Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2009, Page 42
step by step from being a terrorist-political organization into being a cult, with no checks and balances
for the leadership.
[12] Abrishamchii, First Lieutenant of Rajavi, in his speech about ideological revolution, emphasized: ―As
it was mentioned in the political bureau communiqué, all those below the ideological leader are
conditioned to their immediate masoul (superior or person in charge). But Masoud Rajavi, at the top of
the organization, is conditioned to whom or answerable to whom? Nobody but God. And Maryam as
co-leader has no superior but God, as well as Masoud Rajavi. MEK‘s published speech of Abrishamchii,
about ideological revolution, pp. 47, 48.
[13] ―Al Qaeda operates globally and independently of states. They take state support when they can
get it, but they are not manipulated directly by states, and that makes them particularly dangerous. Al
Qaeda is less like a state and more like an NGO [non-government organization] with multiple
independent franchises. Its terrorists can strike—whether in Bali, Casablanca, Riyadh, Istanbul,
Madrid, or New York and Washington—without the direct support of states. These franchises are likely
to survive the death of its ―corporate parent.‖ Al Qaeda is no longer a regular terrorist organization
that can be defeated by killing or capturing its leader it is a global insurgency that spreads
revolutionary fervour throughout the Muslim world. We can target its operatives, but its ideas and
inspiration are ultimately far more dangerous. Bruce Hoffman has identified four different types of al
Qaeda operatives.‖ (Excerpted from Hoffman, ―The Leadership Secrets of Osama Bin Laden.‖) This has
been cited from ‗Dying to Kill by Mia Bloom But the whole article can be found in
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200304/hoffman Bruce Hoffman is the director of the Rand
Corporation's Washington, D.C., office and the author of Inside Terrorism (1999).
These four types of operatives include ―1) Professional cadres. The most dedicated element of al
Qaeda. Teams are carefully selected, provided with specific instructions, and generously funded. 2)
Trained amateurs. For example, Ahmed Ressam, arrested in December 1999 at Port Angeles,
Washington after entering the United States from Canada with explosive materials in the trunk of his
car. Ressam had some background in terrorism.... Unlike the professional cadres, however, Ressam
was given only open-ended instructions.... 3) Local walk-ins, independent Islamic radicals who come
up with terrorist-attack ideas on their own and then attempt to obtain funding from al Qaeda.... 4)
Like-minded guerrillas and terrorists. This group embraces existing insurgent or terrorist groups that
have benefited over the years from either Bin Laden‘s largesse or his spiritual guidance that have
received al Qaeda training in Afghanistan or elsewhere or that the organization has provided with
arms, material, and other assistance in order to further the cause of global Jihad.‖ (Cited from Dying
to Kill by Mia Bloom, pp. 187, 188.)
[14] ―The essential feature of this new terrorism is its privatisation. It is financed through charitable
foundations, or by wealthy individuals such as Arab businessmen in the Gulf, by the drug trade (opium
in Al Qaeda‘s case), the extortion of funds from shopkeepers and businessmen, the illegal sale of
cigarettes or other goods in Western countries (as in the United States), or by taking Westerners
hostage.‖ (The Abu Sayaf group in the Philippines specialises in taking tourists hostage.) (From Farhad
Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers, p. 163.)
[15] MEK‘s message to students on the opening day of schools after the summer holiday of 1981 was
this: ‖This year‘s first lesson is Resistance,‖ and the MEK asked students to prioritise resistance, and
choose joining armed pickets over their education (MEK‘s publication Nashrieh, October 9, 1981).
[16] ―Ernst Becker in Denial of Death writes: ‗It is not death that man fears the most, it is death without
some sense of personal significance.‘ Starr in Feet of Clay writes: ‗The dying Keats, in despair at the
lack of recognition accorded him by his countrymen, desired that his name should be left off his
tombstone and only these words engraved upon it: ―Here lies one whose name was writ in water.‖ If
so wonderfully gifted a poet as Keats could thus express his disillusion, what is it possible for the
ordinary person to say about himself? ‗I lived, I died, I know not why. I shall not be remembered.‘
Therefore, dying for a cause by itself can create great incentive for terrorists and suicide bombers on
top of that some terrorist organizations promise assent to heaven to their disciples as well. ‗Sacrifice
and risk—when employed on behalf of the group—become valuable virtues, rewarded by social status.
Thus, the culture … transforms individual risk and loss into group status and benefit, ultimately cycling
that status back onto the individual. The higher the risk, the higher the status.‘‖ (From Argo, ‗Banality
of Evil,‘ in Dying to Kill, C-153, p. 87.)
step by step from being a terrorist-political organization into being a cult, with no checks and balances
for the leadership.
