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not mean, however, that solid research has not been conducted on specific, nonfundamental
questions. Nor does it mean that the investigative methodologies of law and journalism are
not appropriate for some specific questions, e.g., whether or not the leader of a particular
group committed tax-evasion or defrauded members.) Moreover, once individuals have
attributed low credibility to members of the opposite camp, they tend not to read what the
other camp publishes. This, of course, means that false preconceptions and prejudices may
persist for many years, even when there is solid evidence or argument to disprove them.
Unfortunately, those who are most confident that they know, even though they don‘t, may
be most likely to act forcefully and decisively. Extreme elements in both camps, then, may
come to dominate the debate. Moreover, because science and reason can‘t as yet
definitively resolve the debate, people holding different opinions may compete for
institutional power (e.g., government sanction), that is, the debate becomes, as Dr.
Bromley maintains, a ―political imbroglio.‖ The political dispute intensifies when
governmental or legal bodies issue opinions or conclusions, even if on specific cases, that
run counter to one or the other camp‘s view of the general issue, framed by the
fundamental questions listed above. In these situations ideological, i.e., ―political,‖
motivations become most transparent.
Nevertheless, it is vitally important to keep in mind that the political dimension of the
academic dispute does not negate its empirical base. I quote Barker again:
Undifferentiated relativism, as espoused by some of the exponents of
deconstructionism and postmodernism, seems to me to be just plain silly.
The rules of science (even loosely characterized as in this paper) are not
merely a language game they are an assurance of a minimal, albeit limited,
epistemological status. We would be crazy to argue that anything goes 
some things are patently false, and empirical observation can demonstrate
this to anyone with their faculties in good working order. (Barker, 1995, pp.
301-302)
A Way Out of the Political Imbroglio?
I believe that to escape the political imbroglio a large number of key players in each camp
must acknowledge:
1. The existence and ramifications of the political dispute that arises from the issue‘s
resistance to simple and quick scientific resolution.
2. The necessity, especially given the uncertain state of scientific knowledge concerning
foundational issues, to consider a variety of information sources, including testimony
from current and former members of groups, family testimony, mental health
findings, media investigations, data collected through legal actions and government
inquiries, as well as formal scientific data.
3. That under some circumstances some groups can harm some people.
4. That the variety among and within groups on dimensions of harm and manipulation
is enormous.
5. That proposals to ameliorate problems associated with cults must recognize the
fundamental scientific uncertainty of the field.
Let us briefly discuss each of these recommended acknowledgments.
Acknowledge the Implications of Scientific Uncertainty and Political Differences
I agree with Dr. Bromley that ―at the end of the day, both sides are endorsing individual
autonomy, voluntarism, and self-directedness‖ (p. 33) and that ―even to debate the political

Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 64
differences openly rather than through the veil of scientific objectivity would constitute a
measure of progress‖ (p. 33). I do not, however, see the political dispute as the coalitions‘
defending ―alternative sources of authorization and tacitly accept[ing] the different costs
associated with expanded religious or state authorization‖ (p. 33). Dr. Bromley sees the
conflict involving different value preferences I see the conflict involving different judgments
about the empirical reality of ethical transgressions and harms and the consequences of
remedial actions concerning cultic and related groups. Dr. Bromley sees the political dispute
as a natural consequence of the two camps‘ value preferences I see the political dispute as
an understandable, though not inevitable, consequence of the two camps‘ competing for
power and influence in the media, education, medicine, the courts, academia, and
government.
I suspect that some members of each coalition seek in each of these realms the absolute
triumph of their own unproven and uncertain view of empirical reality. Unfortunately, these
people can come to have a disproportionate influence over the decisions of policy makers.
How does this happen? It happens when, as Amitrani and Di Marzio express it in this issue,
these people act more like prosecutors and defense attorneys than scholars or
professionals:
 when they omit important pieces of information (including, but not limited to,
financial and other relationships that might affect their testimony or writing) and/or
slant their presentations in order to engineer a particular response
 when they directly or indirectly use ad hominem attacks as a substitute for rational
or empirical arguments, e.g., the campaign to ―blacklist‖ notions of brainwashing 
Zablocki, 1997)
 when they form or even appear to form alliances with organizations that are widely
perceived to be untrustworthy or dangerous
 when they studiously avoid granting their opponents even a modicum of credibility
for points well taken
 when they studiously avoid mentioning any facts that might be perceived as
weakening their case
 when they distort or, worse, caricature their opponents‘ points of view
 when they substitute slogans for facts
 when they abuse science by ignoring methodological deficiencies of studies that
agree with their opinions and highlighting such deficiencies in studies that arrive at
contrary conclusions
 when they deliberately appeal to emotion instead of reason.
We expect this kind of truth-twisting from attorneys, salesmen, and some others. But we
do not expect it from scholars and professionals ostensibly reporting on their academic
research or professional experience. Obviously, in some settings (e.g., testifying as an
expert witness in a court case) less academic objectivity is expected than in other settings
(e.g., testimony to an official investigative body, publications submitted to academic
journals, interviews granted to journalists). When, however, scholars or professionals
become truth-twisting advocates outside as well as inside the courtroom, their credibility
wanes.
Ironically, eschewing prosecutorial or defense-attorney roles and openly acknowledging the
scientific uncertainty attached to their views would probably magnify the potentially
constructive impact of scholars and professionals testifying to decision-makers. Competent