Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 27
grow even more convinced that our musings have some basis in fact. The more people who
share an opinion with us, the more convinced we become that it must be accurate, an
entirely vacuous reasoning process known as consensual validation (Zebrowitz, 1990).
In the world of the far right all these processes can be seen at work. Gossip and rumor are
rife. Furthermore, real evidence is irrelevant. Every event is interpreted as proof of the
underlying conspiratorial theory, whatever the facts actually suggest. When ideas are
liberated from the constraints of evidence-based argument in this manner, unsubstantiated
gossip becomes the mainstay of human conversation. Furthermore, internal gatherings on
the far right (in common with those of most cult organizations) exclude dissenters. This
ensures that True Believers constantly share bogus stories that have one redeeming
featurethey are all consistent with the belief system. Self-persuasion is thus rampant.
Furthermore, the spectacle is one of many people agreeing with each other. Consensual
validation takes root. By these means, the weed of conformity is watered thrice daily and
bathed in perpetual sunshine.
The conspiracy theories ardently promoted by the Christian Identity movement encourage
rampant social categorization. The attribution process then becomes a means of assigning
predictable intentions and dispositions to large numbers of people. True Believers no longer
need to know precisely what other people really think, believe, and intend to do. It is
sufficient to know which category they belong to. In the process, all political life is
conceptualized as nothing more than the orderly working out of whatever theory the cult‘s
worldview has ordained as ―the truth.‖ Evidence and further analysis is irrelevant. What
remains is the need for organization, total unanimity around a few simplistic but compelling
myths, hyperactivity, and the frantic quest for wider political influence.
Conclusion and Implications
Increasingly, the incitement promulgated by Identity theologians is enacted on the streets.
Between 1991 and 1995 there were 4046 pipe bomb incidents in the US (Stern, 1996).
Members of Aryan Nations have been accused of murder, conducting armored car robberies,
and staging over 20 bank robberies to finance a white supremacist revolution (Preston,
1999). A far right organization known as The Order staged two major robberies in the
1980s, netting over $4 million, and was implicated in the 1984 murder of the Jewish talk
show host, Alan Berg (Cox, 1998). The Order‘s founder, killed in a shoot out with the FBI,
expressed his belief system in a letter written shortly before his demise, that clearly echoes
the concerns of the Christian Identity movement. He feared that his son would grow up to
―be a stranger in his own land, a blond-haired, blue-eyed Aryan in a country populated
mainly by Mexicans, mulattoes, blacks and Asians‖ (Ridgeway, 1990, p.96).
As we have seen, supremacist organizations and cults thrive on a diet of Armageddon, of
imminent End Times, of a final confrontation between the races. If they alone adhered to
such a perspective then their influence would undoubtedly remain limited. However,
apocalyptic visions of the future are widely held in American society. A recent survey found
that 59% of American adults feared that the world would come to an end (Dyer, 1998).
Twelve percent of those surveyed believed it would happen within the next few years. It is
of course true that the influence of the far right is severely limited by its designation of
many potential supporters as out-groups, and its consequent fragmentation (Bruce, 1995).
Nevertheless, a lot of people, when they think of the future, tremble in fear. The
propagandists of hate play daily with matches in a room packed with explosives.
In addition, we have attempted to suggest that many of the psychological dynamics that
underlie prejudice formation (e.g., uncertainty reduction, stereotyping, expectancy effects)
are not limited to members of hate groups. Rather, they are practiced to a greater or lesser
extent by most of us. For this reason, explanations of right wing activism that focus solely
on personality seem unsatisfactory. Moreover, it enables us to engage in stereotyping

Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 28
ourselves, while deploring its consequences in others―we‖ belong to the civilized majority,
while barbarian right wing fanatics stand as a solid phalanx on the other side of the
barricades. So deeply entrenched are many individuals' concepts of the right (in the form of
archetypes) that it is in fact certain stereotyping occurs in the course of this paper.
However, if it is true that much right wing activism emanates from tendencies towards
stereotyping in which we all engage, it suggests that the propaganda of far right groups
could provoke a wider echo, under certain conditions. Even if such an echo falls short of
majority support, and even if it proves a temporary aberration, it could still be sufficient to
inflict significant damage on the political process. The upsurge of support for One Nation in
Australia, now halted, is one warning of this possibility.
Furthermore, the theology of Christian Identity may evoke an opposite but equally powerful
reaction from many of those it stigmatizes. Suffering is not ennobling and does not create a
monopoly of virtue. A variety of attitude measurements taken in the past have shown that
Jewish students who felt themselves the victims of prejudice were more rather than less
likely to display anti-Negro sentiments. Catholic students who were surveyed and felt that
they had been victimized ranked higher on tests of both anti-Semitism and anti-Negro
prejudice than those who did not. (These studies are discussed in detail by Young-Bruehl,
1996, p.53). Those at the receiving end of prejudice themselves feel frustration, and in turn
direct this against other minority groups. A spiral of social disintegration can be set in
motion, in which a fragmented society turns in on itself, allowing all sorts of bizarre cults to
seize this time as their time and impose a separatist agenda on our society. In the heat of
the night, white supremacist movements may yet find real phantoms stepping out of the
shadows to greet them.
Not all supremacist organizations are cults. Some do not meet the most commonly agreed
criteria for cultic organizations that are familiar to readers of this journal (See Langone,
1993, pp. 2-5). However, they do possess what we would describe as a cultic mindset. In
some cases, the forms of organization adopted on the far right lag slightly behind the
mentality of their members. Thus, as outlined at the beginning of this paper, cults are best
viewed on a continuum. As we have argued here, some ideologies are particularly liable to
activate the process of cultic formation.
Our primary concern has been with Christian Identity. David Neiwert has accurately
described its belief system as
so far astray from those of mainstream Christianity --and so repellant to
average Americans -that they induce in the religion‘s followers a cult-like
closed mind-set: a sense of persecution coupled with self-righteousness.
(Cited by Knickerbocker, 1999, p.2)
For those fired by the passions of prejudice, Posse Comitatus, Aryan Nations, and the other
groups on the supremacist right offer the certainty of absolute conviction. They tantalize
with a feast of simple answers to complex problems. Above all, at long last, there will be
someone to blame. In the eyes of many, some answerany answeris better than none.
By comparison, most mainstream politicians seem incapable of offering solutions. The
simple certainties of the far right often appear a welcome refuge from the torrent of change
engulfing the outside world. Just how many people have been inspired in this way is a moot
point. However, Rosemary Ruether, a professor of applied theology, estimates that about
50,000 people call themselves Identity Christians (Cited by Knickerbocker, 1999, p.2). This
is not an insignificant force. As Cox (1998) argues, we should not underestimate what is a
heavily armed and often dangerous force, nor underestimate its ability to exploit anxieties
rampant in the wider society. For example, a key precursor of the modern militia movement
is the Ku Klux Klan. Its efforts are commonly credited with securing the election of
governors in Georgia, Alabama, California, Indiana, and Oregon in the 1920s (Miller, 1958).