Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2006, Page 21
Michael Langone applies the notion of a continuum to the influence that psychologists and
mental heath professionals have on their clients (1985, 378-82 1989). At one extreme of
this continuum lie nondirective techniques such as reflection and clarification. At the other
extreme are physical restraint and punishment. The methods of the first extreme are
obviously ethical, while the use of physical restraint in counseling is obviously unethical.
Difficulties arise, of course, in assessing the methods that lie in between these extremes.
Langone goes on to introduce a more general notion of ―climates of influence,‖ which can be
applied specifically to proselytizing. Here again climates of influence can be seen as on a
continuum ranging from healthy to unhealthy, from ethical to unethical. Langone identifies
four methods of influence and places them on this continuum (educative, advisory,
persuasive, and coercive) (1985, 378-80). The first two methods are classified as choice-
respecting, while the latter two fall under a compliance-gaining mode, and hence are seen
as increasingly unacceptable.
How then do we assess these various attempts to distinguish between ethical and unethical
proselytizing in terms of a continuum? Clearly, we have not eliminated the problem of
vagueness entirely—to assess proselytizing activities in the middle of the continuum will still
be difficult. But it would seem that we have gained something with this approach because
cases that fall on either extreme of this continuum should be clearly identifiable as moral or
immoral. However, a problem emerges here with the writers I have referred to above who
use the continuum approach.
A major concern I have with all of these writers is that they beg the question by tending to
assume that all attempts at persuasion or influence are at least somewhat coercive or
aggressive, and hence morally problematic. In other words, they fail to clearly identify one
extreme of the continuum as nonaggressive or noncoercive and so morally acceptable. For
example, Battin‘s scale moves from mildly aggressive to very aggressive, and all
proselytizing is located on this scale of aggressiveness. Given that her scale also functions
as a scale of moral repugnance, the possibility of finding a moral form of proselytizing is by
definition ruled out. Now I am sure that Battin would be opposed to the use of arbitrary
definitions in fact, at one point she tries to avoid the same by holding up her preferred
invitational approach to proselytizing as one that ―can be wholly nonaggressive‖ (1990,
142). But her analysis is confusing because at times she describes invitational evangelism
as a convert-seeking activity, and, as such, still coercive, though only mildly so (141, 142).4
Langone seems to avoid the problem of a question-begging definition and seems to allow for
a healthy noncoercive approach to proselytizing by starting his continuum with a choice-
respecting method of influence. Unfortunately, a problem surfaces in that persuasion is
classified in the second category of methods of influence (i.e., compliance-gaining), and
hence is understood to be problematic. I would further suggest that Langone commits a
category mistake when he classifies his first two methods, education and advising, as
choice-respecting and hence as not including any element of persuasion. I would argue that
degrees of persuasion already exist in the first two methods, and, if so, they too should be
seen as belonging to the compliance-gaining mode of methods of influence. Therefore,
these two methods should be seen as unacceptable, at least to some degree. Interestingly,
in a later treatment of this subject, Langone adds a third ―persuasive‖ category to the
choice-respecting methods (1989,18-19), admitting that some forms of persuasion are
acceptable. Langone‘s position, like that of Battin, is simply not clear
I would suggest that the reason for this confusion and hesitancy in clearly allowing for a
noncoercive and moral type of influence or persuasion is that these writers share a
widespread suspicion about persuasion itself, a perspective that various writers on
communication ethics have pointed out (Genevieve McBride 1989, 14 Jaksa &Pritchard
1994, 76). Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin, in an article revealingly entitled ―Beyond
Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric,‖ provide a blistering attack on
Michael Langone applies the notion of a continuum to the influence that psychologists and
mental heath professionals have on their clients (1985, 378-82 1989). At one extreme of
this continuum lie nondirective techniques such as reflection and clarification. At the other
extreme are physical restraint and punishment. The methods of the first extreme are
obviously ethical, while the use of physical restraint in counseling is obviously unethical.
Difficulties arise, of course, in assessing the methods that lie in between these extremes.
Langone goes on to introduce a more general notion of ―climates of influence,‖ which can be
applied specifically to proselytizing. Here again climates of influence can be seen as on a
continuum ranging from healthy to unhealthy, from ethical to unethical. Langone identifies
four methods of influence and places them on this continuum (educative, advisory,
persuasive, and coercive) (1985, 378-80). The first two methods are classified as choice-
respecting, while the latter two fall under a compliance-gaining mode, and hence are seen
as increasingly unacceptable.
How then do we assess these various attempts to distinguish between ethical and unethical
proselytizing in terms of a continuum? Clearly, we have not eliminated the problem of
vagueness entirely—to assess proselytizing activities in the middle of the continuum will still
be difficult. But it would seem that we have gained something with this approach because
cases that fall on either extreme of this continuum should be clearly identifiable as moral or
immoral. However, a problem emerges here with the writers I have referred to above who
use the continuum approach.
A major concern I have with all of these writers is that they beg the question by tending to
assume that all attempts at persuasion or influence are at least somewhat coercive or
aggressive, and hence morally problematic. In other words, they fail to clearly identify one
extreme of the continuum as nonaggressive or noncoercive and so morally acceptable. For
example, Battin‘s scale moves from mildly aggressive to very aggressive, and all
proselytizing is located on this scale of aggressiveness. Given that her scale also functions
as a scale of moral repugnance, the possibility of finding a moral form of proselytizing is by
definition ruled out. Now I am sure that Battin would be opposed to the use of arbitrary
definitions in fact, at one point she tries to avoid the same by holding up her preferred
invitational approach to proselytizing as one that ―can be wholly nonaggressive‖ (1990,
142). But her analysis is confusing because at times she describes invitational evangelism
as a convert-seeking activity, and, as such, still coercive, though only mildly so (141, 142).4
Langone seems to avoid the problem of a question-begging definition and seems to allow for
a healthy noncoercive approach to proselytizing by starting his continuum with a choice-
respecting method of influence. Unfortunately, a problem surfaces in that persuasion is
classified in the second category of methods of influence (i.e., compliance-gaining), and
hence is understood to be problematic. I would further suggest that Langone commits a
category mistake when he classifies his first two methods, education and advising, as
choice-respecting and hence as not including any element of persuasion. I would argue that
degrees of persuasion already exist in the first two methods, and, if so, they too should be
seen as belonging to the compliance-gaining mode of methods of influence. Therefore,
these two methods should be seen as unacceptable, at least to some degree. Interestingly,
in a later treatment of this subject, Langone adds a third ―persuasive‖ category to the
choice-respecting methods (1989,18-19), admitting that some forms of persuasion are
acceptable. Langone‘s position, like that of Battin, is simply not clear
I would suggest that the reason for this confusion and hesitancy in clearly allowing for a
noncoercive and moral type of influence or persuasion is that these writers share a
widespread suspicion about persuasion itself, a perspective that various writers on
communication ethics have pointed out (Genevieve McBride 1989, 14 Jaksa &Pritchard
1994, 76). Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin, in an article revealingly entitled ―Beyond
Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric,‖ provide a blistering attack on
