ISSN: 2710-4028 DOI: https://doi.org/10.54208/0003 25
seen among extremists as a need for personal meaning/
identity a need for belonging and a perceived injustice
or humiliation.
Recruitment and radicalization are related processes by
which an individual might join a terrorist group or act
upon a terrorism mindset (Doosje et al., 2016 Lygre et
al., 2011). Both developments often can advance with
the assistance of multiple, disparate influences that can
serve either as inhibitors or catalysts (Challacombe,
2019: Choudhury, 2007 Jones, 2017). The process may
target vulnerable individuals (Bhui et al., 2012 Borum,
2011a Weenink, 2015) who suffer from structural
unemployment and insecurity (Neumann, 2009),
depression and suicidal thoughts (Horgan, 2014), and
other psychological conditions (Gill, 2016). There are,
however, limited patterns or characteristics that cut
across all terror groups or mindsets.
Recruitment Similarities Between Cults and Terror
Organizations
Religious cults and terror organizations are related, and
sometimes they are identical. Some cults have committed
actions considered terroristic, as with the Rajneeshee
cult. Similarly, Aum Shinrikyo was initially considered
just a Japan-based religious cult until its members
conducted several sarin gas attacks 1995 (Raevskiy,
2014). These attacks, including the large-scale attack
on the Tokyo subway, moved the organization from
being perceived as a cult to being a terror organization.
Another example of a cult that turned into a terror
organization was the People’s Temple, where Jonestown
members attacked US Representative Leo Ryan and his
entourage in Guyana before cult members committed
suicide (Lalich, 2009). Paramount to this comparison
is the reality that most terrorist organizations have
religious foundations (Conway, 2015). Additionally,
religiously based terrorism can be more powerful than
other types as a result of the intent and purpose of the
group (Morehead, 2002).
Stein (2017a) and others have shown how the
process of cult recruitments leading to new recruits’
disengagement with their former lives parallels similar
experiences of new recruits to terror organizations.
Stein (2017) described this as a
three-fold process in setting the stage for the
creation of a disorganized attachment bond
to the group: the initial contact and gaining
access to the recruit, positioning the group
as a new perceived safe haven, and beginning
to detach the recruit from prior attachments.
(p. 43)
Similarly, Young (2012) generalized cult recruitment
as being a core component to cult membership, which
appears to mirror the recruitment and radicalization
process of terrorists (see Horgan et al., 2016 Mullins,
2009 Schwartz, 2001).
Numerous qualitative sources support Stein’s (2017)
similar depiction of the process of cult and terror-
organization recruitment. For example, a former
member of the Islamic Marxist organization Mujahedin-
e-Khalq (MEK) described how he was separated from
family, subjected to mind manipulation, and forced to
see things as black and white (Forrest, 2014). Other
researchers have noted how both types of groups will
lie to potential recruits and utilize coercive persuasion
techniques (Rodriguez-Carballeira et al., 2010).
Others, however, have argued that recruit for cult and
terror organizations differs. Mansfield (2002) suggested
that a terrorist recruit willing to go off to be trained
was different than a cult recruit who just happened
to commit an act of violence after being trained.
Deception in terror organizations may involve the end
result, or intended outcome of the training, such as
the 9/11 hijackers actually being on a suicide mission.
Sageman (2008) also echoed these same sentiments,
instead proposing that most Islamic terror recruits self-
select and willingly join terror organizations. Their
motivation often is fame and thrills, coupled with a
desire to create an Islamic utopia. These researchers
were unable to suggest that isolation is not a factor in
keeping a recruit.
Much earlier, Zimbardo and Hartley (1985) examined
the Contract- Indoctrination-Conversion model
for their study. This model has four distinct phases:
Precontact, Contact, Mediational Process, and Outcome.
Each phase includes several subelements (e.g., for
Contact Variables, there are both Strategies and
Tactics). The model is linear—an individual begins at
one end and then progresses through the stages until
the end. Recruitment, according to this model, begins
seen among extremists as a need for personal meaning/
identity a need for belonging and a perceived injustice
or humiliation.
