21 VOLUME 5 |ISSUE 3 |2014
texts’ interest in money appears indeed, according to the
Supreme Court, as “excessive,” but a similar excessive interest
in money is often found in Catholic and other movements
that nobody would regard as nonreligious. The Supreme
Court observed that, even if one should take at face value
the “crude” comment included in a technical bulletin of
Scientology that “the only reason why LRH [L. Ron Hubbard]
established the Church was in order to sell and deliver
Dianetics and Scientology,” this would not necessarily mean,
accordingly, that Scientology is not a religion. What is, in fact,
the ultimate aim of “selling Dianetics and Scientology”? There
is no evidence, the Supreme Court suggested, that such
“sales” are organized only to assure the personal welfare of
the leaders. If they are intended as a proselytizing tool, then
making money is only an intermediate aim. The ultimate aim
is “proselytization,” and this aim “could hardly be more typical
of a religion,” even if “according to the strategy of the founder
[Hubbard], new converts are sought and organized through
the ‘sale and delivery’ of Dianetics and Scientology.”
Another interesting objection the Supreme Court discussed
is that Scientology is not a religion since there was evidence
in the Milan case itself that a number of Scientologists were
guilty of “fraudulent sales techniques,” or that they abused
particularly weak customers when “selling” Dianetics or
Scientology. These illegal activities, the Supreme Court
commented, should be punished but the presence of
“deviant activities” is not the criterion for establishing
whether or not a group is religious. A group may both
engage in a certain number of illegal activities, which are
not protected by provisions on religious liberty and should
be prohibited and sanctioned, and maintain a basic religious
identity.
Summing up, the Supreme Court decision of 1997
established five fundamental principles about defining
religion under Italian law. First: There is no fixed definition
of religion, since the very notion of religion is subject to
historical evolution and change. Second: Religion may
exist without a belief in a personal God. Third: Neither the
self-definition by the movement concerned, nor the public
opinion influenced by the media should have significant
relevance. Fourth: A movement may exhibit a truly excessive
interest in extorting money from its followers and still
maintain a fundamentally religious nature. Fifth: Leaders of
a movement may be guilty of sustained criminal offenses,
for which they should be prosecuted without being allowed
to claim religious liberty as a defense but these criminal
offenses do not take away the religious nature of the group
when this has been recognized according to general criteria.
We should not be afraid, the Supreme Court implied, that
recognition of certain movements as religious will be a
license for them to commit common crimes. Contrary to a
perception circulated in the media, a movement may be both
religious and guilty of sustained criminal activities. Religions
do not always “do good.”
Both in my capacity as an institutional advocate of religious
liberty and as a social scientist, I believe that these principles
may be useful internationally.
Ultimately, of course, these debates have no final or true
solution. In 1996, sociologist Larry Greil famously stated that
religion [is] not (...)a characteristic which inheres in
certain phenomena, but (...)a cultural resource over
which competing interest groups may vie. From
this perspective, religion is not an entity but a claim
made by certain groups and—in some cases—
contested by others to the right of privileges
associated in a given society with the religious
label.
Definitions of religion are not essentialist truths, but tools
for pursuing certain social aims. The Italian Supreme
Court stated that religious liberty is best served by broad
definitions of religion. Those definitions may involve risks,
too. These risks are the price to pay for the benefit of living
in a free society, which recognizes religious liberty as the
cornerstone of most other liberties. n
A movement may be
both religious and guilty
of sustained criminal
activities. Religions do
not always “do good.”
