Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2009, Page 25
British and Hindu identities. This artificial identity of opposition helped sectarianism
to spread, because sectarian groups could appeal to the grievances of the people
who were not comfortable with the artificial identity by focusing their attention on
the past grandeur and unity of Islam.
4. Precipitating factors. In Pakistan, internal and external events contributed to the
resurgence of sects. Internally, we can point to Pakistan‘s division into two parts
(present-day Pakistan and Bangladesh) and the Islamization program of the military
dictator, Zia ul-Haq. Externally, there was the Iranian revolution, which fed Shia
militancy and the Afghanistan war, with the consequences it had on Sunnis. The
authorities‘ repeated lying to the Pakistani masses caused a loss of governmental
credibility that paved the way for conflict.
5. Mobilisation for action. The affected groups felt the need to become organized. Such
organization was provided with the help and sponsorship of foreign and local agents,
in the shape of politico-religious groups.
6. Failure of social control. The state‘s weakness and lack of control and inability to
react effectively resulted in a generalized breakdown of social control.
Given this context, the character of sects in the Pakistani context would be defined by:
A political reading of Islam and not a formulation of a new theology. Nonetheless, it
must be noted that some groups, by taking some verses of the Quran out of context,
are, to a degree, reinventing religion.
Sects appearing as a form of politico-religious nationalism. They all claim to have the
best solution for the country‘s problems.
A combination of ethnic with Islamic discourses creating a new ethnic nationalism.
Nevertheless, most ethnic-nationalist groups in Pakistan are secular. This nationalism
is more related to tribalism.
Sectarian groups not necessarily being marginal. Some of them become political
parties.
Sectarian groups portraying themselves as opposed to the corrupted system
represented by the State.
The History of the Red Mosque
Children coming from backward tribal areas (mainly Pashtun, but some also Punjabi 4 some
of the children were family to mujahideen dead fighting in Kashmir) had come to study at
both schools attached to the Mosque, in one of the nicest and posh areas of the capital.
These children did not relate to the Pakistani elites, or to the artificial Islamic identity these
elites promoted. They were, therefore, vulnerable to those peddling a ―pure‖ form of Islam,
one that would empower the poor.
The leaders of the Mosque, the two brothers Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi, were
children during the war against the ―infidel‖ Soviets in neighboring Afghanistan. They grew
up with the idea of jihad5 as a sacred duty of Muslims. Their father was the first leader of
the Mosque, built in 1969, and was well known during the days when militancy and the
mujahideen were the fighters the West supported to stop the spread of Communism. He
had sent many to fight there, and their vision of religion was similar to a military discipline.
A dualist vision of the world, Good against Evil, was thus assumed by the two brothers, who
did not and could not strip themselves of all the ideas they had assimilated.
At the end of the war with the Soviets, all the constructed imagery about fighting evil under
the flag of Islam vanished, and the brothers, as well as many others, were abandoned and,
British and Hindu identities. This artificial identity of opposition helped sectarianism
to spread, because sectarian groups could appeal to the grievances of the people
who were not comfortable with the artificial identity by focusing their attention on
the past grandeur and unity of Islam.
4. Precipitating factors. In Pakistan, internal and external events contributed to the
resurgence of sects. Internally, we can point to Pakistan‘s division into two parts
(present-day Pakistan and Bangladesh) and the Islamization program of the military
dictator, Zia ul-Haq. Externally, there was the Iranian revolution, which fed Shia
militancy and the Afghanistan war, with the consequences it had on Sunnis. The
authorities‘ repeated lying to the Pakistani masses caused a loss of governmental
credibility that paved the way for conflict.
5. Mobilisation for action. The affected groups felt the need to become organized. Such
organization was provided with the help and sponsorship of foreign and local agents,
in the shape of politico-religious groups.
6. Failure of social control. The state‘s weakness and lack of control and inability to
react effectively resulted in a generalized breakdown of social control.
Given this context, the character of sects in the Pakistani context would be defined by:
A political reading of Islam and not a formulation of a new theology. Nonetheless, it
must be noted that some groups, by taking some verses of the Quran out of context,
are, to a degree, reinventing religion.
Sects appearing as a form of politico-religious nationalism. They all claim to have the
best solution for the country‘s problems.
A combination of ethnic with Islamic discourses creating a new ethnic nationalism.
Nevertheless, most ethnic-nationalist groups in Pakistan are secular. This nationalism
is more related to tribalism.
Sectarian groups not necessarily being marginal. Some of them become political
parties.
Sectarian groups portraying themselves as opposed to the corrupted system
represented by the State.
The History of the Red Mosque
Children coming from backward tribal areas (mainly Pashtun, but some also Punjabi 4 some
of the children were family to mujahideen dead fighting in Kashmir) had come to study at
both schools attached to the Mosque, in one of the nicest and posh areas of the capital.
These children did not relate to the Pakistani elites, or to the artificial Islamic identity these
elites promoted. They were, therefore, vulnerable to those peddling a ―pure‖ form of Islam,
one that would empower the poor.
The leaders of the Mosque, the two brothers Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi, were
children during the war against the ―infidel‖ Soviets in neighboring Afghanistan. They grew
up with the idea of jihad5 as a sacred duty of Muslims. Their father was the first leader of
the Mosque, built in 1969, and was well known during the days when militancy and the
mujahideen were the fighters the West supported to stop the spread of Communism. He
had sent many to fight there, and their vision of religion was similar to a military discipline.
A dualist vision of the world, Good against Evil, was thus assumed by the two brothers, who
did not and could not strip themselves of all the ideas they had assimilated.
At the end of the war with the Soviets, all the constructed imagery about fighting evil under
the flag of Islam vanished, and the brothers, as well as many others, were abandoned and,
