Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 119
18. Li Hongzhi. China Falun Gong Chapter V ―Questions and Answers‖ 19 of 34
19. Li Hongzhi. China Falun Gong. Chapter V ―Questions and Answers‖ 5 of 34
20. Li Hongzhi China Falun Gong Chapter V ―Questions and Answers‖ 6 of 34
21. XiaoYing Zhang, ―I Determined to be a Little True Disciple of Master Li‖
www.falundafa.org/eng./children accessed 4 Aug. 1999. Note: Some of these early articles
may no longer be available on the Falun Gong Web site.
22. Cathy Ashfield, ―Never Too Small To Practice Falun Dafa.‖
www.falundafa.org/eng./children/never_too_small.html accessed 4 Aug. 1999.
23. ―A Letter to Secretary General Kofi Anan of United Nations from Practitioners in Henan, China.‖
―Some practitioners from Nanyang, Henan Province‖ 11 Nov. 1999.
http://minghui.ca/eng/voice/letter_to_annan_ henan.html accessed 13 Nov. 1999.
24. Barend ter Haar made this comment regarding a posting to H-Asia by Patsy Rahn. ―H-Asia
Threads. Patsy Rahn, UCLA, USA. `The significance of recognition.‘ Date Posted: Fri, 19 Nov
1999.‖ Barend ter Haar's Falun Gong Web site at Leiden University
http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/bth/falunhasia. html#Contents.
25. Matthew Kutolowski ―A Letter to Editor of the Wall Street Journal.‖ 4 Nov 1999.
http://minghui.ca/eng/clarification/letter_to_wsj110499.html accessed 2 Feb. 2000.
26. Keith Orton, Chief International Specialist, 24 Feb 2000 Keith.Orton@ci.seattle.wa.us
―Proclamation &Falun Gong‖ email (24 Feb. 2000).
27. ―Maryland apologizes for honoring Falun Gong leader.‖ China Daily 3 Dec. 1999.
28. While I think that many people in the Chinese government and general public agree with this
criticism of the Falun Gong, they also appear to be critical of the government's handling of the
situation as heavy-handed. see ―The Controversy about the Falun Gong: What Do Chinese People
Think?‖ A survey by the Voices of Chinese www.voicesofchinese.org/falun/ surveyrpt.shtml.
accessed 29 Mar. 2000. This report was based on 1064 valid email responses by well-educated
Chinese who are living overseas. 21% said they were Falun Gong practitioners, 68% said they
were not FLG practitioners, and 11% did not say. Some results of the survey showed: Opinions
about Li Hongzhi were more negative than opinions about Falun Gong as a practice. 59% said Li
was an imposter, and 55% said Li's works were ―fallacious‖. Of the non-practitioners, 95% said Li
was an imposter. 64% of the total group agreed that Falun Gong was ―anti-scientific‖. Of the FLG
practitioners, more than 90% said they felt positive about all aspects of Falun Gong. Of the total
group, 62% said FLG was banned because of the government's concern over its ―political
influence‖ (and some said this concern ―wasn't necessarily a bad thing‖) -50% said the
government's actions were inappropriate -and 43% said the government violated human rights.
29. For analysis of conditions in China see: Elizabeth Perry, ―Reinventing the Wheel? The Campaign
against the Falun Gong.‖ Harvard China Review (Spring/Summer 2000) 68-71. Received via email
(Feb. 2000) Also: Jacque deLisle, ―Who‘s afraid of Falun Gong?‖ Asia Times 10 Aug.1999.
30. Michael Langone, ―Clinical Updates on Cults.‖ Psychiatric Times (July1996) 14-18 suggests that
there are ten factors which make for a receptive environment to cults. A case could be made that
all of these conditions apply to the current situation in China. The factors are:
1. a high level of stress or dissatisfaction
2. lack of self-confidence
3. unassertiveness
4. gullibility
5. desire to belong to a group
6. low tolerance of ambiguity
7. naïve idealism
8. cultural disillusionment
9. frustrated spiritual searching
10. susceptibility to trance-like states
31. Southern Weekend Guangzhou, China, quoted in Seth Faison ,New York Times, 17 August 1999
―If it's a Comic Book Why Is Nobody Laughing?‖ ―We are familiar with the cult of personality
created by Li Hongzhi and Falun Gong and Li's claim to be a savior ...This is the legacy of the
Cultural Revolution, as the `savior' kind of idolatry fabricated by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing and their
ilk are deep-rooted in the hearts of the Chinese people.‖ Also: Sima Nan, a lecturer in China who
tries to dispel the superstitious side of qi gong teachings, stated that ―The devotion to Rotating the
Law Wheel (Zhuan Falun) is exactly `how Mao's Little Red Book was used in the Cultural
Revolution'―.

Cultic Studies Journal, Volume 17, 2000, Page 120
32. See: Jacques deLisle ―Who's afraid of Falun Gong?‖ Asia Times 10 August 1999. Several people,
including Jacques deLisle of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and professor of law at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, point out that the Communist Party came to power as a
populist organization, with much of its legitimacy based on its support of the masses, particularly
the peasantry. deLisle suggests that Falun Gong may be more ―disconcerting‖ to the CCP than the
pro-democracy dissidents, since pro-democracy movement tended to be students and ―educated
elites‖ while the Falun Gong shows appeal to the ―urban mass base‖ as well as those in
government positions.
33. See: ―Syncretic Sects and Secret Societies: Revival in the 1980s‖ Chinese Sociology and
Anthropology 21, no.4 (Summer 1989) ed. and trans. Robin Munro. For a more recent discussion
of qigong groups as a form of civil society see Evelyne Micollier, ―Qigong groups and Civil Society
in P.R.China.‖ IIAS Newsletter 22 June 2000.
34. This is particularly important in China for several reasons: 1) being ―scientific‖ is a major part of
Marxist, Leninist, Mao Zedong Thought. 2) China is sensitive to being seen as ―backward‖ or
―superstitious‖ and prefers to be seen as modern and scientific. 3) China is trying to educate its
public and modernize itself to be a leading figure in the international world order. Having major
portions of the population believing in ―feudal superstition‖ is seen as detrimental, both internally
and externally. For an excellent article on the issue of superstition and religion in China, see
Stephan Feuchtwang and Wang Ming Ming: ―The Politics of Culture or a Contest of Histories:
Representation of Chinese Popular Religion‖ Dialectical Anthropology 16 no. 3-4 (1991).
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank David Rapoport, professor emeritus of Political Science, UCLA, for
aiding me in gaining full library research access and for his overall support. I also wish to
thank Barend ter Haar for his support and early discussions on this topic, and for his
generous spirit.
An earlier version of this paper was presented to the American Family Foundation Annual
Conference in Seattle, Washington, April 28, 2000.
Patsy Rahn is studying modern and classical Chinese at UCLA in preparation to enter a
graduate program in Chinese studies. She has two book reviews forthcoming in Nova
Religio and is writing a second paper on the Chinese government and the Falun Gong: ―The
Alchemy of a Conflict: The Chinese Government and the Falun Gong.‖
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