Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1992, Page 24
process in order to verify and cross-check information. It was common practice, particularly in
the early years, to ask a recruit to vouch for a friend, to state that to the best of his or her
knowledge the friend in question was not an agent of the state.
This stage of being investigated immediately set up an unequal relation-ship between the
recruit and the recruiters. The scrutiny was very one-sided. It was supposed to be enough of
an honor to be considered for membership in this elite group. It was very uncool to want to
know too much it was implied that older, more experienced women were calling the shots,
making the decisions. They knew best how to protect the organization in such risky times.
Usually any apprehension was relieved only because each recruit usually had at least one
friend who was already a member or who was being recruited at the same time. One former
member described it like this:
I started thinking to myself that this was all pretty weird and I probably would not
have joined but for the fact that I knew that two of my best friends were going
through the same investigation and were expecting and hoping to join. Since they
were both mature and level-headed individuals whom I respected, I thought it must
be all right and worth a try. Not to forget that at the same time I was being treated
with a lot of favor: I was praised in meetings for my great presentations I was held
up as someone who came from the working class, got a college education, and was
about to give up easy living for the life of a dedicated political activist I was told that
they wanted me to lead study groups because I caught on so quickly. For me, the
words of praise overshadowed my inner doubts and fears.
The intensified degree of security consciousness during this process was not seen as extreme
or unnecessary by most new recruits. Rather, it was taken as an indication of the group’s
seriousness and cautious concern, generating a feeling that both the individual recruit and the
entire group were and would be well cared for. The widespread use of government and police
surveillance, including COINTELPRO (the FBI’s Counter-Intelligence Program), was common
knowledge to the type of person being recruited. If not, recruiters were certain to educate the
naive recruit. As Elizabeth Wheaton (1987) points out in her book on the Communist Workers
Party (another New Communist Movement group that existed in the same era as the WDU),
COINTELPRO was a household word among the radical Left.
From its inception in 1956 to 1976, when Congress imposed restraints on the FBI’s
domestic political surveillance, COINTELPRO used informants, undercover agents, and
provocateurs to disrupt organizations ranging from the nonviolent American Friends
Service Committee and Southern Christian Leadership Conference to militant
extremists of the Black Panthers, Weatherman, the Klans, and American Nazis. ...
Although the full extent of the FBI’s infiltration and provocation of radical groups
was not revealed until the mid-1970s, leftists in particular were acutely aware of the
tactics federal and local law enforcement agencies were using to disrupt their
organizing efforts. Many who witnessed this government interference in lawful
organizing efforts concluded that social change could no longer be accomplished
through traditional political means. Revolution, they felt, was the only solution. (p.
12)
With the use of such evidence and capitalizing on the prevailing atmosphere of paranoia, WDU
leadership was able to rationalize the institution of the most convoluted and extreme forms of
security rules and regulations. These served a variety of purposes:
--to keep members from talking amongst themselves about taboo topics (such as real
names, personal or political histories, locations of party facilities, what went on at
meetings)
process in order to verify and cross-check information. It was common practice, particularly in
the early years, to ask a recruit to vouch for a friend, to state that to the best of his or her
knowledge the friend in question was not an agent of the state.
This stage of being investigated immediately set up an unequal relation-ship between the
recruit and the recruiters. The scrutiny was very one-sided. It was supposed to be enough of
an honor to be considered for membership in this elite group. It was very uncool to want to
know too much it was implied that older, more experienced women were calling the shots,
making the decisions. They knew best how to protect the organization in such risky times.
Usually any apprehension was relieved only because each recruit usually had at least one
friend who was already a member or who was being recruited at the same time. One former
member described it like this:
I started thinking to myself that this was all pretty weird and I probably would not
have joined but for the fact that I knew that two of my best friends were going
through the same investigation and were expecting and hoping to join. Since they
were both mature and level-headed individuals whom I respected, I thought it must
be all right and worth a try. Not to forget that at the same time I was being treated
with a lot of favor: I was praised in meetings for my great presentations I was held
up as someone who came from the working class, got a college education, and was
about to give up easy living for the life of a dedicated political activist I was told that
they wanted me to lead study groups because I caught on so quickly. For me, the
words of praise overshadowed my inner doubts and fears.
The intensified degree of security consciousness during this process was not seen as extreme
or unnecessary by most new recruits. Rather, it was taken as an indication of the group’s
seriousness and cautious concern, generating a feeling that both the individual recruit and the
entire group were and would be well cared for. The widespread use of government and police
surveillance, including COINTELPRO (the FBI’s Counter-Intelligence Program), was common
knowledge to the type of person being recruited. If not, recruiters were certain to educate the
naive recruit. As Elizabeth Wheaton (1987) points out in her book on the Communist Workers
Party (another New Communist Movement group that existed in the same era as the WDU),
COINTELPRO was a household word among the radical Left.
From its inception in 1956 to 1976, when Congress imposed restraints on the FBI’s
domestic political surveillance, COINTELPRO used informants, undercover agents, and
provocateurs to disrupt organizations ranging from the nonviolent American Friends
Service Committee and Southern Christian Leadership Conference to militant
extremists of the Black Panthers, Weatherman, the Klans, and American Nazis. ...
Although the full extent of the FBI’s infiltration and provocation of radical groups
was not revealed until the mid-1970s, leftists in particular were acutely aware of the
tactics federal and local law enforcement agencies were using to disrupt their
organizing efforts. Many who witnessed this government interference in lawful
organizing efforts concluded that social change could no longer be accomplished
through traditional political means. Revolution, they felt, was the only solution. (p.
12)
With the use of such evidence and capitalizing on the prevailing atmosphere of paranoia, WDU
leadership was able to rationalize the institution of the most convoluted and extreme forms of
security rules and regulations. These served a variety of purposes:
--to keep members from talking amongst themselves about taboo topics (such as real
names, personal or political histories, locations of party facilities, what went on at
meetings)
