Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2008, Page 22
content to use northern Uganda as a source of soldiers, labor, and foodstuffs and to invest
in southern Ugandan development (Mawson 2004, 132). As a result of this policy, southern
Uganda (especially the Bugandan region) became rich in commerce, civil service, and cash
crops (Jackson 2002, 36), while northern Uganda stagnated economically, and many men in
the region became dependent on war for employment (Doom and Vlassenroot 1998, 6).
When Uganda gained independence in 1962, Britain granted presidency to the leader of the
Bugandan tribe (the Kabaka), whom Milton Obote soon ousted with the help of the King‘s
Army Rifles (Allen 2006, 28). As a president, however, Obote was dependent on his soldiers
to maintain his power (Allen 2006, 28). One of President Obote‘s commanders, Idi Amin,
took advantage of Obote‘s military dependency in 1971 when Amin held a coup with some
of Obote‘s non-Acholi soldiers (Jackson 2002, 36). The international community initially saw
Amin‘s rise to power as a positive alternative to President Obote, whom many considered
communist, but President Amin soon proved to be a brutal dictator who idolized Hitler,
exiled thousands of Ugandans, and killed many more—including many northern Ugandans
(Legume 1997, 252, 255).
One of President Amin‘s massacres involved the slaughter of many soldiers of northern
descent in 1972 (Van Acker 2004, 340). Horrified, the remainder of those soldiers retreated
into Sudan and became the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), which supported
former President Obote (Allen 2006, 29). In 1979, the Tanzanian government aligned with
the UNLA to oust President Amin and restore Obote to power (Allen 2006, 29). Obote ruled
by violence and faced opposition from many people. In 1980, the future president, Yoweri
Museveni, retreated into the forest with his guerilla forces, the National Resistance Army
(NRA [Allen 2006, 29]).
From 1980 until 1985, battles raged between rebel groups and the government in the
Luwero triangle (located in part of southern Uganda), where more than 300,000 Ugandans
lost their lives (Jackson 2002, 36). In 1985, Acholi general Tito Okello took power from
Obote (HRW 1997, 63). Okello quickly went to work drafting a peace agreement with
Museveni‘s NRA—the other large opposition force in the Luwero triangle (Allen 2006, 30).
Museveni, however, saw the peace agreement as an opportunity to take power from Acholi-
supported President Okello, and within months he marched against the unsuspecting leader
(Allen 2006, 30).
After taking power in 1986, President Museveni ordered Acholi soldiers to report to
barracks, but many northern Ugandans refused to do so because they feared a repeat of
President Amin‘s massacre of Acholi soldiers in 1972 (Van Acker 2004, 340). Convinced that
Museveni was no better than Amin, many ex-soldiers again retreated into northern Uganda
and southern Sudan to regroup as the Ugandan Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA [Doom
and Vlassenroot 1998, 13 Van Acker 2004, 340]).
Since Museveni‘s rise to power, the NRA (now named the Ugandan Peoples Democratic
Forces [UPDF]) committed many crimes against northern Ugandans, especially opposition
soldiers (Behrend 1998, 108 Dodge 1991, 71).3 In 1988, the UPDA signed a peace
agreement with Museveni‘s NRA. But that same year, the NRA launched military operations
to destroy the remaining UPDA bases in Uganda (Van Acker 2004, 41). Although since 1991
the NRA has eased up on its actions against the Acholi, it has never ceased punishing the
Acholi, and—with the current state of violence in northern Uganda—every atrocity
committed by government forces today reminds the Acholi people of their history of
oppression (Mawson 2004, 139).
