Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 57
and in the person, a view that was nothing like the sensationalized ―brainwashing‖ stories
that circulated in the popular press at that time (although many media stories were
responsible and balanced.).
We hasten to add, however, that our argument should not be construed as
condemning all cults and cult-like organizations as unhealthy. Different
groups present different settingssome harmful, some benign, others
perhaps constructive,  to potential converts, each of whom in turn presents
a unique personality sometimes healthy, sometimes troubled, always more or
less vulnerable  to the proselytizers with whom he comes into contact.
(Clark et al., 1981, p. 6)
Some of us ―floated‖ alternatives to the terms that most dominated the media, that is,
―cult‖ and ―brainwashing.‖ John Clark, and I were fond of the term, ―unethical social
influence.‖ Margaret Singer for a while spoke about SMPSI, the systematic manipulation of
psychological and social influence. Some people suggested the use of ―high intensity
groups‖ or ―high control groups‖ as an alternative to ―cult‖ and ―mind control‖ as an
alternative to ―brainwashing.‖ Although ―mind control‖ achieved a measure of acceptance in
public discourse and became the preferred term of some activists in this field, the press
liked ―cult‖ and, to a lesser extent, ―brainwashing.‖ Alternative terms languished. By the
mid-1980s most of us gave in to popular usage and learned to make the best of ―cult‖ and
―brainwashing,‖ trying, when we could, to communicate more subtlety  than these terms
typically conveyed. (See Rosedale &Langone, 1998, for a discussion of definitional issues.)
Sympathizers and the “ACM”
Despite the variety of views within the critical community, academic sympathizers (mainly
sociologists) did not conduct empirical surveys of professionals or activists in the so-called
ACM. To understand the ―ACM‖ they relied on theories that emphasized the social
construction of phenomena such as deviance or evil (e.g., Bromley &Shupe, 1981), rather
than the evaluation of the objective nature of the phenomenon under study. This theoretical
orientation led to their writing about such notions as ―atrocity tales‖ (Bromley, Shupe, &
Ventimiglia, 1979) to characterize the negative reports of former group members, who were
dubbed ―apostates‖ and distinguished from ―defectors,‖ who did not produce negative
reports. Although, strictly speaking, these terms may not have been intended to be value
judgments or statistical generalizations about the truth claims of critics (Bromley, 1998),
they clearly came to be perceived as suchin both camps. Sympathizers tended to discount
the negative reports of ex-members and critics, attributing them to social indoctrination
processes of the so-called ACM (Lewis &Bromley, 1987). Critics viewed the propagation of
the notion of ―atrocity tales‖ as academic obfuscation, designed to whitewash realities that,
as with other social issues, were indeed ―bad,‖ not mere ―constructions‖ imposed on social
groups by other social groups. (The Nuremberg trials, for example, explored real evil, not
mere social constructions of evil.) Critics sometimes concluded that sympathizers used such
notions to hide their true agenda of protecting cultic groups. Sympathizers, for example
seemed to accept uncritically the positive reports of current members, whose accounts they
did not tag with derogatory labels, such as ―benevolence tales,‖ or ―personal growth tales.‖
Only the critical reports of ex-members were called ―tales,‖ a term that clearly implies
falsehood or fiction. Not until 1996 did a researcher actually conduct an empirical study to
assess the extent to which so-called ―atrocity tales‖ might be based on fact (Zablocki,
1996).
Sympathizers also presented the ―brainwashing model‖ in such simplified terms that their
descriptions could be called a caricature of ―brainwashing.‖ A review of Strange Gods: The
Great American Cult Scare includes a telling critique of this caricature:

Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 58
[Bromley and Shupe‘s] notion of coercion doesn‘t go much further than the
use of torture and threats of violence, so it is rare that anyone ever is guilty
of unjustified manipulation of human behavior. They construct a straw man
argument which they attribute to the critics of the cults that is easily refuted.
For unwarranted coercion to exist, one would seem to need to develop a
metallic sheen, walk with a gimp, smile on cue, and not exhibit fear of death.
Under their subtle touch, brainwashing appears literally as a washed-out
cranium with wind whistling through the brain cavity. Short of physical
violence, they presume that ―free will‖ is operating intact…Throughout the
book, they systematically doubt the assertions made by parents and ex-cult
members about their experiences (unless the statements are sufficiently
outrageous and then they are allowed to stand), since these parties have a
vested interest in rewriting history. This scrupulous caution doesn‘t extend to
the current cult members‘ statements about the camaraderie, idealism, moral
vision, and purpose of their lives. (Schuller, 1983, pp. 9-11)
The widespread and long-standing caricature of brainwashing promulgated in sociological
and religious studies circles resulted in what some believe was a ―blacklisting‖ of
brainwashing theory in some academic journals (Zablocki, 1997). Although personal
communications indicate that some sympathizers have backed away from the relentless
dissemination of brainwashing caricatures and have acknowledged the difference between
what they call ―robot theory‖ and ―social influence approaches,‖ I still await persuasive
evidence that even a sizeable minority of professionals or scholars subscribe to the ―robot
theory‖ of ―brainwashing‖ (although I don‘t doubt that a few professionals may hold
undiscerning positions on the subject).
Lowering the Heat
During the 1980s the definitional and conceptual confusion that marred the field, especially
with regard to ―brainwashing,‖ was exacerbated when scholars and professionals appeared
as expert witnesses  on both sides of the legal conflicts  in at least several dozen court
cases (See ABA Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law, 1995 Van Hoey, 1991).
Suspicions between the two camps grew and communication across the ―divide‖ virtually
stopped, in part because of fears about how lawyers and journalists might exploit and/or
distort what was said to those who might not support one‘s position. Barker (1995), in a
presidential address to the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, makes a candid
comment about the sympathizer camp, a comment that with minor changes could be
applied to the critics‘ camp:
If we are to be honest and self-critical, we have to admit that several of us
have reacted against the selective negativity of the ACM by, sometimes quite
unconsciously, making our own unbalanced selections. Having been affronted
by what have appeared to be gross violations of human rights perpetrated
through practices such as deprogramming and the medicalization of belief,
there have been occasions when social scientists have withheld information
about the movements because they know that this will be taken, possibly out
of context, to be used as a justification for such actions. The somewhat
paradoxical situation is that the more we feel the NRMs are having untrue bad
things said about them, the less inclined we are to publish true ―bad‖ things
about the movements. (Barker, 1995, p. 305)
The tendency to which Dr. Barker refers magnifies as participants in each camp seek
collegial support when attacked by members of the other camp. Again, Barker is eloquently
candid on the subject, and her remarks could easily apply to the critics‘ camp with minor
changes: