Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2008, Page 24
Severino Lukoya is a catechist who attempted to claim his daughter‘s following by insisting
that some of Alice‘s jogi along with other well-known Acholi jogi possessed him (Behrend
1999b, 27-28). But Lukoya‘s attempts to convert Alice‘s followers failed, perhaps in part
because Alice refused his aid while she commanded the HSMF (Allen 2006, 36). Responding
to his feelings of failure, Lukoya also used violence to coerce followers, earning the
nickname otong-tong, which means ―one who chops victims to pieces‖ (Doom and
Vlassenroot 1998, 19). Lukoya succeeded in gathering 2,000 followers for his movement,
the Lord‘s Army (Behrend 1999b, 28). The Lord‘s Army fought some battles before the
group disintegrated.6
Joseph Kony recruited soldiers from all three of these guerrilla movements—the UPDA, the
HSMF, and the Lord‘s Army—but his movement primarily is a schism off the HSMF and the
UPDA. Kony adopted many aspects of the LRA‘s organization from Alice and Lukoya. For
example, he implements the Holy Spirit Safety Precautions from the HSMF, he initiates
similar rituals to Lukoya‘s and Alice‘s, he claims jogi possess him, and he violently recruits
like Lukoya. Part of the explanation, however, for the LRA‘s brutality is the adoption of the
battle tactics used by some UPDA commanders who would not surrender when the UPDA
disbanded (Behrend 1999b, 20). Most UPDA commanders who turned to Kony previously
committed atrocities that prevented their reintegration (Vinci 2005, 365). The LRA‘s use of
child soldiers, however, is unique among these groups (and the early NRA during its march
on Kampala), although not unique among internationally located guerrilla movements
(Dodge 1991, 52).
Dealing with child soldiers is a complex endeavor for various governments around the world.
In many countries, guerrilla forces or government forces make use of children (Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004 Singer 2005, 16 Wessells 2006, 10-11). Indeed, if the
definition of a child soldier is any military fighter under the age of eighteen, then many
European countries, as well as Canada and the United States, enlist children into the armed
forces with parental consent (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004, 122, 152,
217).7 The experience of child soldiers varies extensively depending on what country they
are situated within and who recruits them. While children in the LRA have particularly
horrific experiences, many other groups that recruit child soldiers also create comparably
terrible environments.8
To combat the LRA‘s use of child soldiers, Museveni held several peace talks with the LRA in
the 1990s (Allen 2006, 70 Amnesty International 1997, 5). Previous peace talks, however,
ended with the government‘s accusation that the rebels are ‗anti-peace‘—a position
reinforced by the LRA‘s resurgence of violence. Nonetheless, recent peace negotiations
leave the Final Peace Agreement between the LRA and the Ugandan government awaiting
signatures from both Kony and Museveni (Sudan Tribune, 2008). Moreover, the negotiations
were threatened by the LRA‘s hesitancy to travel to the talks unless the International
Criminal Court dropped its charges for Kony and three of his commanders—the warrants
may only be for Kony and two of his commanders now because Kony allegedly had his
second in command, Vincent Otti, executed (Independent Online, 2007).