Recruitment and radicalization are related processes by
which an individual might join a terrorist group or act
upon a terrorism mindset (Doosje et al., 2016 Lygre et
al., 2011). Both developments often can advance with
the assistance of multiple, disparate influences that can
serve either as inhibitors or catalysts (Challacombe,
2019: Choudhury, 2007 Jones, 2017). The process may
target vulnerable individuals (Bhui et al., 2012 Borum,
2011a Weenink, 2015) who suffer from structural
unemployment and insecurity (Neumann, 2009),
depression and suicidal thoughts (Horgan, 2014), and
other psychological conditions (Gill, 2016). There are,
however, limited patterns or characteristics that cut
across all terror groups or mindsets.
Recruitment Similarities Between Cults and Terror
Organizations
Religious cults and terror organizations are related, and
sometimes they are identical. Some cults have committed
actions considered terroristic, as with the Rajneeshee
cult. Similarly, Aum Shinrikyo was initially considered
just a Japan-based religious cult until its members
conducted several sarin gas attacks 1995 (Raevskiy,
2014). These attacks, including the large-scale attack
on the Tokyo subway, moved the organization from
being perceived as a cult to being a terror organization.
Another example of a cult that turned into a terror
organization was the People’s Temple, where Jonestown
members attacked US Representative Leo Ryan and his
entourage in Guyana before cult members committed
suicide (Lalich, 2009). Paramount to this comparison
is the reality that most terrorist organizations have
religious foundations (Conway, 2015). Additionally,
religiously based terrorism can be more powerful than
other types as a result of the intent and purpose of the
group (Morehead, 2002).
Stein (2017a) and others have shown how the
process of cult recruitments leading to new recruits’
disengagement with their former lives parallels similar
experiences of new recruits to terror organizations.
Stein (2017) described this as a
three-fold process in setting the stage for the
creation of a disorganized attachment bond
to the group: the initial contact and gaining
access to the recruit, positioning the group
as a new perceived safe haven, and beginning
to detach the recruit from prior attachments.
(p. 43)
Similarly, Young (2012) generalized cult recruitment
as being a core component to cult membership, which
appears to mirror the recruitment and radicalization
process of terrorists (see Horgan et al., 2016 Mullins,
2009 Schwartz, 2001).
Numerous qualitative sources support Stein’s (2017)
similar depiction of the process of cult and terror-
organization recruitment. For example, a former
member of the Islamic Marxist organization Mujahedin-
e-Khalq (MEK) described how he was separated from
family, subjected to mind manipulation, and forced to
see things as black and white (Forrest, 2014). Other
researchers have noted how both types of groups will
lie to potential recruits and utilize coercive persuasion
techniques (Rodriguez-Carballeira et al., 2010).
Others, however, have argued that recruit for cult and
terror organizations differs. Mansfield (2002) suggested
that a terrorist recruit willing to go off to be trained
was different than a cult recruit who just happened
to commit an act of violence after being trained.
Deception in terror organizations may involve the end
result, or intended outcome of the training, such as
the 9/11 hijackers actually being on a suicide mission.
Sageman (2008) also echoed these same sentiments,
instead proposing that most Islamic terror recruits self-
select and willingly join terror organizations. Their
motivation often is fame and thrills, coupled with a
desire to create an Islamic utopia. These researchers
were unable to suggest that isolation is not a factor in
keeping a recruit.
Much earlier, Zimbardo and Hartley (1985) examined
the Contract- Indoctrination-Conversion model
for their study. This model has four distinct phases:
Precontact, Contact, Mediational Process, and Outcome.
Each phase includes several subelements (e.g., for
Contact Variables, there are both Strategies and
Tactics). The model is linear—an individual begins at
one end and then progresses through the stages until
the end. Recruitment, according to this model, begins