In the late 1980s, the UPDF responded to abuse from the NRA by rallying support from
northern Ugandans—including Joseph Kony—in an effort to take power back from Museveni
(Doom and Vlassenroot 1998, 13). As a guerrilla force, the UPDA was initially successful but
terribly disorganized and under-trained (Pain 1997, 31). The group‘s only unifying force was
content to use northern Uganda as a source of soldiers, labor, and foodstuffs and to invest
in southern Ugandan development (Mawson 2004, 132). As a result of this policy, southern
Uganda (especially the Bugandan region) became rich in commerce, civil service, and cash
crops (Jackson 2002, 36), while northern Uganda stagnated economically, and many men in
the region became dependent on war for employment (Doom and Vlassenroot 1998, 6).
When Uganda gained independence in 1962, Britain granted presidency to the leader of the
Bugandan tribe (the Kabaka), whom Milton Obote soon ousted with the help of the King‘s
Army Rifles (Allen 2006, 28). As a president, however, Obote was dependent on his soldiers
to maintain his power (Allen 2006, 28). One of President Obote‘s commanders, Idi Amin,
took advantage of Obote‘s military dependency in 1971 when Amin held a coup with some
of Obote‘s non-Acholi soldiers (Jackson 2002, 36). The international community initially saw
Amin‘s rise to power as a positive alternative to President Obote, whom many considered
communist, but President Amin soon proved to be a brutal dictator who idolized Hitler,
exiled thousands of Ugandans, and killed many more—including many northern Ugandans
(Legume 1997, 252, 255).
One of President Amin‘s massacres involved the slaughter of many soldiers of northern
descent in 1972 (Van Acker 2004, 340). Horrified, the remainder of those soldiers retreated
into Sudan and became the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), which supported
former President Obote (Allen 2006, 29). In 1979, the Tanzanian government aligned with
the UNLA to oust President Amin and restore Obote to power (Allen 2006, 29). Obote ruled
by violence and faced opposition from many people. In 1980, the future president, Yoweri
Museveni, retreated into the forest with his guerilla forces, the National Resistance Army
(NRA [Allen 2006, 29]).
From 1980 until 1985, battles raged between rebel groups and the government in the
Luwero triangle (located in part of southern Uganda), where more than 300,000 Ugandans
lost their lives (Jackson 2002, 36). In 1985, Acholi general Tito Okello took power from
Obote (HRW 1997, 63). Okello quickly went to work drafting a peace agreement with
Museveni‘s NRA—the other large opposition force in the Luwero triangle (Allen 2006, 30).
Museveni, however, saw the peace agreement as an opportunity to take power from Acholi-
supported President Okello, and within months he marched against the unsuspecting leader
(Allen 2006, 30).
After taking power in 1986, President Museveni ordered Acholi soldiers to report to
barracks, but many northern Ugandans refused to do so because they feared a repeat of
President Amin‘s massacre of Acholi soldiers in 1972 (Van Acker 2004, 340). Convinced that
Museveni was no better than Amin, many ex-soldiers again retreated into northern Uganda
and southern Sudan to regroup as the Ugandan Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA [Doom
and Vlassenroot 1998, 13 Van Acker 2004, 340]).
Since Museveni‘s rise to power, the NRA (now named the Ugandan Peoples Democratic
Forces [UPDF]) committed many crimes against northern Ugandans, especially opposition
soldiers (Behrend 1998, 108 Dodge 1991, 71).3 In 1988, the UPDA signed a peace
agreement with Museveni‘s NRA. But that same year, the NRA launched military operations
to destroy the remaining UPDA bases in Uganda (Van Acker 2004, 41). Although since 1991
the NRA has eased up on its actions against the Acholi, it has never ceased punishing the
Acholi, and—with the current state of violence in northern Uganda—every atrocity
committed by government forces today reminds the Acholi people of their history of
oppression (Mawson 2004, 139).
In the late 1980s, the UPDF responded to abuse from the NRA by rallying support from
northern Ugandans—including Joseph Kony—in an effort to take power back from Museveni
(Doom and Vlassenroot 1998, 13). As a guerrilla force, the UPDA was initially successful but
terribly disorganized and under-trained (Pain 1997, 31). The group‘s only unifying force was
