Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1991, Page 46
such policy.) Molko and Leal contended that, in light of the alleged brainwashing, there was
a triable issue of fact as to whether reliance on those misrepresentations was justified.
The plaintiffs further contended they did not question the truth or falsity of the church‟s
beliefs, nor their sincerity rather, they challenged the fraudulent conduct in implementing
those beliefs. The court agreed the validity of belief was not in question but rather the
practice of “deceiving nonmembers into subjecting themselves, without their knowledge or
consent, to coercive persuasion.”36
The court determined the burden of such liability on the church‟s religious conduct was not
substantial. The appellate court disagreed, relying on Katz v. Superior Court,37 which also
involved allegations of brainwashing against the Unification Church.38 The supreme court
distinguished Katz and held that the present burden on the church members‟ free exercise
of religion did not compare to the circumstances in Katz: “At most, it potentially closes one
questionable avenue for bringing new members into the [c]hurch.39
The court then justified even this “marginal burden” on the church‟s free exercise of religion
“by the compelling state interest in protecting individuals and families from the substantial
threat to public safety, peace and order posed by the fraudulent induction of unconsenting
individuals into an atmosphere of coercive persuasion.”40 The court asserted the
consequences of such coercion on some individuals is the development of “serious and
sometimes irreversible physical and psychiatric disorders, up to and including schizophrenia,
self-mutilation and suicide.”41 The court found no less drastic alternative available (such as
criminalizing brainwashing, obtaining signed informed consent of potential converts, or
authorization involuntary deprogramming).
Finally, the court concluded its thorough First Amendment analysis by finding that
traditional sanctioning of tort liability for fraudulent recruitment, as in this case, satisfies the
requirement that the state‟s secular goals are advanced without discrimination between
religions.
Having found the fraud theory constitutionally permissible, the court then examined
whether under that theory the church‟s conduct also gave rise to an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs‟ claims rested on more than just threats of
divine retribution or other protected religious speech. The court examined whether the
church‟s conduct in fraudulently inducing the plaintiffs into an atmosphere of coercive
persuasion was “extreme and outrageous” enough to support a cause of action.
The court found the church‟s “continued deceptions might well be seen as conduct breaching
plaintiffs‟ trust in the integrity of those who were promising to make their lives more
meaningful,” which might constitute an abuse of the church‟s position of power to damage
the plaintiffs. The court held that the issue of the extremity or outrageousness of the
church‟s conduct must be left to the jury.
Leal sought to make the church liable for falsely imprisoning her by threatening divine
retribution against herself and her family. The court found that false imprisonment may be
effected by fraud or deceit but threats of divine retribution constituted protected religious
speech and, absent actual physical restraint, there was no cause of action. Molko‟s
restitution claim fared better. The court found there was a triable issue of fact “as to
whether Molko lost his ability to make independent decisions as a result of being deceived
into submitting to coercive persuasion.”42
The Robin George Case
On May 14, 1990, the United States Supreme Court refused review of George v.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness,43 a case that has been called “the most
important single religious liberty case ever to reach it.”44 The California Supreme Court had
such policy.) Molko and Leal contended that, in light of the alleged brainwashing, there was
a triable issue of fact as to whether reliance on those misrepresentations was justified.
The plaintiffs further contended they did not question the truth or falsity of the church‟s
beliefs, nor their sincerity rather, they challenged the fraudulent conduct in implementing
those beliefs. The court agreed the validity of belief was not in question but rather the
practice of “deceiving nonmembers into subjecting themselves, without their knowledge or
consent, to coercive persuasion.”36
The court determined the burden of such liability on the church‟s religious conduct was not
substantial. The appellate court disagreed, relying on Katz v. Superior Court,37 which also
involved allegations of brainwashing against the Unification Church.38 The supreme court
distinguished Katz and held that the present burden on the church members‟ free exercise
of religion did not compare to the circumstances in Katz: “At most, it potentially closes one
questionable avenue for bringing new members into the [c]hurch.39
The court then justified even this “marginal burden” on the church‟s free exercise of religion
“by the compelling state interest in protecting individuals and families from the substantial
threat to public safety, peace and order posed by the fraudulent induction of unconsenting
individuals into an atmosphere of coercive persuasion.”40 The court asserted the
consequences of such coercion on some individuals is the development of “serious and
sometimes irreversible physical and psychiatric disorders, up to and including schizophrenia,
self-mutilation and suicide.”41 The court found no less drastic alternative available (such as
criminalizing brainwashing, obtaining signed informed consent of potential converts, or
authorization involuntary deprogramming).
Finally, the court concluded its thorough First Amendment analysis by finding that
traditional sanctioning of tort liability for fraudulent recruitment, as in this case, satisfies the
requirement that the state‟s secular goals are advanced without discrimination between
religions.
Having found the fraud theory constitutionally permissible, the court then examined
whether under that theory the church‟s conduct also gave rise to an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs‟ claims rested on more than just threats of
divine retribution or other protected religious speech. The court examined whether the
church‟s conduct in fraudulently inducing the plaintiffs into an atmosphere of coercive
persuasion was “extreme and outrageous” enough to support a cause of action.
The court found the church‟s “continued deceptions might well be seen as conduct breaching
plaintiffs‟ trust in the integrity of those who were promising to make their lives more
meaningful,” which might constitute an abuse of the church‟s position of power to damage
the plaintiffs. The court held that the issue of the extremity or outrageousness of the
church‟s conduct must be left to the jury.
Leal sought to make the church liable for falsely imprisoning her by threatening divine
retribution against herself and her family. The court found that false imprisonment may be
effected by fraud or deceit but threats of divine retribution constituted protected religious
speech and, absent actual physical restraint, there was no cause of action. Molko‟s
restitution claim fared better. The court found there was a triable issue of fact “as to
whether Molko lost his ability to make independent decisions as a result of being deceived
into submitting to coercive persuasion.”42
The Robin George Case
On May 14, 1990, the United States Supreme Court refused review of George v.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness,43 a case that has been called “the most
important single religious liberty case ever to reach it.”44 The California Supreme Court had
