Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 64
differences openly rather than through the veil of scientific objectivity would constitute a
measure of progress‖ (p. 33). I do not, however, see the political dispute as the coalitions‘
defending ―alternative sources of authorization and tacitly accept[ing] the different costs
associated with expanded religious or state authorization‖ (p. 33). Dr. Bromley sees the
conflict involving different value preferences I see the conflict involving different judgments
about the empirical reality of ethical transgressions and harms and the consequences of
remedial actions concerning cultic and related groups. Dr. Bromley sees the political dispute
as a natural consequence of the two camps‘ value preferences I see the political dispute as
an understandable, though not inevitable, consequence of the two camps‘ competing for
power and influence in the media, education, medicine, the courts, academia, and
government.
I suspect that some members of each coalition seek in each of these realms the absolute
triumph of their own unproven and uncertain view of empirical reality. Unfortunately, these
people can come to have a disproportionate influence over the decisions of policy makers.
How does this happen? It happens when, as Amitrani and Di Marzio express it in this issue,
these people act more like prosecutors and defense attorneys than scholars or
professionals:
 when they omit important pieces of information (including, but not limited to,
financial and other relationships that might affect their testimony or writing) and/or
slant their presentations in order to engineer a particular response
 when they directly or indirectly use ad hominem attacks as a substitute for rational
or empirical arguments, e.g., the campaign to ―blacklist‖ notions of brainwashing 
Zablocki, 1997)
 when they form or even appear to form alliances with organizations that are widely
perceived to be untrustworthy or dangerous
 when they studiously avoid granting their opponents even a modicum of credibility
for points well taken
 when they studiously avoid mentioning any facts that might be perceived as
weakening their case
 when they distort or, worse, caricature their opponents‘ points of view
 when they substitute slogans for facts
 when they abuse science by ignoring methodological deficiencies of studies that
agree with their opinions and highlighting such deficiencies in studies that arrive at
contrary conclusions
 when they deliberately appeal to emotion instead of reason.
We expect this kind of truth-twisting from attorneys, salesmen, and some others. But we
do not expect it from scholars and professionals ostensibly reporting on their academic
research or professional experience. Obviously, in some settings (e.g., testifying as an
expert witness in a court case) less academic objectivity is expected than in other settings
(e.g., testimony to an official investigative body, publications submitted to academic
journals, interviews granted to journalists). When, however, scholars or professionals
become truth-twisting advocates outside as well as inside the courtroom, their credibility
wanes.
Ironically, eschewing prosecutorial or defense-attorney roles and openly acknowledging the
scientific uncertainty attached to their views would probably magnify the potentially
constructive impact of scholars and professionals testifying to decision-makers. Competent

Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 65
decision-makers are quite capable of formulating strategies appropriate to a climate of
uncertainty, when necessary. They may, for example, focus only on the most extreme
violations of a particular standard or set up mechanisms for further studying the subject
under investigation, or deal with cases on an individual basis. When, however,
academicians, professionals, or activists mislead decision-makers into thinking that there is
more scientific certainty than actually exists, or so annoy them that the decision-makers
discount valid scientific evidence, incorrect and controversial decisions are more likely to
result.
Consider All Information Sources
This recommendation is a corollary of the first. If the state of scientific knowledge is
uncertain, then decision-makers, scholars, and professionals should be open to all sources
of information, not just to scientifically collected data. Testimony of and reports from all
concerned parties should be consideredformer members, current members, families, as
well as journalists, helping professionals, academicians, and others. We should, of course,
remain vigilant about the limitations of the various sources of information, but, given the
lack of conclusive scientific evidence, we should not a priori discount information sources.
It is also unfortunate that many members of each camp are ignorant about what members
of the other camp have written. Dialogue would be enhanced, in my view, if a committee
composed of members from both camps developed a study guide with recommended
readings designed to reduce ignorance of the other side‘s literature.
Acknowledge that Groups May Sometimes Harm Individuals
Common sense seems to dictate that the denial of this proposition flies in the face of even
everyday experience, let alone observations of groups such as Aum Shinrikyo. However, the
climate in this field has become so polarized and politicized that some people appear to be
reluctant to acknowledge this obvious fact, presumably for fear that their opponents will
spin this acknowledgement into something much more extreme than was intended. Sadly,
their reluctance has some foundation in reality. I believe, however, that for the religion
coalition the benefits to be gained by publicly acknowledging this proposition outweigh the
downside. If members of both coalitions agree that groups can harm people, then they must
directly confront what they disagree about, namely, the nature and level of this harm. Such
an acknowledgment highlights the fundamental empirical nature of the dispute, the
scientific uncertainty attached to proffered opinions, and the need for continued study.
Acknowledge that Groups Vary Enormously
As the religion coalition needs to publicly acknowledge that groups can harm individuals, the
individual rights coalition needs to acknowledge that groups vary enormously. Again,
common sense would seem to dictate that this acknowledgment should be easy to make.
Yet some seem to act as though the label attached to groups is the reality rather than the
groups themselves, or as though acknowledging a ―good‖ unorthodox group would
somehow undermine testimony about ―bad‖ groups, or as though acknowledging some
―good‖ in a ―bad‖ group would negate valid criticisms of what is ―bad.‖ As with the
proposition that groups may harm individuals, however, acknowledging the truth of group
variation will in the end prove more productive than twisting the truth. If both coalitions can
publicly agree that some groups harm people and that the population of new groups varies
a great deal, then they must confront together the necessity to develop criteria (preferably
scientific in nature) for assessing these diverse groups and their diverse effects on
individuals. Rather than engaging in a spin contest, as though they were contestants on
CNN‘s Crossfire, the parties might find themselves cooperating to expand scientific
understanding.