80 International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 3, 2012
then beating the critical reader to the punch in
condemning them.
Theissen is most concerned to challenge those
who condemn all proselytizing as immoral and
always wrong. This is especially true of liberals
like my fellow-Lutheran, Martin Marty
Theissen cites Marty as condemning
evangelization for violating the ethical mandate
of a pluralistic society that demands mutually
respectful tolerance as the moral imperative
among peoples of different beliefs and practices,
and thus substituting dialog for efforts to
convert.
Much later, the author identifies the fact that
many countries legally condemn proselytizing
he cites a 2009 Pew Forum on Religion and
Public Life study, which reported that 70 per
cent of the world’s population lives in 64 nations
that impose high restrictions on religion.
Although his research identifies a number of
proposed ethical codes for evangelism, he deals
with none of them in detail but chooses to focus
the reader’s attention instead on his own 15
criteria for the moral and ethical practice of
proselytizing: dignity, care, physical coercion,
psychological coercion, social coercion,
inducement, rationality, truthfulness, humility,
tolerance, motivation, identity, cultural
sensitivity, results, and the Golden Rule.
A thorough review of the literature on the ethics
of evangelism is one of the greatest strengths of
Theissen’s work, even if it frequently leaves him
disappointed at the meager results. The review
produced 20 pages of bibliography totaling some
380 publications, including a number by
Michael Langone and 13 other authors
associated with the ICSA and its predecessor
organizations.
Regarding my inquiry about Theissen’s
awareness and treatment of the cults and ICSA, I
was initially pleased, three pages into the
Preface, to find evidence of cooperation between
the author and ICSA about cults. Among four
publications the author cited to be quoted later
with permission was a 2006 Cultic Studies
Review article, “The Problems and Possibilities
of Defining Precise Criteria to Distinguish
Between Ethical and Unethical
Proselytizing/Evangelism.”
My initial warm feelings about Theissen, cults,
and the ICSA turned quite cool when, among 24
related references by my count, the next
significant statement came in a chapter that dealt
with various forms of religious coercion:
So much for the charge of coercion
against the cults. More generally, I
would suggest that critics of
proselytizing are playing fast and loose
with the notion of coercion. It is this
kind of elasticity in meaning and non-
specificity in its applicability that makes
Young and Griffith reject coercive
persuasion as a useful way to distinguish
between moral and immoral methods of
proselytizing (1992). Further, the
language used in making the charge of
coercion against proselytizing is
invariably strident and exaggerated.
(page 87)
I began to wonder whether the good Dr.
Theissen has ever experienced firsthand, in a
personal encounter, a cult victim, the victim’s
family, and their story. The next significant
interaction regarding coercion comes on page
157, where we read,
More has been written on this topic in
relation to what are often identified as
cults, or new religious movements.
However as I already explained in
chapters 1 and 4, we should not expect
too much by way of help from this
corner in distinguishing between ethical
and unethical proselytizing.
Then he refers us to Appendix 2 (page 248),
where he continues to discount research
associated with ICSA even further:
Clearly, scholarly opinion still remains
divided on identifying what is
objectionable in the cults (Young and
Griffith, 1992, 96). This is one reason
why [sic] I have avoided getting too
preoccupied with this cult literature and
with this dispute regarding the cults.
There are other reasons for doing so.
Much of the literature on the cults is not
that useful for my purposes as it lacks
the conceptual precision philosophers
then beating the critical reader to the punch in
condemning them.
Theissen is most concerned to challenge those
who condemn all proselytizing as immoral and
always wrong. This is especially true of liberals
like my fellow-Lutheran, Martin Marty
Theissen cites Marty as condemning
evangelization for violating the ethical mandate
of a pluralistic society that demands mutually
respectful tolerance as the moral imperative
among peoples of different beliefs and practices,
and thus substituting dialog for efforts to
convert.
Much later, the author identifies the fact that
many countries legally condemn proselytizing
he cites a 2009 Pew Forum on Religion and
Public Life study, which reported that 70 per
cent of the world’s population lives in 64 nations
that impose high restrictions on religion.
Although his research identifies a number of
proposed ethical codes for evangelism, he deals
with none of them in detail but chooses to focus
the reader’s attention instead on his own 15
criteria for the moral and ethical practice of
proselytizing: dignity, care, physical coercion,
psychological coercion, social coercion,
inducement, rationality, truthfulness, humility,
tolerance, motivation, identity, cultural
sensitivity, results, and the Golden Rule.
A thorough review of the literature on the ethics
of evangelism is one of the greatest strengths of
Theissen’s work, even if it frequently leaves him
disappointed at the meager results. The review
produced 20 pages of bibliography totaling some
380 publications, including a number by
Michael Langone and 13 other authors
associated with the ICSA and its predecessor
organizations.
Regarding my inquiry about Theissen’s
awareness and treatment of the cults and ICSA, I
was initially pleased, three pages into the
Preface, to find evidence of cooperation between
the author and ICSA about cults. Among four
publications the author cited to be quoted later
with permission was a 2006 Cultic Studies
Review article, “The Problems and Possibilities
of Defining Precise Criteria to Distinguish
Between Ethical and Unethical
Proselytizing/Evangelism.”
My initial warm feelings about Theissen, cults,
and the ICSA turned quite cool when, among 24
related references by my count, the next
significant statement came in a chapter that dealt
with various forms of religious coercion:
So much for the charge of coercion
against the cults. More generally, I
would suggest that critics of
proselytizing are playing fast and loose
with the notion of coercion. It is this
kind of elasticity in meaning and non-
specificity in its applicability that makes
Young and Griffith reject coercive
persuasion as a useful way to distinguish
between moral and immoral methods of
proselytizing (1992). Further, the
language used in making the charge of
coercion against proselytizing is
invariably strident and exaggerated.
(page 87)
I began to wonder whether the good Dr.
Theissen has ever experienced firsthand, in a
personal encounter, a cult victim, the victim’s
family, and their story. The next significant
interaction regarding coercion comes on page
157, where we read,
More has been written on this topic in
relation to what are often identified as
cults, or new religious movements.
However as I already explained in
chapters 1 and 4, we should not expect
too much by way of help from this
corner in distinguishing between ethical
and unethical proselytizing.
Then he refers us to Appendix 2 (page 248),
where he continues to discount research
associated with ICSA even further:
Clearly, scholarly opinion still remains
divided on identifying what is
objectionable in the cults (Young and
Griffith, 1992, 96). This is one reason
why [sic] I have avoided getting too
preoccupied with this cult literature and
with this dispute regarding the cults.
There are other reasons for doing so.
Much of the literature on the cults is not
that useful for my purposes as it lacks
the conceptual precision philosophers
