Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 62
They quarrel, I believe, because they make different judgments about the magnitude and
severity of ethical transgressions and resulting harms related to individuals‘ decisions to
submit to or challenge institutional claims, particularly religious claims. The individual rights
coalition believes that the magnitude and severity of ethical transgressions (and the
psychological, medical, and economic harm that sometimes results from these
transgressions) by groups claiming a transcendent authorization is great enough to warrant
criticism and sometimes private or public remedial responses. The religion coalition believes
that the level of ethical transgressions and harm is sufficiently low as to make the search for
―solutions‖ to an at worst minor problem more dangerous than the reputed problem,
especially when solutions call for state intervention.
The Empirical Heart of the Dispute
Contrary to Dr. Bromley‘s fundamental thesis, then, the issue is at heart empirical. The
fundamental questions driving the dispute are:
1. How much unethical (including illegal) behavior is associated with certain new
groups‘ influence over members, prospective members, and the public?
2. How much and what kinds of harm result from such behaviors?
3. How effective are proposed remedies for limiting transgressions and harm?
4. What kinds and amounts of negative consequences (especially unjustified constraints
on religious freedom), whether intended or not, might result from attempts to limit
transgressions and harm?
Some aspects of these questions could, in theory, be investigated through careful and
extensive scientific study carried out over a long period of time. However, as Dr. Bromley
asserts elsewhere in his paper, ―the investigation of religious movement affiliations is an
empirical thorny thicket that does not easily lend itself to empirical resolution‖ (Bromley, in
press, p. 1 for a critical review of empirical studies in this field see Aronoff, Malinoski, &
Lynn, 2000). This is so because:
1. The dependent variables (unethical behaviors, harm, negative consequences) involve
value judgments about which consensus would be difficult to achieve.
(Disagreement about value-laden concepts, however, doesn‘t make research
impossible, e.g., research on child abuse, emotional abuse of women, social
attractiveness.)
2. Even though psychological case studies and judicial, legislative, and media
investigations have documented many instances of harm and some useful scientific
work has been completed (e.g., Malinoski, Langone, &Lynn, 1998), scientifically
assessing the nature, level, and pervasiveness of harm within the general population
of new movements, or even subcategories of that broad category (e.g., controversial
new movements), would take many years and far more resources than society is
currently willing to commit to this issue.
In the absence of definitive empirical data, members of the two coalitions arrive at different
judgments concerning what, if anything, should be done about the (alleged) problem, their
judgments, in large part, reflecting how much credibility they attribute to the many case
reports, legal or governmental investigations, and scientific studies. The dispute becomes
politicized because too many people in both coalitions act (with regard to the fundamental
questions listed above) as though they know, when in actuality they opine. Because
neither coalition can legitimately claim the unqualified support of science (although both
have triedsee in this issue Amitrani &Di Marzio‘s, 2000, article on the APA and
―brainwashing‖), neither camp can easily persuade even the rational and balanced members
of the other camp to change their opinions about these fundamental questions. (This does

Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 63
not mean, however, that solid research has not been conducted on specific, nonfundamental
questions. Nor does it mean that the investigative methodologies of law and journalism are
not appropriate for some specific questions, e.g., whether or not the leader of a particular
group committed tax-evasion or defrauded members.) Moreover, once individuals have
attributed low credibility to members of the opposite camp, they tend not to read what the
other camp publishes. This, of course, means that false preconceptions and prejudices may
persist for many years, even when there is solid evidence or argument to disprove them.
Unfortunately, those who are most confident that they know, even though they don‘t, may
be most likely to act forcefully and decisively. Extreme elements in both camps, then, may
come to dominate the debate. Moreover, because science and reason can‘t as yet
definitively resolve the debate, people holding different opinions may compete for
institutional power (e.g., government sanction), that is, the debate becomes, as Dr.
Bromley maintains, a ―political imbroglio.‖ The political dispute intensifies when
governmental or legal bodies issue opinions or conclusions, even if on specific cases, that
run counter to one or the other camp‘s view of the general issue, framed by the
fundamental questions listed above. In these situations ideological, i.e., ―political,‖
motivations become most transparent.
Nevertheless, it is vitally important to keep in mind that the political dimension of the
academic dispute does not negate its empirical base. I quote Barker again:
Undifferentiated relativism, as espoused by some of the exponents of
deconstructionism and postmodernism, seems to me to be just plain silly.
The rules of science (even loosely characterized as in this paper) are not
merely a language game they are an assurance of a minimal, albeit limited,
epistemological status. We would be crazy to argue that anything goes 
some things are patently false, and empirical observation can demonstrate
this to anyone with their faculties in good working order. (Barker, 1995, pp.
301-302)
A Way Out of the Political Imbroglio?
I believe that to escape the political imbroglio a large number of key players in each camp
must acknowledge:
1. The existence and ramifications of the political dispute that arises from the issue‘s
resistance to simple and quick scientific resolution.
2. The necessity, especially given the uncertain state of scientific knowledge concerning
foundational issues, to consider a variety of information sources, including testimony
from current and former members of groups, family testimony, mental health
findings, media investigations, data collected through legal actions and government
inquiries, as well as formal scientific data.
3. That under some circumstances some groups can harm some people.
4. That the variety among and within groups on dimensions of harm and manipulation
is enormous.
5. That proposals to ameliorate problems associated with cults must recognize the
fundamental scientific uncertainty of the field.
Let us briefly discuss each of these recommended acknowledgments.
Acknowledge the Implications of Scientific Uncertainty and Political Differences
I agree with Dr. Bromley that ―at the end of the day, both sides are endorsing individual
autonomy, voluntarism, and self-directedness‖ (p. 33) and that ―even to debate the political