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such policy.) Molko and Leal contended that, in light of the alleged brainwashing, there was
a triable issue of fact as to whether reliance on those misrepresentations was justified.
The plaintiffs further contended they did not question the truth or falsity of the church‟s
beliefs, nor their sincerity rather, they challenged the fraudulent conduct in implementing
those beliefs. The court agreed the validity of belief was not in question but rather the
practice of “deceiving nonmembers into subjecting themselves, without their knowledge or
consent, to coercive persuasion.”36
The court determined the burden of such liability on the church‟s religious conduct was not
substantial. The appellate court disagreed, relying on Katz v. Superior Court,37 which also
involved allegations of brainwashing against the Unification Church.38 The supreme court
distinguished Katz and held that the present burden on the church members‟ free exercise
of religion did not compare to the circumstances in Katz: “At most, it potentially closes one
questionable avenue for bringing new members into the [c]hurch.39
The court then justified even this “marginal burden” on the church‟s free exercise of religion
“by the compelling state interest in protecting individuals and families from the substantial
threat to public safety, peace and order posed by the fraudulent induction of unconsenting
individuals into an atmosphere of coercive persuasion.”40 The court asserted the
consequences of such coercion on some individuals is the development of “serious and
sometimes irreversible physical and psychiatric disorders, up to and including schizophrenia,
self-mutilation and suicide.”41 The court found no less drastic alternative available (such as
criminalizing brainwashing, obtaining signed informed consent of potential converts, or
authorization involuntary deprogramming).
Finally, the court concluded its thorough First Amendment analysis by finding that
traditional sanctioning of tort liability for fraudulent recruitment, as in this case, satisfies the
requirement that the state‟s secular goals are advanced without discrimination between
religions.
Having found the fraud theory constitutionally permissible, the court then examined
whether under that theory the church‟s conduct also gave rise to an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs‟ claims rested on more than just threats of
divine retribution or other protected religious speech. The court examined whether the
church‟s conduct in fraudulently inducing the plaintiffs into an atmosphere of coercive
persuasion was “extreme and outrageous” enough to support a cause of action.
The court found the church‟s “continued deceptions might well be seen as conduct breaching
plaintiffs‟ trust in the integrity of those who were promising to make their lives more
meaningful,” which might constitute an abuse of the church‟s position of power to damage
the plaintiffs. The court held that the issue of the extremity or outrageousness of the
church‟s conduct must be left to the jury.
Leal sought to make the church liable for falsely imprisoning her by threatening divine
retribution against herself and her family. The court found that false imprisonment may be
effected by fraud or deceit but threats of divine retribution constituted protected religious
speech and, absent actual physical restraint, there was no cause of action. Molko‟s
restitution claim fared better. The court found there was a triable issue of fact “as to
whether Molko lost his ability to make independent decisions as a result of being deceived
into submitting to coercive persuasion.”42
The Robin George Case
On May 14, 1990, the United States Supreme Court refused review of George v.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness,43 a case that has been called “the most
important single religious liberty case ever to reach it.”44 The California Supreme Court had

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1991, Page 47
refused to consider the case on November 30, 1989 and ordered the appellate decision to
be depublished. While the case has lost its value as precedent, the judgment of what is now
$5 million (including interest) against the Krishna organization still stands. To the chagrin of
cult defenders and the Krishnas, this may mean the forced sale of some of its real property,
including temples, monasteries, schools, and its world headquarters in Los Angeles.
At the age of 14, Robin George visited a Krishna temple in Laguna Beach with a friend and,
after repeated visits, became a full member. The head of the temple convinced the girls
their parents were demons, told them it was permissible to deceive non-believers such as
their parents who were blind to the “truth,” and persuaded them to run away from home to
a Krishna hiding Place.
For over a year, Robin‟s parents tried to get the Krishnas to reveal Robin‟s whereabouts, but
instead they moved her from temple to temple around the country and eventually to
Canada while telling her parents they had no idea where she was. While Robin was in the
cult, her father was diagnosed with a heart condition, a fact Robin‟s mother made clear to
the Krishna leaders.
Upon learning from a friend of Robin‟s that she was being hidden in Canada, the Georges
called the police, who threatened the Krishnas with criminal prosecution if they did not
produce the girl. After the Krishnas‟ attorney instructed Robin to lie to the police about the
circumstances of her indoctrination, she fled and eventually returned home.
Less than four months later, Robin‟s father suffered a heart attack, followed by several
strokes, and he died the following September. An expert at trial testified that two years of
anxiety over his daughter aggravated his heart condition and caused him an early death.
Robin and Marcia George became anti-cult activists. On the eve of a Citizens Freedom
Foundation press conference at which the Georges were to speak, the Krishnas put out an
“official statement” concerning Robin claiming she had run away from her parents because
of “cruelty, beatings, harsh treatment.”45
In October 1977, Robin and Marcia George sued the Krishnas for false imprisonment of
Robin, intentional infliction of emotional distress to both, libel to both, and Robin sued for
the wrongful death of her father.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Georges on all causes of action and awarded
them in excess of $32.5 million. The Georges accepted a remittitur reducing both punitive
and compensatory damages to a total of $7.9 million.
The tort of false imprisonment derives from the crime of “unlawful violation of the personal
liberty of another”46 and this involves, with one exception, direct physical restraint or the
threat of physical restraint. The exception is when false imprisonment is accomplished by
fraud or deceit.47
The court of appeal found that Robin had not sufficiently established she had been falsely
imprisoned in that 1) there was no proof offered of force or threat of force 2) she was over
14 when enticed to leave home, an age the court found to be “capable of consenting to
conduct that would otherwise be tortious” and 3) she resented no evidence of fraud as to
herself.
Robin sought to distinguish the Molko court‟s finding on false imprisonment as based solely
on protected religious speech, whereas her brainwashing theory involved more than simple
threats of divine retribution. The court determined she had not proved her case, and went
on to describe Molko as
a reaffirmation that physical force or the threat of it is a necessary element of a
false imprisonment cause of action even in the context of a brainwashing claim.