Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2006, Page 17
The Problems and Possibilities of Defining Precise Criteria
to Distinguish Between Ethical and Unethical
Proselytizing/Evangelism1
Elmer J. Thiessen, Ph.D.
Medicine Hat College, Alberta, Canada
Abstract
This paper explores some of the problems that I have encountered in trying
to define precise general criteria to distinguish between ethical and unethical
proselytizing or evangelism. Another objective is to explore ways to
overcome these problems. I examine the notion of a ―continuum‖ of
persuasion or proselytizing techniques as a way of overcoming, at least
partially, the problem of vagueness. A continuum of persuasion, ranging
from obviously noncoercive to obviously coercive, does at least help us to
define clear examples of ethical and unethical proselytizing at either end of
the continuum. I then suggest that examples that fall in between these
extremes are best treated in terms of a case by case analysis. Finally, I
suggest a multi-level approach to ethical thinking, which allows for different
levels of precision in criteria to distinguish between ethical and unethical
proselytizing.
This paper grows out of my manuscript on the ethics of proselytizing/evangelism, which is
currently being sent to publishers. My three main objectives of this hopefully soon-to-be
published book are (a) to answer objections that are frequently raised against proselytizing
(b) to defend, and discuss the possibility of, an ethical form of proselytizing and (c) to
develop criteria to distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing or evangelism (I
use the terms proselytizing and evangelism interchangeably). Throughout the manuscript, I
illustrate my arguments by referring to three religions: Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, the
latter used as an illustration of a supposedly nonproselytizing religion. I also refer to ―cults‖
or new religious movements, but I am not assuming that only they are guilty of unethical
proselytizing. One reason I do not focus on the proselytizing activities of cults is that doing
so risks making cults a scapegoat, thereby hindering critical scrutiny of proselytizing in
other so-called ―benign religious groups‖ (West 1990, 126). Various writers have drawn
attention to the existence of ―cult-like‖ behaviour in conventional religious groups (Young
and Griffith 1992, 91-93 Sawatsky 1986). I believe unethical proselytizing or recruitment
practices that are often associated with cults also occur in conventional religious groups.
Further, as various writers have noted, there are problems with defining ―cults,‖ and the
distinction between cults and ―benign‖ religious groups is not as clear-cut as is usually
assumed. So I try to avoid making any assumptions about where unethical proselytizing is
occurring.
My overall aim in this book is to provide a philosophical defense of proselytizing, showing
that an ethical form of proselytizing is indeed possible. However, my intent is not to provide
a blanket defense of all proselytizing. Indeed, another central thrust of this book is to clarify
the distinction between ethical and unethical proselytizing. Thus, toward the end of the
book, I devote two chapters to defining some criteria that can be used to distinguish
between ethical and unethical proselytizing.
This paper focuses on the problems I have encountered in attempting to define some of
these criteria. I also explore ways to overcome the difficulties that arise in trying to define
sharp criteria to distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing.
The Problems and Possibilities of Defining Precise Criteria
to Distinguish Between Ethical and Unethical
Proselytizing/Evangelism1
Elmer J. Thiessen, Ph.D.
Medicine Hat College, Alberta, Canada
Abstract
This paper explores some of the problems that I have encountered in trying
to define precise general criteria to distinguish between ethical and unethical
proselytizing or evangelism. Another objective is to explore ways to
overcome these problems. I examine the notion of a ―continuum‖ of
persuasion or proselytizing techniques as a way of overcoming, at least
partially, the problem of vagueness. A continuum of persuasion, ranging
from obviously noncoercive to obviously coercive, does at least help us to
define clear examples of ethical and unethical proselytizing at either end of
the continuum. I then suggest that examples that fall in between these
extremes are best treated in terms of a case by case analysis. Finally, I
suggest a multi-level approach to ethical thinking, which allows for different
levels of precision in criteria to distinguish between ethical and unethical
proselytizing.
This paper grows out of my manuscript on the ethics of proselytizing/evangelism, which is
currently being sent to publishers. My three main objectives of this hopefully soon-to-be
published book are (a) to answer objections that are frequently raised against proselytizing
(b) to defend, and discuss the possibility of, an ethical form of proselytizing and (c) to
develop criteria to distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing or evangelism (I
use the terms proselytizing and evangelism interchangeably). Throughout the manuscript, I
illustrate my arguments by referring to three religions: Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, the
latter used as an illustration of a supposedly nonproselytizing religion. I also refer to ―cults‖
or new religious movements, but I am not assuming that only they are guilty of unethical
proselytizing. One reason I do not focus on the proselytizing activities of cults is that doing
so risks making cults a scapegoat, thereby hindering critical scrutiny of proselytizing in
other so-called ―benign religious groups‖ (West 1990, 126). Various writers have drawn
attention to the existence of ―cult-like‖ behaviour in conventional religious groups (Young
and Griffith 1992, 91-93 Sawatsky 1986). I believe unethical proselytizing or recruitment
practices that are often associated with cults also occur in conventional religious groups.
Further, as various writers have noted, there are problems with defining ―cults,‖ and the
distinction between cults and ―benign‖ religious groups is not as clear-cut as is usually
assumed. So I try to avoid making any assumptions about where unethical proselytizing is
occurring.
My overall aim in this book is to provide a philosophical defense of proselytizing, showing
that an ethical form of proselytizing is indeed possible. However, my intent is not to provide
a blanket defense of all proselytizing. Indeed, another central thrust of this book is to clarify
the distinction between ethical and unethical proselytizing. Thus, toward the end of the
book, I devote two chapters to defining some criteria that can be used to distinguish
between ethical and unethical proselytizing.
This paper focuses on the problems I have encountered in attempting to define some of
these criteria. I also explore ways to overcome the difficulties that arise in trying to define
sharp criteria to distinguish between ethical and unethical proselytizing.
