56 International Journal of Cultic Studies ■ Vol. 8, 2017
violations.
164F
165 Moreover, the focus of exit
intervention is to ensure that the group member
is making an informed and healthy decision, not
merely following the group’s influence. Thus,
cults must comply with the court order by
making the targeted member available for his
meetings.
Objections to Exit Intervention
Although exit interventions are far less coercive,
and hence far less impinging on an individual’s
civil rights than other approaches, they still
affect an individual’s freedom of choice by
requiring him to be present at weekly meetings.
There are two main arguments against exit
interventions: They violate an individual’s First
Amendment rights of freedom of belief and
expression,
165F
166 and they violate an individual’s
due-process rights because the person is not
present for the initial court hearing to defend
himself.
166F
167
165 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03
(1963) (“the Court has rejected challenges under the
Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of
certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or
principles, for ‘even when the action is in accord with
one's religious convictions, [it] is not totally free from
legislative restrictions.’”) (quoting Braunfield v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961)). Assuming exit
interventions would be enacted through legislation,
an officer of the law can carry out the court’s order
without impinging the group’s free exercise under the
First Amendment.
166 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.”) NCAAP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444–45 (1963) (“For the
Constitution protects expression and association
without regard to the race, creed, or political or
religious affiliation of the members of the group
which invokes its shield, or to the truth, popularity, or
social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are
offered.”).
167 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall ...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”).
First-Amendment Concerns
According to the Supreme Court, it is well
established that a person’s beliefs, unlike
actions, are absolutely protected under the First
Amendment.
167F
168 Thus, cult members can argue
that exit interventions are unconstitutional
because they target an individual’s belief
system. However, the goals of an exit
intervention are to ensure that the member is
informed when deciding to stay in the group,
and that he is mentally capable to do so.
168F
169 The
exit intervention has nothing to do with his
beliefs it has everything to do with his decision
to stay in the group. The decision to stay in the
group is an overt act prompted by religious
beliefs or principles—overt acts are not “free
from legislative restrictions.”
169F
170 Moreover, exit
interventions seek to bring back the group
member’s ability to think critically. If the
program successfully promotes critical thought,
and the group member decides to remain with
the group, then his beliefs were strengthened,
not attacked.
A group member may also raise the argument
that exit interventions substantially burden an
individual’s exercise of religion.
170F
171 For the sake
168 See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–03 Braunfield
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
169 The only meeting that could be argued as an attack
on the member’s belief is week 4 when the
deprogrammer is present. However, having a 2-hour
disagreement about whose belief system is correct
does not seem like the kind of attack that warrants
First Amendment protection.
170 Sherbert, 375 U.S. at 403.
171 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (2015) Holt v. Hobbs, 155 S.Ct. 853, 859–
860 (2015) (“RFRA provides that ‘[g]overnment
shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability,’ unless the government
‘demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.’”). For purposes of this discussion, assume
the RFRA applies under state law.
violations.
164F
165 Moreover, the focus of exit
intervention is to ensure that the group member
is making an informed and healthy decision, not
merely following the group’s influence. Thus,
cults must comply with the court order by
making the targeted member available for his
meetings.
Objections to Exit Intervention
Although exit interventions are far less coercive,
and hence far less impinging on an individual’s
civil rights than other approaches, they still
affect an individual’s freedom of choice by
requiring him to be present at weekly meetings.
There are two main arguments against exit
interventions: They violate an individual’s First
Amendment rights of freedom of belief and
expression,
165F
166 and they violate an individual’s
due-process rights because the person is not
present for the initial court hearing to defend
himself.
166F
167
165 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03
(1963) (“the Court has rejected challenges under the
Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of
certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or
principles, for ‘even when the action is in accord with
one's religious convictions, [it] is not totally free from
legislative restrictions.’”) (quoting Braunfield v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961)). Assuming exit
interventions would be enacted through legislation,
an officer of the law can carry out the court’s order
without impinging the group’s free exercise under the
First Amendment.
166 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.”) NCAAP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444–45 (1963) (“For the
Constitution protects expression and association
without regard to the race, creed, or political or
religious affiliation of the members of the group
which invokes its shield, or to the truth, popularity, or
social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are
offered.”).
167 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall ...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”).
First-Amendment Concerns
According to the Supreme Court, it is well
established that a person’s beliefs, unlike
actions, are absolutely protected under the First
Amendment.
167F
168 Thus, cult members can argue
that exit interventions are unconstitutional
because they target an individual’s belief
system. However, the goals of an exit
intervention are to ensure that the member is
informed when deciding to stay in the group,
and that he is mentally capable to do so.
168F
169 The
exit intervention has nothing to do with his
beliefs it has everything to do with his decision
to stay in the group. The decision to stay in the
group is an overt act prompted by religious
beliefs or principles—overt acts are not “free
from legislative restrictions.”
169F
170 Moreover, exit
interventions seek to bring back the group
member’s ability to think critically. If the
program successfully promotes critical thought,
and the group member decides to remain with
the group, then his beliefs were strengthened,
not attacked.
A group member may also raise the argument
that exit interventions substantially burden an
individual’s exercise of religion.
170F
171 For the sake
168 See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–03 Braunfield
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
169 The only meeting that could be argued as an attack
on the member’s belief is week 4 when the
deprogrammer is present. However, having a 2-hour
disagreement about whose belief system is correct
does not seem like the kind of attack that warrants
First Amendment protection.
170 Sherbert, 375 U.S. at 403.
171 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (2015) Holt v. Hobbs, 155 S.Ct. 853, 859–
860 (2015) (“RFRA provides that ‘[g]overnment
shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability,’ unless the government
‘demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.’”). For purposes of this discussion, assume
the RFRA applies under state law.
