Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1998, page 15
5. See generally MARGARET THALER SINGER, CULTS IN OUR MIDST: THE HIDDEN MENACE IN OUR
EVERYDAY LIVES 88-89 (1995) (“Cults are abusive and destructive to varying degrees.”).
6. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, NCJ148064, THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO RAPE (1994) [hereinafter “Response to
Rape”] (providing a detailed summary of the states‟ reformed rape laws).
7. Id. at 1.
8. See id. at 7.
9. See id. At 9 Symposium, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: A Promise Waiting to be
Fulfilled, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: Legislative History, Policy
Implications &Litigation Strategy, 4 J.L. &Pol‟y 371, 429 n.6 (1995) [hereinafter “VAWA
Symposium”] (providing a comprehensive listing of state laws).
10. See N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW § 60.42 (Mckinney 1992).
11. See Response to Rape, supra note 6, at 9
12. See BEVERLY BALOS &MARY LOUISE FELLOWS, LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON SYSTEMS OF OPPRESSION 456-60 nn. 1-3 (1994) (suggesting that
inadequacies in law school teaching have led to rape shield laws lacking protection for
complainants.)
13. See Response to Rape, supra note 6, at 10 KATHERINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW 520-25
(1993) (provides history and summary of marital rape laws) Patricia Searles and Ronald J.
Berger, The Current Status of Rape Reform Legislation: An Examination of State Statutes, 10
Women‟s Rts. L. Rep. 25 (1987) (providing a survey of state rape laws).
14. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503 &39-13-507 (providing that spousal rape is only a
class C felony, whereas “rape” is one of class B) (1997).
15. See, e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 (1997) see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 21, § 1111 B.
(West 1983 &Supp. 1998) (defining rape as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a
male or female who is the spouse of the perpetrator if force or violence is used or threatened”).
16. See State v. Haines, 51 La. Ann. 731, 732, 25 So. 372, 273 (1899) The court held: “For if [the
husband] were the one who forcibly and against her consent performed the sexual act upon her,
there was and could be no rape. This is so, because the husband of a woman cannot himself be
guilty of an actual rape upon his wife, on account of the matrimonial consent which she has given,
and which she cannot retract.” ld.
17. See Response to Rape, supra note 6, at 45-47.
18. See id. at 53-58.
19. See id. at 27-39.
20. Id. at 1.
21. See id.
22. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 29 (1987) (footnotes mitted) (emphasis in the original) (providing a
detailed discussion of the crime of rape and the relevant laws) see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95
Yale L.J. 1087 (1986) (discussing rape laws).
23. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). In Michael M., the
United States Supreme Court held that California‟s statute, which defined statutory rape as
“sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female
is under the age of 18 years,” did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The equal protection clause challenge was based upon “making men alone” criminally
liable for the sexual act. The court based its reasoning upon the policy of preventing teenage
pregnancy. Critics complain of the distinction in Michael M. that a 17-year-old boy was liable for
intercourse with a girl one year younger, and that generally statutory rape laws rely upon the
premise that “young girls are too easily coerced to effectively consent to sex.” See Michelle
Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 15, 41 (1994).
24. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25(2) (McKinney 1998). The New York statute provides: “A person is
guilty of rape in the third degree when:
2) Being twenty-one years old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another
person to whom the actor is not married less than seventeen years old.” ld.
25. See State v. Martinez, No. L-95-009, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5091 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1995).
26. See State v. Glover, No. CA85-12-106, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3345 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15,
1988).
27. Lack of consent is an element that the prosecution needs to prove at trial. An example of a typical
state penal law of “lack of consent” for sex offense is found in the New York state:
5. See generally MARGARET THALER SINGER, CULTS IN OUR MIDST: THE HIDDEN MENACE IN OUR
EVERYDAY LIVES 88-89 (1995) (“Cults are abusive and destructive to varying degrees.”).
6. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, NCJ148064, THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO RAPE (1994) [hereinafter “Response to
Rape”] (providing a detailed summary of the states‟ reformed rape laws).
7. Id. at 1.
8. See id. at 7.
9. See id. At 9 Symposium, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: A Promise Waiting to be
Fulfilled, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: Legislative History, Policy
Implications &Litigation Strategy, 4 J.L. &Pol‟y 371, 429 n.6 (1995) [hereinafter “VAWA
Symposium”] (providing a comprehensive listing of state laws).
10. See N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW § 60.42 (Mckinney 1992).
11. See Response to Rape, supra note 6, at 9
12. See BEVERLY BALOS &MARY LOUISE FELLOWS, LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON SYSTEMS OF OPPRESSION 456-60 nn. 1-3 (1994) (suggesting that
inadequacies in law school teaching have led to rape shield laws lacking protection for
complainants.)
13. See Response to Rape, supra note 6, at 10 KATHERINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW 520-25
(1993) (provides history and summary of marital rape laws) Patricia Searles and Ronald J.
Berger, The Current Status of Rape Reform Legislation: An Examination of State Statutes, 10
Women‟s Rts. L. Rep. 25 (1987) (providing a survey of state rape laws).
14. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503 &39-13-507 (providing that spousal rape is only a
class C felony, whereas “rape” is one of class B) (1997).
15. See, e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 (1997) see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 21, § 1111 B.
(West 1983 &Supp. 1998) (defining rape as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a
male or female who is the spouse of the perpetrator if force or violence is used or threatened”).
16. See State v. Haines, 51 La. Ann. 731, 732, 25 So. 372, 273 (1899) The court held: “For if [the
husband] were the one who forcibly and against her consent performed the sexual act upon her,
there was and could be no rape. This is so, because the husband of a woman cannot himself be
guilty of an actual rape upon his wife, on account of the matrimonial consent which she has given,
and which she cannot retract.” ld.
17. See Response to Rape, supra note 6, at 45-47.
18. See id. at 53-58.
19. See id. at 27-39.
20. Id. at 1.
21. See id.
22. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 29 (1987) (footnotes mitted) (emphasis in the original) (providing a
detailed discussion of the crime of rape and the relevant laws) see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95
Yale L.J. 1087 (1986) (discussing rape laws).
23. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). In Michael M., the
United States Supreme Court held that California‟s statute, which defined statutory rape as
“sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female
is under the age of 18 years,” did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The equal protection clause challenge was based upon “making men alone” criminally
liable for the sexual act. The court based its reasoning upon the policy of preventing teenage
pregnancy. Critics complain of the distinction in Michael M. that a 17-year-old boy was liable for
intercourse with a girl one year younger, and that generally statutory rape laws rely upon the
premise that “young girls are too easily coerced to effectively consent to sex.” See Michelle
Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 15, 41 (1994).
24. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25(2) (McKinney 1998). The New York statute provides: “A person is
guilty of rape in the third degree when:
2) Being twenty-one years old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another
person to whom the actor is not married less than seventeen years old.” ld.
25. See State v. Martinez, No. L-95-009, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5091 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1995).
26. See State v. Glover, No. CA85-12-106, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3345 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15,
1988).
27. Lack of consent is an element that the prosecution needs to prove at trial. An example of a typical
state penal law of “lack of consent” for sex offense is found in the New York state:
