Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 6, 2006, Page 18
Problem of Vagueness
What then are some problems inherent in trying to distinguish between ethical and
unethical proselytizing? The fundamental problem is that many criteria used to make this
distinction suffer from vagueness.
Consider, for example, the dignity criterion, which in fact appears quite often in literature
that deals with the ethics of communication, persuasion, and proselytizing.2 I maintain that
ethical proselytizing should always be done in such a way as to protect the dignity and
worth of the person or persons being proselytized. Proselytizing becomes unethical when it
reduces the proselytizee to the status of an object or a pawn in the proselytizing program of
any religious institution or religious organization.
The problem with the dignity criterion, however, is that it is very broad it is in fact difficult
to determine exactly when someone‘s dignity has been violated. Immanuel Kant has given
us a classic formulation of the dignity criterion—to treat persons with dignity entails that
they must be valued as ends in themselves.
Anthropologist and long-time Christian missionary Jacob Loewen, in reflecting on his life‘s
work, draws attention to a specific way in which a violation of the principle of treating
persons as ends in themselves can occur when proselytizing. He refers to what is often
called ―friendship evangelism‖ in Christian evangelical circles, an approach to evangelism
wherein church members befriend nonchurchgoing individuals with the goal of bringing
them to church. What worries Loewen about friendship evangelism is that it can so easily be
subverted to become a ―bated hook‖ approach to evangelism (2000, 90). If friendship is
merely a way of luring the unsuspecting into the Christian fold—hence, the label ―bated
hook‖—then the person being befriended is not being treated as an end in himself or
herself. The problem here is that it is very difficult to determine the genuineness of a
friendship. Indeed, Kant would admit that even in a friendship, persons are treated as a
means to an end to some degree. Only if a person is ―simply‖ being used as a means to an
end has something gone wrong. But here again, it is difficult to determine if in fact a person
is being used simply as a means to an end. This problem also applies to the area of
friendship evangelism.
I move on to consider a second criterion that can be seen as growing out of the dignity
criterion. I refer to this second measure as the ―coercion criterion.‖ The freedom to make
choices is central to the dignity of persons. Moral proselytizing will therefore allow persons
to make a genuinely free and uncoerced choice with regard to conversion. Coercive
proselytizing is immoral. It is rather easy to articulate the essence of the coercion criterion
as a basis for distinguishing between moral and immoral proselytizing. Difficulties quickly
emerge when it comes to describing exactly what is meant by uncoerced choice. Indeed, it
is necessary to distinguish between several quite different understandings of coercive
proselytizing.
I begin with a mark of noncoercive proselytizing that would seem to be the easiest to
identify—the absence of physical coercion or the threat of physical coercion. Clearly, if I
hold a sword over you while you are in a supine position, and then tell you to convert, I am
being coercive in my proselytizing efforts. But even here questions can be raised as to
whether this action is necessarily coercive. After all, there are many examples in history of
persons who refused to convert to whatever religion, even under such ―obvious‖ conditions
of physical coercion. So even the physical coercion criterion is not as tight as is often
assumed. However, I suspect that most of us will still maintain that the use of physical
coercion when proselytizing is coercive and hence immoral. Surely ordinary people typically
find themselves incapable of resisting the pressures of physical coercion. Therefore, we
generally understand the application of physical force to be an extreme expression of
coercion, and hence immoral.
Problem of Vagueness
What then are some problems inherent in trying to distinguish between ethical and
unethical proselytizing? The fundamental problem is that many criteria used to make this
distinction suffer from vagueness.
Consider, for example, the dignity criterion, which in fact appears quite often in literature
that deals with the ethics of communication, persuasion, and proselytizing.2 I maintain that
ethical proselytizing should always be done in such a way as to protect the dignity and
worth of the person or persons being proselytized. Proselytizing becomes unethical when it
reduces the proselytizee to the status of an object or a pawn in the proselytizing program of
any religious institution or religious organization.
The problem with the dignity criterion, however, is that it is very broad it is in fact difficult
to determine exactly when someone‘s dignity has been violated. Immanuel Kant has given
us a classic formulation of the dignity criterion—to treat persons with dignity entails that
they must be valued as ends in themselves.
Anthropologist and long-time Christian missionary Jacob Loewen, in reflecting on his life‘s
work, draws attention to a specific way in which a violation of the principle of treating
persons as ends in themselves can occur when proselytizing. He refers to what is often
called ―friendship evangelism‖ in Christian evangelical circles, an approach to evangelism
wherein church members befriend nonchurchgoing individuals with the goal of bringing
them to church. What worries Loewen about friendship evangelism is that it can so easily be
subverted to become a ―bated hook‖ approach to evangelism (2000, 90). If friendship is
merely a way of luring the unsuspecting into the Christian fold—hence, the label ―bated
hook‖—then the person being befriended is not being treated as an end in himself or
herself. The problem here is that it is very difficult to determine the genuineness of a
friendship. Indeed, Kant would admit that even in a friendship, persons are treated as a
means to an end to some degree. Only if a person is ―simply‖ being used as a means to an
end has something gone wrong. But here again, it is difficult to determine if in fact a person
is being used simply as a means to an end. This problem also applies to the area of
friendship evangelism.
I move on to consider a second criterion that can be seen as growing out of the dignity
criterion. I refer to this second measure as the ―coercion criterion.‖ The freedom to make
choices is central to the dignity of persons. Moral proselytizing will therefore allow persons
to make a genuinely free and uncoerced choice with regard to conversion. Coercive
proselytizing is immoral. It is rather easy to articulate the essence of the coercion criterion
as a basis for distinguishing between moral and immoral proselytizing. Difficulties quickly
emerge when it comes to describing exactly what is meant by uncoerced choice. Indeed, it
is necessary to distinguish between several quite different understandings of coercive
proselytizing.
I begin with a mark of noncoercive proselytizing that would seem to be the easiest to
identify—the absence of physical coercion or the threat of physical coercion. Clearly, if I
hold a sword over you while you are in a supine position, and then tell you to convert, I am
being coercive in my proselytizing efforts. But even here questions can be raised as to
whether this action is necessarily coercive. After all, there are many examples in history of
persons who refused to convert to whatever religion, even under such ―obvious‖ conditions
of physical coercion. So even the physical coercion criterion is not as tight as is often
assumed. However, I suspect that most of us will still maintain that the use of physical
coercion when proselytizing is coercive and hence immoral. Surely ordinary people typically
find themselves incapable of resisting the pressures of physical coercion. Therefore, we
generally understand the application of physical force to be an extreme expression of
coercion, and hence immoral.
