Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2006, Page 20
If we had more time, I could show that the problem of vagueness also surfaces in other
criteria that have been proposed to distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing
for example, in reference to social coercion, inducement when proselytizing, truthfulness,
and the need for humility, tolerance, and motivation. This problem of vagueness leads some
writers to dismiss some of these criteria, while others are tempted to suggest that the entire
enterprise is doomed to failure. For example, Thomas Robbins says this about cult critics
who appeal to the psychological coercion criterion: They appeal to ―a broad and only
tenuously bounded concept of ‗coercion‘‖ (1984, 243, 247). More generally, it is this kind of
elasticity in its meaning and nonspecificity in its applicability that make Young and Griffith
reject coercive persuasion as a useful way to distinguish between moral and immoral
methods of proselytizing (1992). But we must not give up too soon. Surely we can‘t simply
dismiss these criteria because they succumb to the problem of vagueness. Surely there
must be some point at which we can agree that psychological coercion has been taken to an
extreme and hence must be viewed as immoral. This point also applies to other criteria that
we have considered. So is there any way to rescue these criteria from the problem of
vagueness?
Continuum of Influence and Persuasion
Social scientists might be of some help in overcoming the problem of vagueness. For
example, social scientists connected with ICSA have developed a Group Psychological Abuse
Scale (GPA) (Chambers et. al. 1994). Although this scale does not specifically address the
issue of proselytizing, the category of mind control does include such descriptors as coercive
persuasion, which could be applied to proselytizing. However, the precision offered here is
quite deceptive, I believe, and rests on some questionable assumptions. For example, the
study focuses on cults as the paradigm of psychological abuse (Chambers et. al. 1994, 90),
thereby assuming a distinction between cults and mainstream religions, a distinction that I
have already called into question.
I therefore move on to what I consider a more promising approach to dealing with the
problem of vagueness. Various scholars have introduced the notion of a ―continuum‖ of
persuasion or proselytizing techniques. For example, Richard Perloff, after pointing out that
the relationship between coercion and persuasion has long been of interest to philosophers
and communication scholars, seems to suggest that there may not be a sharp difference
between these two terms (1993, 11). He then refers to another writer who places various
modes of social influence on a continuum that ranges from relatively ―noncoercive‖ to
―highly coercive.‖
Margaret Battin introduces the notion of a continuum by first reviewing a series of examples
of unethical proselytizing (1990, ch. 3). These examples are carefully chosen for the
purpose of developing ―an overall, composite scale of aggressiveness in religious convert
seeking‖ (140). It needs to be underscored that Battin‘s scale of aggressiveness in
proselytizing also serves as ―a scale of ethical repugnance‖—―the more aggressive a
practice, the more morally problematic― (147).
At the lower, milder end of the scale is ―invitational convert seeking,‖ where missionaries
represent themselves as models or examples of faith by doing good, engaging in social
activist projects, and thereby hoping to spread the faith by contagion," although no overt
attempt is made to make converts (142). The opposite end of this aggressiveness
continuum includes overt proselytizing that is manipulative, deceptive, and exploitive (135).
Other approaches to proselytizing fall in the middle of this aggressiveness scale. Here, in
the middle of the scale, outright coercion is avoided, but proselytizing is still aggressive in
that it is confrontational, uninvited, and manipulative. This mid-range also includes the
offering of inducements to convert (146).
If we had more time, I could show that the problem of vagueness also surfaces in other
criteria that have been proposed to distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing
for example, in reference to social coercion, inducement when proselytizing, truthfulness,
and the need for humility, tolerance, and motivation. This problem of vagueness leads some
writers to dismiss some of these criteria, while others are tempted to suggest that the entire
enterprise is doomed to failure. For example, Thomas Robbins says this about cult critics
who appeal to the psychological coercion criterion: They appeal to ―a broad and only
tenuously bounded concept of ‗coercion‘‖ (1984, 243, 247). More generally, it is this kind of
elasticity in its meaning and nonspecificity in its applicability that make Young and Griffith
reject coercive persuasion as a useful way to distinguish between moral and immoral
methods of proselytizing (1992). But we must not give up too soon. Surely we can‘t simply
dismiss these criteria because they succumb to the problem of vagueness. Surely there
must be some point at which we can agree that psychological coercion has been taken to an
extreme and hence must be viewed as immoral. This point also applies to other criteria that
we have considered. So is there any way to rescue these criteria from the problem of
vagueness?
Continuum of Influence and Persuasion
Social scientists might be of some help in overcoming the problem of vagueness. For
example, social scientists connected with ICSA have developed a Group Psychological Abuse
Scale (GPA) (Chambers et. al. 1994). Although this scale does not specifically address the
issue of proselytizing, the category of mind control does include such descriptors as coercive
persuasion, which could be applied to proselytizing. However, the precision offered here is
quite deceptive, I believe, and rests on some questionable assumptions. For example, the
study focuses on cults as the paradigm of psychological abuse (Chambers et. al. 1994, 90),
thereby assuming a distinction between cults and mainstream religions, a distinction that I
have already called into question.
I therefore move on to what I consider a more promising approach to dealing with the
problem of vagueness. Various scholars have introduced the notion of a ―continuum‖ of
persuasion or proselytizing techniques. For example, Richard Perloff, after pointing out that
the relationship between coercion and persuasion has long been of interest to philosophers
and communication scholars, seems to suggest that there may not be a sharp difference
between these two terms (1993, 11). He then refers to another writer who places various
modes of social influence on a continuum that ranges from relatively ―noncoercive‖ to
―highly coercive.‖
Margaret Battin introduces the notion of a continuum by first reviewing a series of examples
of unethical proselytizing (1990, ch. 3). These examples are carefully chosen for the
purpose of developing ―an overall, composite scale of aggressiveness in religious convert
seeking‖ (140). It needs to be underscored that Battin‘s scale of aggressiveness in
proselytizing also serves as ―a scale of ethical repugnance‖—―the more aggressive a
practice, the more morally problematic― (147).
At the lower, milder end of the scale is ―invitational convert seeking,‖ where missionaries
represent themselves as models or examples of faith by doing good, engaging in social
activist projects, and thereby hoping to spread the faith by contagion," although no overt
attempt is made to make converts (142). The opposite end of this aggressiveness
continuum includes overt proselytizing that is manipulative, deceptive, and exploitive (135).
Other approaches to proselytizing fall in the middle of this aggressiveness scale. Here, in
the middle of the scale, outright coercion is avoided, but proselytizing is still aggressive in
that it is confrontational, uninvited, and manipulative. This mid-range also includes the
offering of inducements to convert (146).
