Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2006, Page 23
the Children of God, David Berg, known as Moses David or ―Mo‖ (1990, 135-6). Mo would
send his second wife or mistress, Maria, out onto the dance floor at a London dancing school
as ―bait.‖ At Mo‘s urging, Maria struck up a relationship, which quickly became sexual, with
an Englishman named Arthur. Once Arthur was firmly ―hooked,‖ he was passed on to one of
Mo‘s other wives. Maria was then commissioned to catch another ―fish.‖ Flirty fishing
became a regular practice of this group, and ―was developed and refined practically into an
art form.‖ In his annual statistical newsletter for 1979, Mo reported that ―Our dear FF‘ers
(women engaged in flirty fishing) are still going strong, God bless‘m, having now witnessed
to over a quarter-of-a-million souls, loved over 25,000 of them and won nearly 19,000 to
the Lord‖ (Battin 1990, 136). This is an obvious and extreme case of an immoral form of
psychologically coercive proselytizing.
I move on to what I consider to be some positive examples of proselytizing. Let me
introduce these examples in the form of questions, drawing on the use of pejorative
language often associated with proselytizing. Is the Jehovah‘s Witness, quietly standing on a
Denver street corner, holding out a Watchtower Magazine for any passer-by to take, really
being coercive? Is it really fair to talk about stalking and pouncing and coercion when a
―sinner‖ has responded to an advertisement on a billboard for a Billy Graham Crusade and
freely walks into the arena to hear him speak? If as a Christian, at some point in my long-
standing friendship with a Jewish colleague, (a) I suggest to her that my religious position is
―the highest truth and the greatest good‖ (to use Novak‘s terms) (b) I even go on to argue
the same and seek to persuade her to adopt the better religion (c) she then rejects my
argument and my appeal and (d) despite all this, our friendship continues to flourish, am I
cajoling her? And if, in giving aid to the many who are starving in various parts of the globe,
the Mennonite Central Committee puts on each sack of grain shipped overseas the words
―In the name of Christ,‖ with nothing more said when the grain is distributed, can this really
be described as coercive? The answer to all of these questions is, surely, "No!" But all of the
above scenarios are obviously cases of proselytizing, although the latter example is perhaps
better classified as a case of covert proselytizing. (I will grant that there may be some
readers who might not agree with my assessment of these examples, but I would suggest
that such disagreement rests on a negative view of persuasion generally which I have
already critiqued.)
I hope these questions and examples illustrate that we might get further in our attempt to
distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing if we focus on specific cases rather
than the development of broad ethical principles. I believe we will more easily achieve
consensus if we focus on case studies rather than general criteria.
At the same time, being able to clearly differentiate these underlying principles will surely
help highlight differing aspects of what is or is not objectionable about proselytizing. Indeed,
any consensus concerning case studies will be, at least implicitly, a result of some
underlying general principles. So I cannot give up entirely my efforts to define criteria to
help us to distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing.
This commitment brings me to a final suggestion, which has to do with the nature of ethical
principles: We must be careful not to mistakenly assume that ethical principles are, like the
Ten Commandments, specific and precise. Christian and Jewish ethics consist of various
levels of principles that range from broad to specific. For example, at one point Paul
describes the Great Commandment—love God and love your fellow man—as summing up
the more specific Ten Commandments (Romans 13:8-10). Arthur Holmes has encouraged
us to think of different levels of ethical principles (1984, 50-56). Similarly, as we try to
define criteria to distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing, we must allow for
differing levels of specificity.
the Children of God, David Berg, known as Moses David or ―Mo‖ (1990, 135-6). Mo would
send his second wife or mistress, Maria, out onto the dance floor at a London dancing school
as ―bait.‖ At Mo‘s urging, Maria struck up a relationship, which quickly became sexual, with
an Englishman named Arthur. Once Arthur was firmly ―hooked,‖ he was passed on to one of
Mo‘s other wives. Maria was then commissioned to catch another ―fish.‖ Flirty fishing
became a regular practice of this group, and ―was developed and refined practically into an
art form.‖ In his annual statistical newsletter for 1979, Mo reported that ―Our dear FF‘ers
(women engaged in flirty fishing) are still going strong, God bless‘m, having now witnessed
to over a quarter-of-a-million souls, loved over 25,000 of them and won nearly 19,000 to
the Lord‖ (Battin 1990, 136). This is an obvious and extreme case of an immoral form of
psychologically coercive proselytizing.
I move on to what I consider to be some positive examples of proselytizing. Let me
introduce these examples in the form of questions, drawing on the use of pejorative
language often associated with proselytizing. Is the Jehovah‘s Witness, quietly standing on a
Denver street corner, holding out a Watchtower Magazine for any passer-by to take, really
being coercive? Is it really fair to talk about stalking and pouncing and coercion when a
―sinner‖ has responded to an advertisement on a billboard for a Billy Graham Crusade and
freely walks into the arena to hear him speak? If as a Christian, at some point in my long-
standing friendship with a Jewish colleague, (a) I suggest to her that my religious position is
―the highest truth and the greatest good‖ (to use Novak‘s terms) (b) I even go on to argue
the same and seek to persuade her to adopt the better religion (c) she then rejects my
argument and my appeal and (d) despite all this, our friendship continues to flourish, am I
cajoling her? And if, in giving aid to the many who are starving in various parts of the globe,
the Mennonite Central Committee puts on each sack of grain shipped overseas the words
―In the name of Christ,‖ with nothing more said when the grain is distributed, can this really
be described as coercive? The answer to all of these questions is, surely, "No!" But all of the
above scenarios are obviously cases of proselytizing, although the latter example is perhaps
better classified as a case of covert proselytizing. (I will grant that there may be some
readers who might not agree with my assessment of these examples, but I would suggest
that such disagreement rests on a negative view of persuasion generally which I have
already critiqued.)
I hope these questions and examples illustrate that we might get further in our attempt to
distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing if we focus on specific cases rather
than the development of broad ethical principles. I believe we will more easily achieve
consensus if we focus on case studies rather than general criteria.
At the same time, being able to clearly differentiate these underlying principles will surely
help highlight differing aspects of what is or is not objectionable about proselytizing. Indeed,
any consensus concerning case studies will be, at least implicitly, a result of some
underlying general principles. So I cannot give up entirely my efforts to define criteria to
help us to distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing.
This commitment brings me to a final suggestion, which has to do with the nature of ethical
principles: We must be careful not to mistakenly assume that ethical principles are, like the
Ten Commandments, specific and precise. Christian and Jewish ethics consist of various
levels of principles that range from broad to specific. For example, at one point Paul
describes the Great Commandment—love God and love your fellow man—as summing up
the more specific Ten Commandments (Romans 13:8-10). Arthur Holmes has encouraged
us to think of different levels of ethical principles (1984, 50-56). Similarly, as we try to
define criteria to distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing, we must allow for
differing levels of specificity.
