Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2006, Page 19
I move next to a consideration of psychological coercion, a charge frequently made against
the influence techniques that cults use. Edgar Schein, who first introduced the notion of
coercive persuasion in his study of prisoners, talks in terms of subjection to ―unusually
intense and prolonged persuasion‖ that prisoners could not avoid thus, ―they were coerced
into allowing themselves to be persuaded‖ (1961, 18). But how intense must a persuasion
technique be for it to be deemed coercive? And how prolonged is ―prolonged persuasion‖?
This kind of vagueness extends to other attempts to define extremes in persuasive
techniques.
Richard Ofshe, for example, suggests that a key factor that distinguishes coercive
persuasion from other training and socialization schemes is ―the reliance on intense
interpersonal and psychological attack to destabilize an individual‘s sense of self to promote
compliance‖ (1992, 213). But how intense must this attack be to be coercive? We must also
keep in mind that conversion that results from proselytizing will necessarily involve some
degree of destabilizing an individual‘s sense of self—after all, the person is undergoing a
serious re-evaluation of core beliefs that he or she may have held for a long time. So we
need to be careful not to be too hasty in identifying the destabilizing of an individual‘s sense
of self as coercive.
Another attempt at defining coercion in cults is to introduce the notion of a coordinated
program of a variety of techniques, the combination of which can be seen as psychologically
coercive (Ofshe and Singer 1986). But how coordinated does a program of influence have to
be to be coercive? Another problem here is that we find coordinated efforts at influencing
beliefs and behavior in other contexts that are generally considered to be quite acceptable.
For example, as Singer and Addis point out, sales programs, recruitment programs, and
political campaigns all include ―planned influence procedures‖ (1992, 171). But unless one
can identify a difference between these coordinated programs to influence beliefs and
behavior and proselytizing programs, one is being inconsistent in calling one kind of
program coercive and the other noncoercive.
In fact, Singer and Addis try to identify a difference in terms of the ―intense and frequent‖
attempts cults make to control and manipulate the social environment of the proselytizees
in various ways (1992, 171). The purpose of such environmental manipulation is to
undermine people‘s confidence and judgment, to cause them to re-evaluate themselves,
and to isolate them from previous social contacts where disconfirming information and
nonsupporting opinions might be expressed. Social, psychological, and spiritual threats and
punishments are used to bring about compliance (171).
The problem here again is the vagueness inherent in the notion of ―intense and frequent‖
attempts to undermine a person‘s capacity to make genuinely free choices. It is also all too
easy to exaggerate human vulnerability. Surely, as Robbins points out, three weeks of
―indoctrination,‖ presuming that brutality and torture were not used, are not sufficient for
an adult to actually ―lose capacity‖ to make choices (1984, 252). Indeed, as various studies
have shown, the high rates of defection from cults and NRMs would suggest that some of
these individuals have not at all lost their capacity to make choices.3 There is also a problem
with the idea of contrived and manipulated environments. If ever there was an institution
that can be characterized as a contrived environmental setting, complete with isolation from
previous social contacts, it is the state-maintained public schools of Western societies. If we
accept control over a person‘s social environment here, should we not also accept it in the
religious context? I will not pursue this point here because I have argued it at length
elsewhere (Thiessen, 1993, ch. 7). We must also be very careful not to rule out the
possibility that recent converts will have a natural tendency to disassociate themselves to
some degree from previous social contacts. A degree of isolation can be a result of
uncoerced individual choice.
I move next to a consideration of psychological coercion, a charge frequently made against
the influence techniques that cults use. Edgar Schein, who first introduced the notion of
coercive persuasion in his study of prisoners, talks in terms of subjection to ―unusually
intense and prolonged persuasion‖ that prisoners could not avoid thus, ―they were coerced
into allowing themselves to be persuaded‖ (1961, 18). But how intense must a persuasion
technique be for it to be deemed coercive? And how prolonged is ―prolonged persuasion‖?
This kind of vagueness extends to other attempts to define extremes in persuasive
techniques.
Richard Ofshe, for example, suggests that a key factor that distinguishes coercive
persuasion from other training and socialization schemes is ―the reliance on intense
interpersonal and psychological attack to destabilize an individual‘s sense of self to promote
compliance‖ (1992, 213). But how intense must this attack be to be coercive? We must also
keep in mind that conversion that results from proselytizing will necessarily involve some
degree of destabilizing an individual‘s sense of self—after all, the person is undergoing a
serious re-evaluation of core beliefs that he or she may have held for a long time. So we
need to be careful not to be too hasty in identifying the destabilizing of an individual‘s sense
of self as coercive.
Another attempt at defining coercion in cults is to introduce the notion of a coordinated
program of a variety of techniques, the combination of which can be seen as psychologically
coercive (Ofshe and Singer 1986). But how coordinated does a program of influence have to
be to be coercive? Another problem here is that we find coordinated efforts at influencing
beliefs and behavior in other contexts that are generally considered to be quite acceptable.
For example, as Singer and Addis point out, sales programs, recruitment programs, and
political campaigns all include ―planned influence procedures‖ (1992, 171). But unless one
can identify a difference between these coordinated programs to influence beliefs and
behavior and proselytizing programs, one is being inconsistent in calling one kind of
program coercive and the other noncoercive.
In fact, Singer and Addis try to identify a difference in terms of the ―intense and frequent‖
attempts cults make to control and manipulate the social environment of the proselytizees
in various ways (1992, 171). The purpose of such environmental manipulation is to
undermine people‘s confidence and judgment, to cause them to re-evaluate themselves,
and to isolate them from previous social contacts where disconfirming information and
nonsupporting opinions might be expressed. Social, psychological, and spiritual threats and
punishments are used to bring about compliance (171).
The problem here again is the vagueness inherent in the notion of ―intense and frequent‖
attempts to undermine a person‘s capacity to make genuinely free choices. It is also all too
easy to exaggerate human vulnerability. Surely, as Robbins points out, three weeks of
―indoctrination,‖ presuming that brutality and torture were not used, are not sufficient for
an adult to actually ―lose capacity‖ to make choices (1984, 252). Indeed, as various studies
have shown, the high rates of defection from cults and NRMs would suggest that some of
these individuals have not at all lost their capacity to make choices.3 There is also a problem
with the idea of contrived and manipulated environments. If ever there was an institution
that can be characterized as a contrived environmental setting, complete with isolation from
previous social contacts, it is the state-maintained public schools of Western societies. If we
accept control over a person‘s social environment here, should we not also accept it in the
religious context? I will not pursue this point here because I have argued it at length
elsewhere (Thiessen, 1993, ch. 7). We must also be very careful not to rule out the
possibility that recent converts will have a natural tendency to disassociate themselves to
some degree from previous social contacts. A degree of isolation can be a result of
uncoerced individual choice.
