Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2008, Page 25
soldiers to leave the LRA without fear of legal reparations,9 does motivate some soldiers to
surrender (Vinci, 2005:366-367). Despite the government‘s efforts to broadcast the
Amnesty Accord over the radio, the LRA prevents many children and soldiers from learning
about it.
Because of Museveni‘s policies, many northern Ugandans question his commitment to
removing children from war, and documentary makers even have recorded Museveni saying
that it is tradition for children to know how to fight by the age of four (In a Soldier‟s
Footsteps, 2005). When Museveni took power in 1986, his forces consisted of many
‗adopted‘ children to whom the NRA offered food and clothing in exchange for their services.
The NRA used children from 1981 until 1986 when Museveni took power and no longer felt
the need to supplement his forces with underage fighters (Dodge 1991, 52). As a result of
either international pressure or a sincere change in beliefs, however, President Museveni
now argues that Uganda is officially against the use of child soldiers.
Kony began his movement—with little support—as a private gang, which eventually grew to
become the current guerrilla movement (Doom and Vlassenroot 1998, 21). Until 1991, the
Acholi were relatively tolerant of the LRA because it was fighting the NRA, who terrorized
Acholi locals (Behrend 1999a, 189). In 1991, however, the focus of the LRA shifted from
fighting the NRA on behalf of the Acholi to slaughtering the Acholi people themselves (Ward
2003, 200). In 1994, Kony announced that he had had a revelation of how to create a ‗pure‘
society, which required killing impure civilians and recruiting children to form a new society.
That year, the LRA also gained support from Sudan‘s Islamic government—primarily
because of the LRA‘s ability to fight a rebel movement in Southern Sudan, where many LRA
bases were located. With the Sudanese government‘s support, the LRA incorporated
Sudanese weapons, set up bases in southern Sudan, and added Kony‘s interpretation of
Islamic doctrine into the movement (Doom and Vlassenroot 1998, 25). With Sudanese
support, Kony achieved a warlord status (which continues to this day) over a submissive
Ugandan population because of damage caused by child soldiers.10
Aside from Sudan‘s funding, which allegedly has ceased (Prendergast, 2005:3), it is unclear
where the LRA finds its resources and how much it receives. The LRA does have
international representatives who provide some of the revenue that it needs to fund its war.
To encourage people abroad (especially in Britain) to donate money for the group through
publicity campaigns and the Internet, these representatives frame the LRA‘s political goals
as a legitimate battle against a corrupt government (de Temmerman 2001, 152). Despite
these efforts, the LRA seems to operate with inadequate resources—few recruits have
weapons, food is scarce in the group, and the group seems to travel primarily by foot.
Even the composition and quantity of the LRA‘s human resources are difficult to determine.
Former rebels claim that Kony has thousands of children who follow his every demand
without question (Hovil and Lomo 2004, 31). The LRA allegedly grew to a total of 3,000 to
4,000 combatants (Allen 2006, 65). This estimate, however, is from 1997, and it is
impossible to know whether it is accurate because of the high death rate among the
unwilling children involved. Furthermore, as Tim Allen (2006:63) argues, only a small
portion of the LRA is operating in northern Uganda at any given moment, while the
remainder of the LRA remains in bordering nations, such as Sudan and the Congo.
Therefore, the numbers are difficult to count. Between 1995 and 1997, however, 3,000 to
5,000 children escaped the LRA (estimated by UNICEF), leaving another 3,000 to 5,000
abductees unaccounted for (HRW 1997, 4). One important note with these estimates is that
the UPDF and the LRA kill many of the children who attempt to escape during or shortly
after battle. Other children die of starvation, disease, dehydration, or occasionally violence
by civilians who fear for their own safety. Furthermore, outsiders may consider children who
wish to escape but never do to be loyal members of the LRA.
soldiers to leave the LRA without fear of legal reparations,9 does motivate some soldiers to
surrender (Vinci, 2005:366-367). Despite the government‘s efforts to broadcast the
Amnesty Accord over the radio, the LRA prevents many children and soldiers from learning
about it.
Because of Museveni‘s policies, many northern Ugandans question his commitment to
removing children from war, and documentary makers even have recorded Museveni saying
that it is tradition for children to know how to fight by the age of four (In a Soldier‟s
Footsteps, 2005). When Museveni took power in 1986, his forces consisted of many
‗adopted‘ children to whom the NRA offered food and clothing in exchange for their services.
The NRA used children from 1981 until 1986 when Museveni took power and no longer felt
the need to supplement his forces with underage fighters (Dodge 1991, 52). As a result of
either international pressure or a sincere change in beliefs, however, President Museveni
now argues that Uganda is officially against the use of child soldiers.
Kony began his movement—with little support—as a private gang, which eventually grew to
become the current guerrilla movement (Doom and Vlassenroot 1998, 21). Until 1991, the
Acholi were relatively tolerant of the LRA because it was fighting the NRA, who terrorized
Acholi locals (Behrend 1999a, 189). In 1991, however, the focus of the LRA shifted from
fighting the NRA on behalf of the Acholi to slaughtering the Acholi people themselves (Ward
2003, 200). In 1994, Kony announced that he had had a revelation of how to create a ‗pure‘
society, which required killing impure civilians and recruiting children to form a new society.
That year, the LRA also gained support from Sudan‘s Islamic government—primarily
because of the LRA‘s ability to fight a rebel movement in Southern Sudan, where many LRA
bases were located. With the Sudanese government‘s support, the LRA incorporated
Sudanese weapons, set up bases in southern Sudan, and added Kony‘s interpretation of
Islamic doctrine into the movement (Doom and Vlassenroot 1998, 25). With Sudanese
support, Kony achieved a warlord status (which continues to this day) over a submissive
Ugandan population because of damage caused by child soldiers.10
Aside from Sudan‘s funding, which allegedly has ceased (Prendergast, 2005:3), it is unclear
where the LRA finds its resources and how much it receives. The LRA does have
international representatives who provide some of the revenue that it needs to fund its war.
To encourage people abroad (especially in Britain) to donate money for the group through
publicity campaigns and the Internet, these representatives frame the LRA‘s political goals
as a legitimate battle against a corrupt government (de Temmerman 2001, 152). Despite
these efforts, the LRA seems to operate with inadequate resources—few recruits have
weapons, food is scarce in the group, and the group seems to travel primarily by foot.
Even the composition and quantity of the LRA‘s human resources are difficult to determine.
Former rebels claim that Kony has thousands of children who follow his every demand
without question (Hovil and Lomo 2004, 31). The LRA allegedly grew to a total of 3,000 to
4,000 combatants (Allen 2006, 65). This estimate, however, is from 1997, and it is
impossible to know whether it is accurate because of the high death rate among the
unwilling children involved. Furthermore, as Tim Allen (2006:63) argues, only a small
portion of the LRA is operating in northern Uganda at any given moment, while the
remainder of the LRA remains in bordering nations, such as Sudan and the Congo.
Therefore, the numbers are difficult to count. Between 1995 and 1997, however, 3,000 to
5,000 children escaped the LRA (estimated by UNICEF), leaving another 3,000 to 5,000
abductees unaccounted for (HRW 1997, 4). One important note with these estimates is that
the UPDF and the LRA kill many of the children who attempt to escape during or shortly
after battle. Other children die of starvation, disease, dehydration, or occasionally violence
by civilians who fear for their own safety. Furthermore, outsiders may consider children who
wish to escape but never do to be loyal members of the LRA.
