Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 58
[Bromley and Shupe‘s] notion of coercion doesn‘t go much further than the
use of torture and threats of violence, so it is rare that anyone ever is guilty
of unjustified manipulation of human behavior. They construct a straw man
argument which they attribute to the critics of the cults that is easily refuted.
For unwarranted coercion to exist, one would seem to need to develop a
metallic sheen, walk with a gimp, smile on cue, and not exhibit fear of death.
Under their subtle touch, brainwashing appears literally as a washed-out
cranium with wind whistling through the brain cavity. Short of physical
violence, they presume that ―free will‖ is operating intact…Throughout the
book, they systematically doubt the assertions made by parents and ex-cult
members about their experiences (unless the statements are sufficiently
outrageous and then they are allowed to stand), since these parties have a
vested interest in rewriting history. This scrupulous caution doesn‘t extend to
the current cult members‘ statements about the camaraderie, idealism, moral
vision, and purpose of their lives. (Schuller, 1983, pp. 9-11)
The widespread and long-standing caricature of brainwashing promulgated in sociological
and religious studies circles resulted in what some believe was a ―blacklisting‖ of
brainwashing theory in some academic journals (Zablocki, 1997). Although personal
communications indicate that some sympathizers have backed away from the relentless
dissemination of brainwashing caricatures and have acknowledged the difference between
what they call ―robot theory‖ and ―social influence approaches,‖ I still await persuasive
evidence that even a sizeable minority of professionals or scholars subscribe to the ―robot
theory‖ of ―brainwashing‖ (although I don‘t doubt that a few professionals may hold
undiscerning positions on the subject).
Lowering the Heat
During the 1980s the definitional and conceptual confusion that marred the field, especially
with regard to ―brainwashing,‖ was exacerbated when scholars and professionals appeared
as expert witnesses  on both sides of the legal conflicts  in at least several dozen court
cases (See ABA Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law, 1995 Van Hoey, 1991).
Suspicions between the two camps grew and communication across the ―divide‖ virtually
stopped, in part because of fears about how lawyers and journalists might exploit and/or
distort what was said to those who might not support one‘s position. Barker (1995), in a
presidential address to the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, makes a candid
comment about the sympathizer camp, a comment that with minor changes could be
applied to the critics‘ camp:
If we are to be honest and self-critical, we have to admit that several of us
have reacted against the selective negativity of the ACM by, sometimes quite
unconsciously, making our own unbalanced selections. Having been affronted
by what have appeared to be gross violations of human rights perpetrated
through practices such as deprogramming and the medicalization of belief,
there have been occasions when social scientists have withheld information
about the movements because they know that this will be taken, possibly out
of context, to be used as a justification for such actions. The somewhat
paradoxical situation is that the more we feel the NRMs are having untrue bad
things said about them, the less inclined we are to publish true ―bad‖ things
about the movements. (Barker, 1995, p. 305)
The tendency to which Dr. Barker refers magnifies as participants in each camp seek
collegial support when attacked by members of the other camp. Again, Barker is eloquently
candid on the subject, and her remarks could easily apply to the critics‘ camp with minor
changes:

Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 59
The situation becomes compounded when a group of social scientists who
have been similarly vilified get together and exchange their experiences at
SSSR meetings or elsewhere. In some ways we are doing precisely what
members of a professional body are expected to doexchanging information
and providing a critique of each other‘s work. But one can also recognize the
process whereby we are creating a cozy little support group within which we
collaborate to construct a monolithic image of the ACM, taking insufficient
account of the differences and changes within the movement as we
collectively confirm our prejudices about ―them‖ (but see Bromley and Shupe
1995). Insofar as we respond to the ACM‘s response to us in this way, we are
in danger of ignoring what it has to say that might be of relevance to our
understanding of the NRMs, but also, and more significantly so far as the
topic of this paper is concerned, of actually obstructing ourselves from
acquiring a fuller understanding of how the ACM operates within the cult
scene. (Barker, 1995, p. 307)
The lack of communication between camps and the tendency toward confirmatory bias that
infects us all have fed the untested stereotypes and false assumptions that distort each
camp‘s view of the other camp. Occasionally, the resulting distortions of reality become
silly. At a recent conference (Lalich, personal communication), for example, one prominent
researcher called AFF, the organization that I serve as executive director, a ―hate group.‖
One may disagree with AFF and those associated with the organization, but to call us a
―hate group‖ is ludicrous. An example from the other side of the divide: In 1988, I gave a
paper at an international conference in Barcelona, Spain. During my summary of empirical
research in this field, I offered a few critical comments about Dr. Eileen Barker‘s work.
Several nonscholars in the audience leapt to their feet and screamed at me because, by
deigning even to mention her work, I was giving Dr. Barker credibility that they believed
she didn‘t deserve!
Fortunately, this kind of antipathy seems to have diminished over time, at least for some
people. Perhaps the somewhat cooler emotional climate results from the fact that legal
approaches to the issue proved to be less effective than either side expected.
Conservatorship legislative proposals died in the early 1980s, while deprogramming was
largely supplanted by noncoercive interventions by the end of the 1980s (although
occasional deprogrammings apparently still occur). Hence, sympathizers no longer have to
be concerned about any threat to religious liberty that these two remedial proposals once
posed (in the U.S.A. anyway). Although cult critics won a string of legal victories in the
1980s (mostly damage awards), cult sympathizers, who served as expert witnesses in
defense of cultic groups, crafted strategies (advocacy-oriented strategies, not the objective
academic analyses that these strategies purported to be) that resulted in their winning a
few battles in the 1990s. Although some sympathizers present these victories as ―definitive‖
(see the articles in this issue by Amitrani &Di Marzio), their ―triumph‖ is not what they
sometimes pass it off to be, for cult critics continue to win in some court cases (Martin, Paul
 personal communication).
I think it has become clear that the courts (at least in the U.S.A.) are not going to influence
greatly the fate of cults. Attorneys, for example, discovered that the money actually
obtained from a lawsuit (not the huge judgments that some juries might give) often is not
worth the time, effort, and risks of protracted litigation. Thus, whereas I knew of quite a
number of attorneys who accepted contingency fees for lawsuits against cultic groups in the
1980s, today I know of none. Even cult sympathizers, I suspect, may have begun to realize
that the courts won‘t participate in an assault on religious freedom in the name of curbing
abuses perpetrated by cults. Judges and juries seem to be doing what I believe they ought