In addition, many northern Ugandans criticize some of Museveni‘s policies, such as
Operation North in 1991, which blocked migration between northern and southern Uganda,
trapping northerners within the LRA‘s grasp (Allen 2006, 69-70). Operation Iron Fist I and
Operation Iron Fist II also received wide criticism because both involved sending an
inadequate number of UPDF into Sudan to attempt to suppress the LRA. In both instances,
the operations drove the LRA out of Sudan and back into Uganda, where they increased
attacks on civilians (although it is difficult to estimate how much they increased attacks
because the LRA also ceased attacking Sudanese civilians [Vinci 2005, 367]). In essence,
Museveni‘s efforts to end the conflict through peace negotiations and military operations
have evoked wide criticism. Nevertheless, his 2000 Amnesty Accord, which encourages
Severino Lukoya is a catechist who attempted to claim his daughter‘s following by insisting
that some of Alice‘s jogi along with other well-known Acholi jogi possessed him (Behrend
1999b, 27-28). But Lukoya‘s attempts to convert Alice‘s followers failed, perhaps in part
because Alice refused his aid while she commanded the HSMF (Allen 2006, 36). Responding
to his feelings of failure, Lukoya also used violence to coerce followers, earning the
nickname otong-tong, which means ―one who chops victims to pieces‖ (Doom and
Vlassenroot 1998, 19). Lukoya succeeded in gathering 2,000 followers for his movement,
the Lord‘s Army (Behrend 1999b, 28). The Lord‘s Army fought some battles before the
group disintegrated.6
Joseph Kony recruited soldiers from all three of these guerrilla movements—the UPDA, the
HSMF, and the Lord‘s Army—but his movement primarily is a schism off the HSMF and the
UPDA. Kony adopted many aspects of the LRA‘s organization from Alice and Lukoya. For
example, he implements the Holy Spirit Safety Precautions from the HSMF, he initiates
similar rituals to Lukoya‘s and Alice‘s, he claims jogi possess him, and he violently recruits
like Lukoya. Part of the explanation, however, for the LRA‘s brutality is the adoption of the
battle tactics used by some UPDA commanders who would not surrender when the UPDA
disbanded (Behrend 1999b, 20). Most UPDA commanders who turned to Kony previously
committed atrocities that prevented their reintegration (Vinci 2005, 365). The LRA‘s use of
child soldiers, however, is unique among these groups (and the early NRA during its march
on Kampala), although not unique among internationally located guerrilla movements
(Dodge 1991, 52).
Dealing with child soldiers is a complex endeavor for various governments around the world.
In many countries, guerrilla forces or government forces make use of children (Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004 Singer 2005, 16 Wessells 2006, 10-11). Indeed, if the
definition of a child soldier is any military fighter under the age of eighteen, then many
European countries, as well as Canada and the United States, enlist children into the armed
forces with parental consent (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004, 122, 152,
217).7 The experience of child soldiers varies extensively depending on what country they
are situated within and who recruits them. While children in the LRA have particularly
horrific experiences, many other groups that recruit child soldiers also create comparably
terrible environments.8
To combat the LRA‘s use of child soldiers, Museveni held several peace talks with the LRA in
the 1990s (Allen 2006, 70 Amnesty International 1997, 5). Previous peace talks, however,
ended with the government‘s accusation that the rebels are ‗anti-peace‘—a position
reinforced by the LRA‘s resurgence of violence. Nonetheless, recent peace negotiations
leave the Final Peace Agreement between the LRA and the Ugandan government awaiting
signatures from both Kony and Museveni (Sudan Tribune, 2008). Moreover, the negotiations
were threatened by the LRA‘s hesitancy to travel to the talks unless the International
Criminal Court dropped its charges for Kony and three of his commanders—the warrants
may only be for Kony and two of his commanders now because Kony allegedly had his
second in command, Vincent Otti, executed (Independent Online, 2007).
In addition, many northern Ugandans criticize some of Museveni‘s policies, such as
Operation North in 1991, which blocked migration between northern and southern Uganda,
trapping northerners within the LRA‘s grasp (Allen 2006, 69-70). Operation Iron Fist I and
Operation Iron Fist II also received wide criticism because both involved sending an
inadequate number of UPDF into Sudan to attempt to suppress the LRA. In both instances,
the operations drove the LRA out of Sudan and back into Uganda, where they increased
attacks on civilians (although it is difficult to estimate how much they increased attacks
because the LRA also ceased attacking Sudanese civilians [Vinci 2005, 367]). In essence,
Museveni‘s efforts to end the conflict through peace negotiations and military operations
have evoked wide criticism. Nevertheless, his 2000 Amnesty Accord, which encourages
