International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 8, 2017 57
of argument, assume that exit interventions are a
substantial burden on a person’s exercise of
religion. Then the government must show that
(a) exit interventions are in furtherance of a
compelling government interest, and (b) they are
the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling government interest.
171F
172 In this
scenario, the state has a compelling interest in
the health of its citizens.
172F
173 As seen in previous
comments, the use of thought reform can result
in irreparable physical and psychological
harm.
173F
174 Therefore, the state has a compelling
interest in preventing the use of thought reform
by destructive groups such as cults. Since exit
interventions require the group member to be
present for only 8 hours in a month-long period,
it is hard to imagine a less restrictive means of
furthering this compelling state interest. Thus,
exit interventions do not violate an individual’s
First Amendment rights.
Due-Process Concerns
Although the group member is not present to be
heard in the initial court hearing, due process is
not offended because there are enough
procedural safeguards to prevent error. The Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees that “no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without the due process
of law.”
174F
175 A group member may argue that the
initial court hearing is unconstitutional because
it creates subjective, standardless discretion that
authorizes drastic relief without notice and
without any of the constitutionally necessary
172 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.
§2000bb (2015).
173 The Supreme Court has demonstrated that the
state may have a compelling interest in preventing
fraud under the guise of religion. See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221–29 (1972) Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). Because the use of
deception is not the focus here, it suffices to say that
the state has a compelling interest in the health of its
citizens and protecting its citizens against thought-
reform techniques.
174 See Wong, supra note 9, at 95 see generally
SINGER &LALICH, supra note 21.
175 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
procedural safeguards.
175F
176 In general, the
Supreme Court holds that “[d]ue process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands.”
176F
177 More
precisely, the Supreme Court considers three
distinct factors: (a) “the private interest that will
be affected by the official action” (b) “the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards” and (c) “the
Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”
177F
178
Applying these factors to exit interventions
assures that the initial court hearings are
constitutional. First, the private interest being
affected is the 4-week access period that requires
the group member to be present for 2 hours per
week. Meeting with family and friends in a
public place for a total of 8 hours over a 4-week
period is not a substantial deprivation of the
group member’s liberty. Moreover, the group
member is able to present himself in front of the
hearing judge after the first 2 weeks to convince
the judge the exit intervention is unnecessary.
Second, the family must carry the burden of not
only showing a drastic change in the member’s
behavior and the dangers present in the group,
but also must overcome the slight presumption
that the member voluntarily joined the group and
the court should not interfere. Between the
group member’s ability to try to opt out after 2
weeks and the burden the family must carry, an
erroneous deprivation of liberty is unlikely.
Thus, the procedural safeguards in place
appropriately protect the group member’s liberty
interest. Finally, there are large administrative
burdens if any other safeguards are
implemented. The reason the family must rely
176 To see how this argument fared in a TRO hearing
regarding a guardianship of a 100-year-old woman,
see In re Guardianship of Carlsmith, 151 P.3d 717,
720 (Haw. 2007).
177 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976)
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)).
178 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
of argument, assume that exit interventions are a
substantial burden on a person’s exercise of
religion. Then the government must show that
(a) exit interventions are in furtherance of a
compelling government interest, and (b) they are
the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling government interest.
171F
172 In this
scenario, the state has a compelling interest in
the health of its citizens.
172F
173 As seen in previous
comments, the use of thought reform can result
in irreparable physical and psychological
harm.
173F
174 Therefore, the state has a compelling
interest in preventing the use of thought reform
by destructive groups such as cults. Since exit
interventions require the group member to be
present for only 8 hours in a month-long period,
it is hard to imagine a less restrictive means of
furthering this compelling state interest. Thus,
exit interventions do not violate an individual’s
First Amendment rights.
Due-Process Concerns
Although the group member is not present to be
heard in the initial court hearing, due process is
not offended because there are enough
procedural safeguards to prevent error. The Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees that “no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without the due process
of law.”
174F
175 A group member may argue that the
initial court hearing is unconstitutional because
it creates subjective, standardless discretion that
authorizes drastic relief without notice and
without any of the constitutionally necessary
172 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.
§2000bb (2015).
173 The Supreme Court has demonstrated that the
state may have a compelling interest in preventing
fraud under the guise of religion. See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221–29 (1972) Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). Because the use of
deception is not the focus here, it suffices to say that
the state has a compelling interest in the health of its
citizens and protecting its citizens against thought-
reform techniques.
174 See Wong, supra note 9, at 95 see generally
SINGER &LALICH, supra note 21.
175 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
procedural safeguards.
175F
176 In general, the
Supreme Court holds that “[d]ue process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands.”
176F
177 More
precisely, the Supreme Court considers three
distinct factors: (a) “the private interest that will
be affected by the official action” (b) “the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards” and (c) “the
Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”
177F
178
Applying these factors to exit interventions
assures that the initial court hearings are
constitutional. First, the private interest being
affected is the 4-week access period that requires
the group member to be present for 2 hours per
week. Meeting with family and friends in a
public place for a total of 8 hours over a 4-week
period is not a substantial deprivation of the
group member’s liberty. Moreover, the group
member is able to present himself in front of the
hearing judge after the first 2 weeks to convince
the judge the exit intervention is unnecessary.
Second, the family must carry the burden of not
only showing a drastic change in the member’s
behavior and the dangers present in the group,
but also must overcome the slight presumption
that the member voluntarily joined the group and
the court should not interfere. Between the
group member’s ability to try to opt out after 2
weeks and the burden the family must carry, an
erroneous deprivation of liberty is unlikely.
Thus, the procedural safeguards in place
appropriately protect the group member’s liberty
interest. Finally, there are large administrative
burdens if any other safeguards are
implemented. The reason the family must rely
176 To see how this argument fared in a TRO hearing
regarding a guardianship of a 100-year-old woman,
see In re Guardianship of Carlsmith, 151 P.3d 717,
720 (Haw. 2007).
177 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976)
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)).
178 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
