Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2003, Page 70
evidence that humans lived in a civilized state tens or hundreds of millions of years ago (pp.
240-241). There are other examples of pseudo-historical views propounded merely to
support political or ideological conclusions.
Do these unexpressed biases in evaluations of factual material sound familiar? And what
about the motivation? Schermer and Grobman discuss a number of motivations unearthed
in their analyses of the backgrounds of Holocaust deniers, including anti-Semitism, a
―germanophile‖ view of history, and religious zealotry associated with the Aryan Identity
movement. Indeed, the authors maintain that a primary reason for the acceptance of such
ideologically dependent views of history and the rejection of contrary views is the
proponent‘s commitment to ―religion to anchor the belief system in a meaningful and
significant history of faith‖ in support of which a useful lie might be accepted for the sake of
the greater good.
The authors discuss one of the most commonly used techniques of Holocaust deniers,
namely, ―that these revisionists rarely say anything definitive about their own position and
instead attack their opponents‘ weak spots or mistakes…they find errors made by scholars
and historians and exploit these as if all historians‘ conclusions are wrong…they quote
usually out of context leading mainstream figures to buttress their own position…they
consciously turn debates on scholars on specific issues into debate of veracity of the entire
field…and they focus on what is not known and ignore what is known, carefully selecting
data to fit and ignoring data that do not fit their preconceived ideas‖ (p. 103).
I‘m confident that cult critics can relate to this description of the means used to avoid
genuine debate about issues such as the existence of undue influence or mind control, the
harm cult zealots cause, and the need to balance freedom of religion with the rights of
individuals to assert and carry out their own beliefs and not to impinge on others‘ freedom
and well being.
It may be that there are common dynamics influencing Holocaust deniers and certain
scholars who seem never to see in new religious movements anything warranting criticism.
Or it may be that, as Carl Popper suggested many years ago, the biases so blatantly
demonstrated in these two fields reflect the influence that beliefs and backgrounds can have
on the conclusions of all scientists. Hence, when we hear or read attacks on cult critics, we
should pause and consider the personal biases and motivations that may drive the attacker
so that we may disentangle what might be legitimate criticism from the distortions produced
by ideological or other motives.
evidence that humans lived in a civilized state tens or hundreds of millions of years ago (pp.
240-241). There are other examples of pseudo-historical views propounded merely to
support political or ideological conclusions.
Do these unexpressed biases in evaluations of factual material sound familiar? And what
about the motivation? Schermer and Grobman discuss a number of motivations unearthed
in their analyses of the backgrounds of Holocaust deniers, including anti-Semitism, a
―germanophile‖ view of history, and religious zealotry associated with the Aryan Identity
movement. Indeed, the authors maintain that a primary reason for the acceptance of such
ideologically dependent views of history and the rejection of contrary views is the
proponent‘s commitment to ―religion to anchor the belief system in a meaningful and
significant history of faith‖ in support of which a useful lie might be accepted for the sake of
the greater good.
The authors discuss one of the most commonly used techniques of Holocaust deniers,
namely, ―that these revisionists rarely say anything definitive about their own position and
instead attack their opponents‘ weak spots or mistakes…they find errors made by scholars
and historians and exploit these as if all historians‘ conclusions are wrong…they quote
usually out of context leading mainstream figures to buttress their own position…they
consciously turn debates on scholars on specific issues into debate of veracity of the entire
field…and they focus on what is not known and ignore what is known, carefully selecting
data to fit and ignoring data that do not fit their preconceived ideas‖ (p. 103).
I‘m confident that cult critics can relate to this description of the means used to avoid
genuine debate about issues such as the existence of undue influence or mind control, the
harm cult zealots cause, and the need to balance freedom of religion with the rights of
individuals to assert and carry out their own beliefs and not to impinge on others‘ freedom
and well being.
It may be that there are common dynamics influencing Holocaust deniers and certain
scholars who seem never to see in new religious movements anything warranting criticism.
Or it may be that, as Carl Popper suggested many years ago, the biases so blatantly
demonstrated in these two fields reflect the influence that beliefs and backgrounds can have
on the conclusions of all scientists. Hence, when we hear or read attacks on cult critics, we
should pause and consider the personal biases and motivations that may drive the attacker
so that we may disentangle what might be legitimate criticism from the distortions produced
by ideological or other motives.
