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movement as creating a “new bigotry” and a “cult scare” more offensive than the cults
themselves.19
More importantly, cult sympathizers and their defense attorneys argue cult indoctrination
practices are simple conversion,20 and the brainwashing theory is a kind of witch hunt
designed to eradicate “out-of-the-mainstream faith groups.” Indeed, the recent cases
against cults are most alarming to cult sympathizers as a threat to religious pluralism and
freedom, because damage awards in the millions threaten the wealth and perhaps even the
very existence of the organizations.21 The critics‟ strongest argument, one that requires
careful consideration, is that the First Amendment guarantees these groups immunity from
accountability.22
First Amendment Concerns
Legal scholar Richard Delgado‟s analysis of the potential impact of various forms of
intervention (including legislation and court action) in cult-related matters on the free
exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment23 has been cited by other cult
experts and courts in their decisions. Delgado notes that while the “free exercise” clause of
the First Amendment guarantees that Congress shall make no law prohibiting individuals
from freely pursuing any religion they choose, not everything under the religion umbrella is
protected, however. The law distinguishes between religious belief, which is absolutely
protected,24 and religiously motivated conduct, which is not.25 In this country, an individual
is free to choose his religion,26 and society, particularly the government and the courts,
must treat that belief as an inviolable matter of conscience. Hence, the courts refuse to
address the truth or falsity of doctrines.
Religiously motivated conduct is subject to a balancing test in which the state‟s interest in
regulating or forbidding activity is weighted against the severity of the burden it imposes on
religion. The government must offer sufficient proof of an overriding interest. The religious
group is subject to attack if the belief behind its conduct is found to be insincerely held or if
the conduct is not central to the group‟s belief system.27 Groups whose activities smack of
economic priorities (including fund-raising and roselytizing) are particularly vulnerable to
charges of insincerity.
The over-protection of individuals or groups who practice mind-control techniques in
connection with religious practices may actually frustrate the fundamental values expressed
in the First Amendment. Bending over backwards to protect religious liberty may develop
into a simple license to perpetuate illusion, deception, and exploitation of the unsuspecting.
Delgado finds support from Thomas Jefferson for the theory that the religious liberty clause
was originally intended to protect the freedom of the mind as well as other freedoms:
“Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his supreme will that free it shall
remain.”28 Thus the Jeffersonian view of religious toleration did not contemplate protection
of groups who use destructive persuasion to diminish the psychic autonomy of their
members.
The Molko Case
Three of the most significant cases regarding ex-cult members and their families pursuing
remedies in tort for damages have been decided in California in the last two years. These
cases show that the legal arguments for restricting cult activities are having an impact on
the courts.
In Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn.,29 plaintiffs Molko and Leal, within five months of each other,
were induced to join the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity (the
Moonies) in the usual fashion. While waiting at a bus station, each was approached by
strangers who identified themselves simply as “socially conscious” people with no particular

Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1991, Page 45
religious connections.30 The strangers invited each of them to dinner at an “international
community” gathering place or a “creative community project”31 Both plaintiffs accepted the
invitation, unaware that the strangers were Moonies, and subsequently agreed to spend the
evening at a “farm” called Booneville, unaware that this was an indoctrination facility for the
Unification Church.
In the following days, both plaintiffs were subjected to a tightly planned
exercise/lecture/discussion regimen, and they were accompanied at all times by church
members during breaks for meals and bathroom visits. Both occasionally asked if the group
was “religious” (Leal even directly asked if they were Moonies) but the answer was no --
that is, until the second or third week of the indoctrination, by which time each member
expressed anger and confusion at discovering the true nature of the group but agreed not to
leave immediately.
After only one month, Molko was alienated from his parents, believing them to be “agents of
Satan.” Within three to four months of their involvement with the group, each plaintiff was
subsequently abducted from a public place by their parents and professionally
“deprogrammed.”32
Molko and Leal sued for fraud arising from deceptive recruitment practices, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. Molko added his own claim for
restitution of the $6,000 that he had donated to the church. The church cross-complained
against the plaintiffs‟ deprogrammers for indemnification, on the theory that it was the
abduction and deprogramming of the plaintiffs that caused their mental harm.
The trial court granted the church‟s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs‟ claims
but dismissed the church‟s civil rights claims against the deprogrammers. The court of
appeal affirmed the summary judgment on all of the plaintiffs‟ claims. In ruling on the fraud
issue, the court held that the declarations of expert witnesses, including Singer, were in
conflict with the plaintiffs‟ own statements and, as the sole basis of the plaintiffs‟ theories,
flunked constitutional scrutiny. The appellate court also reversed the dismissal of the
church‟s cross-complaint.
The California Supreme Court upheld the appellate court decision to allow the church
summary judgment with regard to the false imprisonment claim. However, the supreme
court reversed the appellate court‟s decision to allow summary judgment for the church on
the remaining claims --fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and restitution33 --
ruling six to one that Molko and Leal had a right to a jury trial.
The California decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which declined to hear the
case.34 For the first time a major court, without having to face the “brainwashing” issue as
a cause of action, has accepted the premise that religious indoctrination can cause potential
converts to lose the free exercise of their will and, in consequence, can sue for damages.35
This represents a major coup for future plaintiffs in similar actions, particularly in light of the
court‟s analysis of the First Amendment issues and its reliance on the work of Lifton,
Delgado, Schein and Singer in making important distinctions within that analysis.
Fraud and Deceit
The state supreme court found that the existence of differing views as to the effectiveness
of brainwashing raised a factual question that should have gone to the jury. Both plaintiffs
declared they had been unwittingly subjected to mind control techniques after they had
been fraudulently subjected to Moonie indoctrination and before the Moonies disclosed their
true identity. The church conceded misrepresentations were made with intent to induce
Molko and Leal‟s participation (Molko and Leal described “Heavenly Deception” as a Moonie
belief that it is acceptable to lie to a potential convert in this way the church denied any