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to do, that is, evaluating each case individually, rather than setting legal precedents
concerning the fuzzy category of ―cult.‖
Reaching Out
As the prominence of the legal battles diminished, it became easier in the United States for
people in the two camps to reach out across the divide. Consequently, during the past few
years dialogue between the two camps has been slowly increasing. In May of 2000, for
example, AFF hosted a meeting of nine critics and sympathizers, who spent a day in candid
discussions of this field. There has been a growing recognition that some of the differences
stem from different foci and value emphases. Unfortunately, because most professionals
and scholars live over-committed lives and lack travel funds, it is difficult to continue and
expand the dialogue between the two ―camps.‖ (This paper constitutes one small attempt
at follow up.)
In a stimulating essay that in part addresses the need for dialogue, sociologist David
Bromley calls the two ―camps‖ the ―mental health coalition‖ and the ―religion coalition‖
(Bromley, in press). Although this terminology is certainly imperfect, I would like to discuss
briefly aspects of Dr. Bromley‘s paper, for I believe it is illuminating, even though I disagree
with its fundamental thesis that the ―debate is not empirical at all, but rather is a political
imbroglio‖ (Bromley, in press, p. 1 – page numbers for Bromley, in press, are from a
prepublication draft) in which ―brainwashing and conversion have been used as symbolic
umbrellas through which to morally advantage and disadvantage certain forms of individual-
group relationships‖ (Bromley, in press, p. 33).
Dr. Bromley proposes that brainwashing and conversion are competing political narratives
used to describe the radical personal change associated with cults, new religious
movements, and other groups:
The scholarly debate is being conducted in terms of ―weak conversion‖ and
―weak brainwashing‖ positions. That is, scholars on both sides tend to explain
individual-group relationships in terms of some combination of personal and
organizational characteristics. In the conversion model, individuals are
depicted as in protest against the dominant social order and the groups
constitute vehicles of social protest. Models of individual-group relationships
that are constructed in terms of role theory, experimentation, alternation, and
conversion careers all reflect this orientation. In the brainwashing model,
individuals are depicted as vulnerable, and the groups constitute
inappropriate exploitive responses to this vulnerability. Models such as
relational disorders, high exit costs, and spiritual abuse exemplify this
perspective. Currently there appears to be consensus on the issue of physical
coercion. Neither coalition will positively sanction behaviors or accounts that
are directly attributable to such coercion.
The two coalitions continue to divide, however, on the key issue of
authorization. As Sarbin (1973:185) notes, relinquishment of one identity
and formation of another is integral to all ―systems of conduct
reorganization.‖ The dispute is over authorization of that process. The mental
health coalition constitutes a threat to the religion coalition in (1) defining
ultimate selfhood in secular terms, which poses a challenge to transcendent
authorization, and (2) asserting the individual right to challenge institutional
claims, including religious claims, in the name of defending selfhood. The
religion coalition presents a threat to the mental health coalition by (1)
asserting a transcendent authorization, which effectively trumps therapeutic
authority, and (2) asserting the individual right to submit to institutional

Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 61
claims, particularly religious claims, in the name of expressing selfhood.
(Bromley, in press, pp. 31-32)
The preceding excerpt from Dr. Bromley‘s paper reflects, in my view, the perspective of
many of his colleagues. There are, however, several problems with this perspective. These
problems arise from mischaracterizing the dispute as one involving those with favorable
views of religion (the ―religion coalition‖) and those with implicitly unfavorable views of
religion (the ―mental health coalition‖). In large part, this perspective presumes an obsolete,
Freudian view of mental health, which saw religion as an ―illusion.‖ Much of the criticism of
cultic groups, however, comes from people with strong religious convictions. Moreover, the
conversion-brainwashing dichotomy does not account for concerns about children raised in,
rather than converted to, groups deemed to be abusive. In the final analysis, the criticisms
rest on ethical objections to what some groups do to people, not on psychological
assessments or the presence or absence of ―brainwashing,‖ however that term is defined.
Psychological harm may be an important consequence of the ethical transgressions, but it
usually is not, and in my view ought not be, the ultimate or sole authority for criticism. The
issue, then, is not ―conversion vs. brainwashing,‖ as Dr. Bromley puts it, for ―brainwashing‖
refers to a particular type of conversion (One wouldn‘t speak about a conflict as ―red‖ vs.
―color.‖) in which a person‘s identity change is initiated and/or sustained through unethical
manipulations of a group, manipulations, moreover, that do not necessarily have to reach
the level of ―brainwashing‖ to justify criticism or remedial action.
I agree with Dr. Bromley that the religion coalition (what I have thus far called
―sympathizers‖) defends the ―transcendent authorization‖ claimed by religious
organizations. I believe, however, that what he calls the ―mental health coalition‖ can more
profitably be construed as the ―individual rights coalition,‖ which values individual autonomy
and dignity above the collectivist authority of groups, whether religious, political,
psychotherapeutic, or other. The religion coalition threatens the individual rights coalition
not because it asserts ―a transcendent authorization, which effectively trumps therapeutic
authority,‖ but because the latter sometimes perceives the former as asserting a
transcendent authorization that claims to trump our culture‘s fundamental belief in the
value of individual human rights. To the individual rights coalition, valuing transcendent
authorization over selfhood and individual human rights could ultimately lead to an
acceptance of the more oppressive methods of the Inquisition.
I would expect members of the religion coalition to object--and they would be correct to do
so. In fact, I do not believe that the religion coalition values groups‘ claims of transcendent
authorization over individual human rights. They may, as Dr. Bromley asserts, value claims
of transcendent authorization over therapeutic authority. This, however, is ―shadow-boxing‖
for, as I have said, therapeutic authority isn‘t the core issue ethical propriety is. The
question isn‘t whether or not individuals may submit to a group‘s transcendent claims, but
whether a group uses ethically unacceptable methods to bring about and sustain
submission.
Dr. Bromley contrasts the religion coalition‘s assertion of the individual‘s right to submit to
institutional claims, particularly religious claims, in the name of defending selfhood, with the
individual rights coalition‘s assertion of the individual‘s right to challenge these claims. But
is this really a disagreement or a difference in emphasis? None of my colleagues would
object to an individual‘s right to submit to religious claims, e.g., to take a vow of obedience
in a religious order. Indeed, some of my colleagues have taken such vows. Nor would I
expect any of Dr. Bromley‘s colleagues to object to an individual‘s right to challenge
religious claims. I doubt, for example, that they would defend murder, polygamy, genital
mutilation, child abuse, incest, or slavery simply because a religious groups justifies these
practices through some ―transcendent authorization.‖ Why, then, do they quarrel?