Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1998, page 17
many post-reform statutes lack terms that pertain to acquaintance rape) Beverly Balos &Mary
Louise Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Nonstranger Rape, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 599, 601-02
(1991) (advocating common law doctrine of confidential relationship based upon trust should
apply to nonstranger rape thereby assisting rather than hindering prosecution) Lani A. Remick,
Comment, Read Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. Pa. L Rev.
1103 (1993) (advocating for affirmative verbal consent standards).
66. See, e.g. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9A.44.010(7) (West. Supp. 1998) (defining “consent” as “at
the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact there are actual words or conduct
indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”) WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 1996) (defining “consent” as words or overt actions by a person who is
competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual
intercourse or sexual contact.”). See generally Cairney, supra note 65, at 317 (advocating against
affirmative consent statutes and in favor of affirmative nonconsent standards).
67. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(1) (1995 &Supp. 1997).
The Utah statute provides: “An act of sexual intercourse, rape attempted rape, rape of a child … is
without consent of the victim under any of the following circumstances: (1) the victim expresses
lack of consent through words or conduct….” id.
68. See Cairney, supra note 675, at 314.
69. See id. at 303.
70. See Response to Rape, supra note 6, at 79-83. For example, in the fall of 1996, Deputy Chief of
Sex Crimes Unit for the Manhattan District Attorney, Lisa Friel, lectured on the new rape laws in a
“Women and the Law” class held at The New School for Social Research in New York, NY. AFF
President, Herbert Rosedale, also presented and the author moderated.
71. VAWA Symposium, supra note 9 at 429 see Eric Slater, What’s Worse: Killing Rabbit or Beating
Girlfriend? Court: Alleged Assault or Woman Could Cost Man $1,000 Fine, But Strangling Her
Bunny Could Bring a Penalty of $20,000, L.A. Times, June 28, 1995 at B1 (pointing out the
dichotomy between the penalties of beating and choking a girlfriend and receiving a $1,000 fine,
as opposed to doing the same act to a pet rabbit but receiving a $20,000 fine).
72. See NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
DATA COLLECTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, 13-
14, 17 (July 1996). It is difficult to collect data on domestic violence offenses because any violent
act may be considered domestic violence if an intimate relationship exists between the offender
and the victim. On the other hand, sexual violence is usually defined more narrowly as a crime
that is determined by a specifically prohibited sexually-related act taken by a perpetrator against
another person.
73. See Joyce Klemperer, Programs for Battered Women – What Works?, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 1171, 1192
(1995).
74. See VAWA supra, note 1.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 VAWA provides civil rights for women, creating the first civil rights
remedy for violence. This statute protects “the civil rights of victims of gender motivated
violence,” 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a), and provides, “[a]ll persons within the United States shall have
the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender….” 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
76. See 42 U.S.C § 13931.
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 13951.
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 13042.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 13991.
80. See VAWA, 18 U.S.C. § 2265. Protection orders are defined as injunctions or other orders by
courts issued for the purpose of preventing “violent or threatening acts or harassment against, or
contact or communication with ior physical proximity to, another person …” 18 U.S.C. § 2266. For
a discussion of protection orders, see Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate
Enforcement of Protection Orders Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 Fam. L.Q.
253, 254-55 (Summer 1995) (“Without full faith and credit statutes, a state only has the power to
protect victims of domestic violence within its boundaries, limiting the protection afforded to
victims if they are forced to move or flee to another state.”).
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (b).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (a)(1).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (a)(2).
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261(b)
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1)
many post-reform statutes lack terms that pertain to acquaintance rape) Beverly Balos &Mary
Louise Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Nonstranger Rape, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 599, 601-02
(1991) (advocating common law doctrine of confidential relationship based upon trust should
apply to nonstranger rape thereby assisting rather than hindering prosecution) Lani A. Remick,
Comment, Read Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. Pa. L Rev.
1103 (1993) (advocating for affirmative verbal consent standards).
66. See, e.g. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9A.44.010(7) (West. Supp. 1998) (defining “consent” as “at
the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact there are actual words or conduct
indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”) WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 1996) (defining “consent” as words or overt actions by a person who is
competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual
intercourse or sexual contact.”). See generally Cairney, supra note 65, at 317 (advocating against
affirmative consent statutes and in favor of affirmative nonconsent standards).
67. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(1) (1995 &Supp. 1997).
The Utah statute provides: “An act of sexual intercourse, rape attempted rape, rape of a child … is
without consent of the victim under any of the following circumstances: (1) the victim expresses
lack of consent through words or conduct….” id.
68. See Cairney, supra note 675, at 314.
69. See id. at 303.
70. See Response to Rape, supra note 6, at 79-83. For example, in the fall of 1996, Deputy Chief of
Sex Crimes Unit for the Manhattan District Attorney, Lisa Friel, lectured on the new rape laws in a
“Women and the Law” class held at The New School for Social Research in New York, NY. AFF
President, Herbert Rosedale, also presented and the author moderated.
71. VAWA Symposium, supra note 9 at 429 see Eric Slater, What’s Worse: Killing Rabbit or Beating
Girlfriend? Court: Alleged Assault or Woman Could Cost Man $1,000 Fine, But Strangling Her
Bunny Could Bring a Penalty of $20,000, L.A. Times, June 28, 1995 at B1 (pointing out the
dichotomy between the penalties of beating and choking a girlfriend and receiving a $1,000 fine,
as opposed to doing the same act to a pet rabbit but receiving a $20,000 fine).
72. See NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
DATA COLLECTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, 13-
14, 17 (July 1996). It is difficult to collect data on domestic violence offenses because any violent
act may be considered domestic violence if an intimate relationship exists between the offender
and the victim. On the other hand, sexual violence is usually defined more narrowly as a crime
that is determined by a specifically prohibited sexually-related act taken by a perpetrator against
another person.
73. See Joyce Klemperer, Programs for Battered Women – What Works?, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 1171, 1192
(1995).
74. See VAWA supra, note 1.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 VAWA provides civil rights for women, creating the first civil rights
remedy for violence. This statute protects “the civil rights of victims of gender motivated
violence,” 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a), and provides, “[a]ll persons within the United States shall have
the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender….” 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
76. See 42 U.S.C § 13931.
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 13951.
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 13042.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 13991.
80. See VAWA, 18 U.S.C. § 2265. Protection orders are defined as injunctions or other orders by
courts issued for the purpose of preventing “violent or threatening acts or harassment against, or
contact or communication with ior physical proximity to, another person …” 18 U.S.C. § 2266. For
a discussion of protection orders, see Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate
Enforcement of Protection Orders Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 Fam. L.Q.
253, 254-55 (Summer 1995) (“Without full faith and credit statutes, a state only has the power to
protect victims of domestic violence within its boundaries, limiting the protection afforded to
victims if they are forced to move or flee to another state.”).
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (b).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (a)(1).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (a)(2).
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261(b)
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1)