About the Author
Massimo Introvigne, JD,
is a professor of Sociology of religion
at the Pontifical Salesian University,
Turin a partner in one of Italy’s
largest law firms and a member of
the Religions division of the Italian
Association of Sociology. He is the
author of more than thirty books and
one hundred articles in international
journals on the sociology and history
of religious movements, and has been
the chief editor of the award-winning Encyclopedia of Religions
in Italy (2001 third edition: 2013). He is the head of CESNUR
(Center for Studies on New Religions). In 2012 he was appointed
Chairperson, Observatory of Religious Liberty established by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, Italy. n
texts’ interest in money appears indeed, according to the
Supreme Court, as “excessive,” but a similar excessive interest
in money is often found in Catholic and other movements
that nobody would regard as nonreligious. The Supreme
Court observed that, even if one should take at face value
the “crude” comment included in a technical bulletin of
Scientology that “the only reason why LRH [L. Ron Hubbard]
established the Church was in order to sell and deliver
Dianetics and Scientology,” this would not necessarily mean,
accordingly, that Scientology is not a religion. What is, in fact,
the ultimate aim of “selling Dianetics and Scientology”? There
is no evidence, the Supreme Court suggested, that such
“sales” are organized only to assure the personal welfare of
the leaders. If they are intended as a proselytizing tool, then
making money is only an intermediate aim. The ultimate aim
is “proselytization,” and this aim “could hardly be more typical
of a religion,” even if “according to the strategy of the founder
[Hubbard], new converts are sought and organized through
the ‘sale and delivery’ of Dianetics and Scientology.”
Another interesting objection the Supreme Court discussed
is that Scientology is not a religion since there was evidence
in the Milan case itself that a number of Scientologists were
guilty of “fraudulent sales techniques,” or that they abused
particularly weak customers when “selling” Dianetics or
Scientology. These illegal activities, the Supreme Court
commented, should be punished but the presence of
“deviant activities” is not the criterion for establishing
whether or not a group is religious. A group may both
engage in a certain number of illegal activities, which are
not protected by provisions on religious liberty and should
be prohibited and sanctioned, and maintain a basic religious
identity.
Summing up, the Supreme Court decision of 1997
established five fundamental principles about defining
religion under Italian law. First: There is no fixed definition
of religion, since the very notion of religion is subject to
historical evolution and change. Second: Religion may
exist without a belief in a personal God. Third: Neither the
self-definition by the movement concerned, nor the public
opinion influenced by the media should have significant
relevance. Fourth: A movement may exhibit a truly excessive
interest in extorting money from its followers and still
maintain a fundamentally religious nature. Fifth: Leaders of
a movement may be guilty of sustained criminal offenses,
for which they should be prosecuted without being allowed
to claim religious liberty as a defense but these criminal
offenses do not take away the religious nature of the group
when this has been recognized according to general criteria.
We should not be afraid, the Supreme Court implied, that
recognition of certain movements as religious will be a
license for them to commit common crimes. Contrary to a
perception circulated in the media, a movement may be both
religious and guilty of sustained criminal activities. Religions
do not always “do good.”
Both in my capacity as an institutional advocate of religious
liberty and as a social scientist, I believe that these principles
may be useful internationally.
Ultimately, of course, these debates have no final or true
solution. In 1996, sociologist Larry Greil famously stated that
religion [is] not (...)a characteristic which inheres in
certain phenomena, but (...)a cultural resource over
which competing interest groups may vie. From
this perspective, religion is not an entity but a claim
made by certain groups and—in some cases—
contested by others to the right of privileges
associated in a given society with the religious
label.
Definitions of religion are not essentialist truths, but tools
for pursuing certain social aims. The Italian Supreme
Court stated that religious liberty is best served by broad
definitions of religion. Those definitions may involve risks,
too. These risks are the price to pay for the benefit of living
in a free society, which recognizes religious liberty as the
cornerstone of most other liberties. n
A movement may be
both religious and guilty
of sustained criminal
activities. Religions do
not always “do good.”
About the Author
Massimo Introvigne, JD,
is a professor of Sociology of religion
at the Pontifical Salesian University,
Turin a partner in one of Italy’s
largest law firms and a member of
the Religions division of the Italian
Association of Sociology. He is the
author of more than thirty books and
one hundred articles in international
journals on the sociology and history
of religious movements, and has been
the chief editor of the award-winning Encyclopedia of Religions
in Italy (2001 third edition: 2013). He is the head of CESNUR
(Center for Studies on New Religions). In 2012 he was appointed
Chairperson, Observatory of Religious Liberty established by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, Italy. n
