Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2006, Page 22
persuasion, arguing that the traditional conception of rhetoric ―is a rhetoric of patriarchy,
reflecting its values of change, competition, and domination‖ (1995, 4). While this article is
written from a feminist perspective, I believe it reflects a more general and deep suspicion
about persuasion that in fact has a rather long history. This suspicion about persuasion is
extended to proselytizing. Thus, for example, David Novak describes proselytizing in terms
of ―cajoling‖ the adherents of other faiths to cease being what they have been and to
change their identity by becoming what the missionaries are (1999, 43). And Battin uses
terms such as ―accosting,‖ ―buttonholing,‖ and ―haranguing‖ to describe
proselytizing/persuasion and finds these strategies to be morally problematic because ―they
invade privacy and characteristically involve a deliberate attempt to disrupt a person‘s
previously held framework of belief‖ (Battin 1990, 137). Time constraints preclude exploring
the interesting question about the deeper historical reasons that lie behind seeing
persuasion in such a negative light.
I believe that the long-standing and negative connotation given to the notion of persuasion
is completely unwarranted. Persuasion is not in and of itself a bad thing. Indeed, persuasion
is an expression of our social nature. We depend on persuasion to gain knowledge. As Henry
Johnstone has noted, a human being is, among other things, ―a persuading and persuaded
animal‖ (1981, 306).
Of course, persuasion can become manipulative and coercive. Such persuasion should
generally be condemned as immoral.5 Indeed, I would argue that rather than interpreting
persuasion that follows moral guidelines as an encroachment on the other person, a better
approach is to interpret it as an expression of care and respect for the other person. It is
indifference that violates the dignity of the other person. If I attempt to persuade you, I
show that I care about you. Healthy persuasion in fact contributes to a climate that fosters
human dignity.
Returning to the idea of a continuum of persuasion, what is needed is a continuum that
clearly begins with an unqualified notion of a noncoercive or nonaggressive method of
influence or persuasion.6 At this end of the continuum we would therefore have moral
proselytizing, while the other extreme of the continuum would involve aggressive and
morally repugnant proselytizing. Clearly it will be easier to identify and locate certain
activities of proselytizing on either extreme of a continuum of coercion, and therefore as
being either ethical or unethical. So it would seem that we have gained some precision in
identifying moral and immoral proselytizing.
Unfortunately, some vagueness still remains for all the activities that fall in between these
two extremes. This vagueness is, I believe, inescapable. So caution is in order with regard
to declaring any proselytizing activities located between these extremes as either ethical or
unethical. But I do believe we have still gained something with the notion of a continuum of
influence or persuasion.
Case Studies vs. Generalizations
I want to make a couple of further suggestions with regard to overcoming the difficulties of
defining precise criteria to distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing. The focus
of this paper has been on defining general criteria to make the necessary distinction
concerning proselytizing. An assumption underlies this exercise that needs to be brought to
the fore. Perhaps we are being overly optimistic about the possibility of making
generalizations concerning the distinction between ethical and unethical proselytizing. A
better approach, perhaps, is to engage in a case-by-case analysis.
Let me illustrate this point by providing an example of psychologically manipulative
proselytizing that I hope all will agree is excessive and hence immoral. Margaret Battin
describes the practice of ―flirty fishing‖ introduced around the end of 1973 by the leader of
persuasion, arguing that the traditional conception of rhetoric ―is a rhetoric of patriarchy,
reflecting its values of change, competition, and domination‖ (1995, 4). While this article is
written from a feminist perspective, I believe it reflects a more general and deep suspicion
about persuasion that in fact has a rather long history. This suspicion about persuasion is
extended to proselytizing. Thus, for example, David Novak describes proselytizing in terms
of ―cajoling‖ the adherents of other faiths to cease being what they have been and to
change their identity by becoming what the missionaries are (1999, 43). And Battin uses
terms such as ―accosting,‖ ―buttonholing,‖ and ―haranguing‖ to describe
proselytizing/persuasion and finds these strategies to be morally problematic because ―they
invade privacy and characteristically involve a deliberate attempt to disrupt a person‘s
previously held framework of belief‖ (Battin 1990, 137). Time constraints preclude exploring
the interesting question about the deeper historical reasons that lie behind seeing
persuasion in such a negative light.
I believe that the long-standing and negative connotation given to the notion of persuasion
is completely unwarranted. Persuasion is not in and of itself a bad thing. Indeed, persuasion
is an expression of our social nature. We depend on persuasion to gain knowledge. As Henry
Johnstone has noted, a human being is, among other things, ―a persuading and persuaded
animal‖ (1981, 306).
Of course, persuasion can become manipulative and coercive. Such persuasion should
generally be condemned as immoral.5 Indeed, I would argue that rather than interpreting
persuasion that follows moral guidelines as an encroachment on the other person, a better
approach is to interpret it as an expression of care and respect for the other person. It is
indifference that violates the dignity of the other person. If I attempt to persuade you, I
show that I care about you. Healthy persuasion in fact contributes to a climate that fosters
human dignity.
Returning to the idea of a continuum of persuasion, what is needed is a continuum that
clearly begins with an unqualified notion of a noncoercive or nonaggressive method of
influence or persuasion.6 At this end of the continuum we would therefore have moral
proselytizing, while the other extreme of the continuum would involve aggressive and
morally repugnant proselytizing. Clearly it will be easier to identify and locate certain
activities of proselytizing on either extreme of a continuum of coercion, and therefore as
being either ethical or unethical. So it would seem that we have gained some precision in
identifying moral and immoral proselytizing.
Unfortunately, some vagueness still remains for all the activities that fall in between these
two extremes. This vagueness is, I believe, inescapable. So caution is in order with regard
to declaring any proselytizing activities located between these extremes as either ethical or
unethical. But I do believe we have still gained something with the notion of a continuum of
influence or persuasion.
Case Studies vs. Generalizations
I want to make a couple of further suggestions with regard to overcoming the difficulties of
defining precise criteria to distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing. The focus
of this paper has been on defining general criteria to make the necessary distinction
concerning proselytizing. An assumption underlies this exercise that needs to be brought to
the fore. Perhaps we are being overly optimistic about the possibility of making
generalizations concerning the distinction between ethical and unethical proselytizing. A
better approach, perhaps, is to engage in a case-by-case analysis.
Let me illustrate this point by providing an example of psychologically manipulative
proselytizing that I hope all will agree is excessive and hence immoral. Margaret Battin
describes the practice of ―flirty fishing‖ introduced around the end of 1973 by the leader of
