6 ICSA TODAY
The original interview was published in the Scandinavian
Journal of Organizational Psychology (SJOP) in November 2005.
So why revisit it now? Here are my reasons:
(a) Since the horrific bombings in Madrid in 2004, the
situation in Europe has gotten worse. Terrorists
have claimed more than 500 lives since then—in
Ankara, 2016 Paris, 2015 Brussels, 2014 Toulouse,
2012 Oslo, 2011 and London, 2005. Understanding
the mechanisms related to how people engage in
terrorist groups is fundamental to preventing the
creation of future terrorists and rehabilitating current
ones.
(b) Fishman et al. (2009) discovered a 51-page manual
titled A Course in The Art of Recruitment, and it is still
available online (https://archive.org/stream/
ACourseInTheArtOfRecruiting-RevisedJuly2010/A_
Course_in_the_Art_of_Recruiting_-_Revised_
July2010_djvu.txt). This manual gives us a rare
insight into recruiters’ deceptive communication
tactics and supports the link between cultic
dynamics and terrorist recruitment.
(c) In the original interview, Cialdini paid special
attention to three principles that may sway people
under the conditions of uncertainty: authority,
social proof, and scarcity. But we missed out on
discussing in more detail the additional principles of
reciprocity, liking, and consistency. Because grooming
and building relationships by recruiters with their
recruits is so essential to our understanding of
manipulation, and also because these elements are
explicitly described in the jihadi manual, I wanted to
add information about those three principles in this
update to the original interview. All six principles of
persuasion offer a useful framework within which to
understand recruitment and radicalization.
(d) Much needs to be done in terms of public education
on this topic. Without the knowledge of these six
principles, I believe we can’t effectively help guide
former radicals away from their fantasy that they are
saving the world when in effect they are destroying
it, and help reintegrate them into our mainstream
society.
Not many know about Cialdini’s analysis, but in
chapter 6 of Social Psychology: Goals in Interaction
(2015), he analyzed Steve Hassan’s engagement in
and disengagement from the Moonies to show how
these same six principles can be used to counsel
extremists back to society. For a full understanding
of how Cialdini’s principles relate to cultic dynamics,
I recommend reading that chapter. The sooner our
politicians and more psychologists realize what cults
are all about, the sooner they also will realize how
much more can be done to combat terrorism and to
help more victims of abuse.
To be fair, terrorist research into how individuals are recruited
and radicalized has been accompanied by an increased
interest in cults and the tactics of manipulation. But the
general discussion is still dominated by the model that
points to external stressors in the political, socioeconomic,
and cultural context of the radicalized individual. And even
though 40 years of terrorism research has firmly debunked
the notion that only crazy people engage in terrorism and
has yet to reveal a meaningful, stable, terrorist profile (Borum,
2010), some people still point to personality traits as an
explanation.
It is important to emphasize that the explanations that
point toward group processes and chance encounters with
recruiters or other charismatic persons as responsible for
drawing an individual into a radical group do not exclude
individual demographics or personal predispositions. Such
explanations only place the blame for the radicalization
process outside the individual, focusing instead on the novel
and stressful situation of the person’s meeting with a clever
manipulator who has a cynical plan and the ability to carry
out a deliberate attack on that individual’s integrity.
When I asked Cialdini about this in 2005, he said,
I think that the model that best fits how terrorists
are recruited and convinced to adopt these
behaviors … [is] not one that is based on their
personality characteristics or deficits or special
vulnerabilities. In the same way, I don’t believe
it is true of former cult members who have been
swept into cults … it is not because of these
personality features but because of an authoritarian
process that employ[s] these powerful rules for
action in a way that is so persuasive that it can be
extraordinarily successful in getting people to take
action that, outside of that small group, they would
never have dreamed to take. (Moestue, 2005)
The emphasis here is on the radical situation rather than the
radical person. Social psychologists ask not who becomes
radicalized, but rather how that radical change in values and
identity is facilitated.
The sooner our politicians and
more psychologists realize what
cults are all about, the sooner they
also will realize how much more can
be done to combat terrorism and to
help more victims of abuse.