[12] Abrishamchii, First Lieutenant of Rajavi, in his speech about ideological revolution, emphasized: ―As
it was mentioned in the political bureau communiqué, all those below the ideological leader are
conditioned to their immediate masoul (superior or person in charge). But Masoud Rajavi, at the top of
the organization, is conditioned to whom or answerable to whom? Nobody but God. And Maryam as
co-leader has no superior but God, as well as Masoud Rajavi. MEK‘s published speech of Abrishamchii,
about ideological revolution, pp. 47, 48.
[13] ―Al Qaeda operates globally and independently of states. They take state support when they can
get it, but they are not manipulated directly by states, and that makes them particularly dangerous. Al
Qaeda is less like a state and more like an NGO [non-government organization] with multiple
independent franchises. Its terrorists can strike—whether in Bali, Casablanca, Riyadh, Istanbul,
Madrid, or New York and Washington—without the direct support of states. These franchises are likely
to survive the death of its ―corporate parent.‖ Al Qaeda is no longer a regular terrorist organization
that can be defeated by killing or capturing its leader it is a global insurgency that spreads
revolutionary fervour throughout the Muslim world. We can target its operatives, but its ideas and
inspiration are ultimately far more dangerous. Bruce Hoffman has identified four different types of al
Qaeda operatives.‖ (Excerpted from Hoffman, ―The Leadership Secrets of Osama Bin Laden.‖) This has
been cited from ‗Dying to Kill by Mia Bloom But the whole article can be found in
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200304/hoffman Bruce Hoffman is the director of the Rand
Corporation's Washington, D.C., office and the author of Inside Terrorism (1999).
These four types of operatives include ―1) Professional cadres. The most dedicated element of al
Qaeda. Teams are carefully selected, provided with specific instructions, and generously funded. 2)
Trained amateurs. For example, Ahmed Ressam, arrested in December 1999 at Port Angeles,
Washington after entering the United States from Canada with explosive materials in the trunk of his
car. Ressam had some background in terrorism.... Unlike the professional cadres, however, Ressam
was given only open-ended instructions.... 3) Local walk-ins, independent Islamic radicals who come
up with terrorist-attack ideas on their own and then attempt to obtain funding from al Qaeda.... 4)
Like-minded guerrillas and terrorists. This group embraces existing insurgent or terrorist groups that
have benefited over the years from either Bin Laden‘s largesse or his spiritual guidance that have
received al Qaeda training in Afghanistan or elsewhere or that the organization has provided with
arms, material, and other assistance in order to further the cause of global Jihad.‖ (Cited from Dying
to Kill by Mia Bloom, pp. 187, 188.)
[14] ―The essential feature of this new terrorism is its privatisation. It is financed through charitable
foundations, or by wealthy individuals such as Arab businessmen in the Gulf, by the drug trade (opium
in Al Qaeda‘s case), the extortion of funds from shopkeepers and businessmen, the illegal sale of
cigarettes or other goods in Western countries (as in the United States), or by taking Westerners
hostage.‖ (The Abu Sayaf group in the Philippines specialises in taking tourists hostage.) (From Farhad
Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers, p. 163.)
[15] MEK‘s message to students on the opening day of schools after the summer holiday of 1981 was
this: ‖This year‘s first lesson is Resistance,‖ and the MEK asked students to prioritise resistance, and
choose joining armed pickets over their education (MEK‘s publication Nashrieh, October 9, 1981).
[16] ―Ernst Becker in Denial of Death writes: ‗It is not death that man fears the most, it is death without
some sense of personal significance.‘ Starr in Feet of Clay writes: ‗The dying Keats, in despair at the
lack of recognition accorded him by his countrymen, desired that his name should be left off his
tombstone and only these words engraved upon it: ―Here lies one whose name was writ in water.‖ If
so wonderfully gifted a poet as Keats could thus express his disillusion, what is it possible for the
ordinary person to say about himself? ‗I lived, I died, I know not why. I shall not be remembered.‘
Therefore, dying for a cause by itself can create great incentive for terrorists and suicide bombers on
top of that some terrorist organizations promise assent to heaven to their disciples as well. ‗Sacrifice
and risk—when employed on behalf of the group—become valuable virtues, rewarded by social status.
Thus, the culture … transforms individual risk and loss into group status and benefit, ultimately cycling
that status back onto the individual. The higher the risk, the higher the status.‘‖ (From Argo, ‗Banality
of Evil,‘ in Dying to Kill, C-153, p. 87.)
