. In some ways we are doing precisely what
members of a professional body are expected to doexchanging information
and providing a critique of each other‘s work. But one can also recognize the
process whereby we are creating a cozy little support group within which we
collaborate to construct a monolithic image of the ACM, taking insufficient
account of the differences and changes within the movement as we
collectively confirm our prejudices about ―them‖ (but see Bromley and Shupe
1995). Insofar as we respond to the ACM‘s response to us in this way, we are
in danger of ignoring what it has to say that might be of relevance to our
understanding of the NRMs, but also, and more significantly so far as the
topic of this paper is concerned, of actually obstructing ourselves from
acquiring a fuller understanding of how the ACM operates within the cult
scene. (Barker, 1995, p. 307)
The lack of communication between camps and the tendency toward confirmatory bias that
infects us all have fed the untested stereotypes and false assumptions that distort each
camp‘s view of the other camp. Occasionally, the resulting distortions of reality become
silly. At a recent conference (Lalich, personal communication), for example, one prominent
researcher called AFF, the organization that I serve as executive director, a ―hate group.‖
One may disagree with AFF and those associated with the organization, but to call us a
―hate group‖ is ludicrous. An example from the other side of the divide: In 1988, I gave a
paper at an international conference in Barcelona, Spain. During my summary of empirical
research in this field, I offered a few critical comments about Dr. Eileen Barker‘s work.
Several nonscholars in the audience leapt to their feet and screamed at me because, by
deigning even to mention her work, I was giving Dr. Barker credibility that they believed
she didn‘t deserve!
Fortunately, this kind of antipathy seems to have diminished over time, at least for some
people. Perhaps the somewhat cooler emotional climate results from the fact that legal
approaches to the issue proved to be less effective than either side expected.
Conservatorship legislative proposals died in the early 1980s, while deprogramming was
largely supplanted by noncoercive interventions by the end of the 1980s (although
occasional deprogrammings apparently still occur). Hence, sympathizers no longer have to
be concerned about any threat to religious liberty that these two remedial proposals once
posed (in the U.S.A. anyway). Although cult critics won a string of legal victories in the
1980s (mostly damage awards), cult sympathizers, who served as expert witnesses in
defense of cultic groups, crafted strategies (advocacy-oriented strategies, not the objective
academic analyses that these strategies purported to be) that resulted in their winning a
few battles in the 1990s. Although some sympathizers present these victories as ―definitive‖
(see the articles in this issue by Amitrani &Di Marzio), their ―triumph‖ is not what they
sometimes pass it off to be, for cult critics continue to win in some court cases (Martin, Paul
 personal communication).
I think it has become clear that the courts (at least in the U.S.A.) are not going to influence
greatly the fate of cults. Attorneys, for example, discovered that the money actually
obtained from a lawsuit (not the huge judgments that some juries might give) often is not
worth the time, effort, and risks of protracted litigation. Thus, whereas I knew of quite a
number of attorneys who accepted contingency fees for lawsuits against cultic groups in the
1980s, today I know of none. Even cult sympathizers, I suspect, may have begun to realize
that the courts won‘t participate in an assault on religious freedom in the name of curbing
abuses perpetrated by cults. Judges and juries seem to be doing what I believe they ought

Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 60
to do, that is, evaluating each case individually, rather than setting legal precedents
concerning the fuzzy category of ―cult.‖
Reaching Out
As the prominence of the legal battles diminished, it became easier in the United States for
people in the two camps to reach out across the divide. Consequently, during the past few
years dialogue between the two camps has been slowly increasing. In May of 2000, for
example, AFF hosted a meeting of nine critics and sympathizers, who spent a day in candid
discussions of this field. There has been a growing recognition that some of the differences
stem from different foci and value emphases. Unfortunately, because most professionals
and scholars live over-committed lives and lack travel funds, it is difficult to continue and
expand the dialogue between the two ―camps.‖ (This paper constitutes one small attempt
at follow up.)
In a stimulating essay that in part addresses the need for dialogue, sociologist David
Bromley calls the two ―camps‖ the ―mental health coalition‖ and the ―religion coalition‖
(Bromley, in press). Although this terminology is certainly imperfect, I would like to discuss
briefly aspects of Dr. Bromley‘s paper, for I believe it is illuminating, even though I disagree
with its fundamental thesis that the ―debate is not empirical at all, but rather is a political
imbroglio‖ (Bromley, in press, p. 1 – page numbers for Bromley, in press, are from a
prepublication draft) in which ―brainwashing and conversion have been used as symbolic
umbrellas through which to morally advantage and disadvantage certain forms of individual-
group relationships‖ (Bromley, in press, p. 33).
Dr. Bromley proposes that brainwashing and conversion are competing political narratives
used to describe the radical personal change associated with cults, new religious
movements, and other groups:
The scholarly debate is being conducted in terms of ―weak conversion‖ and
―weak brainwashing‖ positions. That is, scholars on both sides tend to explain
individual-group relationships in terms of some combination of personal and
organizational characteristics. In the conversion model, individuals are
depicted as in protest against the dominant social order and the groups
constitute vehicles of social protest. Models of individual-group relationships
that are constructed in terms of role theory, experimentation, alternation, and
conversion careers all reflect this orientation. In the brainwashing model,
individuals are depicted as vulnerable, and the groups constitute
inappropriate exploitive responses to this vulnerability. Models such as
relational disorders, high exit costs, and spiritual abuse exemplify this
perspective. Currently there appears to be consensus on the issue of physical
coercion. Neither coalition will positively sanction behaviors or accounts that
are directly attributable to such coercion.
The two coalitions continue to divide, however, on the key issue of
authorization. As Sarbin (1973:185) notes, relinquishment of one identity
and formation of another is integral to all ―systems of conduct
reorganization.‖ The dispute is over authorization of that process. The mental
health coalition constitutes a threat to the religion coalition in (1) defining
ultimate selfhood in secular terms, which poses a challenge to transcendent
authorization, and (2) asserting the individual right to challenge institutional
claims, including religious claims, in the name of defending selfhood. The
religion coalition presents a threat to the mental health coalition by (1)
asserting a transcendent authorization, which effectively trumps therapeutic
authority, and (2) asserting the individual right to submit to institutional