The original interview was published in the Scandinavian
Journal of Organizational Psychology (SJOP) in November 2005.
So why revisit it now? Here are my reasons:
(a) Since the horrific bombings in Madrid in 2004, the
situation in Europe has gotten worse. Terrorists
have claimed more than 500 lives since then—in
Ankara, 2016 Paris, 2015 Brussels, 2014 Toulouse,
2012 Oslo, 2011 and London, 2005. Understanding
the mechanisms related to how people engage in
terrorist groups is fundamental to preventing the
creation of future terrorists and rehabilitating current
ones.
(b) Fishman et al. (2009) discovered a 51-page manual
titled A Course in The Art of Recruitment, and it is still
available online (https://archive.org/stream/
ACourseInTheArtOfRecruiting-RevisedJuly2010/A_
Course_in_the_Art_of_Recruiting_-_Revised_
July2010_djvu.txt). This manual gives us a rare
insight into recruiters’ deceptive communication
tactics and supports the link between cultic
dynamics and terrorist recruitment.
(c) In the original interview, Cialdini paid special
attention to three principles that may sway people
under the conditions of uncertainty: authority,
social proof, and scarcity. But we missed out on
discussing in more detail the additional principles of
reciprocity, liking, and consistency. Because grooming
and building relationships by recruiters with their
recruits is so essential to our understanding of
manipulation, and also because these elements are
explicitly described in the jihadi manual, I wanted to
add information about those three principles in this
update to the original interview. All six principles of
persuasion offer a useful framework within which to
understand recruitment and radicalization.
(d) Much needs to be done in terms of public education
on this topic. Without the knowledge of these six
principles, I believe we can’t effectively help guide
former radicals away from their fantasy that they are
saving the world when in effect they are destroying
it, and help reintegrate them into our mainstream
society.
Not many know about Cialdini’s analysis, but in
chapter 6 of Social Psychology: Goals in Interaction
(2015), he analyzed Steve Hassan’s engagement in
and disengagement from the Moonies to show how
these same six principles can be used to counsel
extremists back to society. For a full understanding
of how Cialdini’s principles relate to cultic dynamics,
I recommend reading that chapter. The sooner our
politicians and more psychologists realize what cults
are all about, the sooner they also will realize how
much more can be done to combat terrorism and to
help more victims of abuse.
To be fair, terrorist research into how individuals are recruited
and radicalized has been accompanied by an increased
interest in cults and the tactics of manipulation. But the
general discussion is still dominated by the model that
points to external stressors in the political, socioeconomic,
and cultural context of the radicalized individual. And even
though 40 years of terrorism research has firmly debunked
the notion that only crazy people engage in terrorism and
has yet to reveal a meaningful, stable, terrorist profile (Borum,
2010), some people still point to personality traits as an
explanation.
It is important to emphasize that the explanations that
point toward group processes and chance encounters with
recruiters or other charismatic persons as responsible for
drawing an individual into a radical group do not exclude
individual demographics or personal predispositions. Such
explanations only place the blame for the radicalization
process outside the individual, focusing instead on the novel
and stressful situation of the person’s meeting with a clever
manipulator who has a cynical plan and the ability to carry
out a deliberate attack on that individual’s integrity.
When I asked Cialdini about this in 2005, he said,
I think that the model that best fits how terrorists
are recruited and convinced to adopt these
behaviors … [is] not one that is based on their
personality characteristics or deficits or special
vulnerabilities. In the same way, I don’t believe
it is true of former cult members who have been
swept into cults … it is not because of these
personality features but because of an authoritarian
process that employ[s] these powerful rules for
action in a way that is so persuasive that it can be
extraordinarily successful in getting people to take
action that, outside of that small group, they would
never have dreamed to take. (Moestue, 2005)
The emphasis here is on the radical situation rather than the
radical person. Social psychologists ask not who becomes
radicalized, but rather how that radical change in values and
identity is facilitated.
The sooner our politicians and
more psychologists realize what
cults are all about, the sooner they
also will realize how much more can
be done to combat terrorism and to
help more victims of abuse.
