International Journal of Coercion, Abuse, and Manipulation Volume 3 2022 24
to the term is based upon the viewer’s perspective—
adoption of Marxist ideals may be positive or negative
radicalization (Karakatsanis &Herzog, 2016). Kajsiu
(2016) elaborated on this point by showcasing Albanian
evolution in its democratic process. Over several years,
Albanians exhibited substantial shifts toward the
European Union and pro-democracy practices.
Recruitment is a process in which an individual is
typically encouraged to join a group (Jones, 2017). The
recruitment process often involves an exploitation and
exaggeration of personal issues or grievances, and the
offer of an identity or sense of belonging (Choudhury,
2007). Typically, recruitment involves a combination
of factors meant to both push and pull an individual
toward the group. Jones (2017) described the push
as being the sense of injustice, and he described the
pull as being the sense of belonging. Together, these
factors create a narrative or message a potential
recruit can get behind. Recruitment also is facilitated
by communications technology such as websites
and social media (Mahmood &Jetter, 2020). As an
example, some ISIS recruits had found camaraderie
and connection through online chat rooms and Twitter
(Juergensmeyer, 2018).
Recently, the QAnon phenomena has further illustrated
the power of social media as a recruitment tool (Langone,
2021). Langone’s research on this group demonstrates
social media’s power to capture attention and catalyze
recruits. One tweet can influence thousands without
the infrastructure or logistics previously required
by recruiters. Social media serves to assist potential
recruits in becoming believers. As Langone (2021) has
pointed out so succinctly, QAnon “may be construed as
a safe space for paranoid speculation” (p. 12).
Because the ideals of terrorism are often just a mindset
(e.g., a grievance against a certain person, organization,
country, or religion), radicalization does not necessarily
require an individual to join a group to commit an act
of terrorism or be considered a terrorist. Radicalization
can be just the process of an individual deciding to
move toward terrorist ideals (Young et al., 2015). This
distinction differs from political radicalization in
motivations, ideology, and causality.
The motivations for terrorist radicalization typically
have a perspective of victimization that turns into a
personal grievance (Young et al., 2015). Stern (2004)
outlined a reoccurring thread in terrorism grievance
narratives: humiliation. Following the American
invasion of Iraq, Al-Qaida used that war as a recruitment
tool (Stern, 2004). The Americans were humiliating
Muslims and Islamic ideals. Other grievances include
those that encourage immediate action. For example,
Juergensmeyer (2018) identified that many in ISIS
leadership believe the Islamic savior, or Mahdi, will
be coming soon hence, they must act to establish a
Caliphate.
Terrorism ideology differs because it reflects extreme
political or religious views (Chin et al., 2016). For
instance, instead of believing abortion is wrong,
a radicalized individual may believe the only way
to stop abortion would be to kill abortion doctors.
Organizational leaders often take advantage of zealous
recruits (Stern, 2004). Juergensmeyer (2018) also has
pointed out that some Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) recruits were not idealists or true believers, but
rather individuals looking for an opportunity.
Researchers have created several theories about the
radicalization process to explain terrorist or violent
extremist behavior. Historically, radicalization methods
involved stepwise processes that are like staircases
(Moghaddam, 2005), or mechanisms across levels
(McCauley &Moskalenko, 2008). Silber and Bhatt
(2007) viewed radicalization as a four-phase process:
Pre-radicalization, Self- identification, Indoctrination,
and Jihadization. In contrast, in Challacombe’s
(2019) domestic-terrorism radicalization model, the
radicalization process is cyclic: Individuals move
through several stages but fluctuate between stronger or
weaker attractions in their shift toward radicalization.
Many people have argued that potential terrorists
are just vulnerable people, but the research is mixed.
Gill’s (2016) review of lone-actor terrorists did not
find a definitive pattern of vulnerability (or any other
characteristic) among the actors. Horgan (2014),
however, noted the potential, especially for terrorists
who come from impoverish conditions (e.g., Pakistan,
Somalia), that an escape from the poverty may be a
contributing factor. And other researchers, including
Weenink (2015), have found vulnerability to be a
commonplace characteristic in terror groups. Borum
(2011a, 2011b, 2004) identified common vulnerabilities

ISSN: 2710-4028 DOI: https://doi.org/10.54208/0003 25
seen among extremists as a need for personal meaning/
identity a need for belonging and a perceived injustice
or humiliation.
Recruitment and radicalization are related processes by
which an individual might join a terrorist group or act
upon a terrorism mindset (Doosje et al., 2016 Lygre et
al., 2011). Both developments often can advance with
the assistance of multiple, disparate influences that can
serve either as inhibitors or catalysts (Challacombe,
2019: Choudhury, 2007 Jones, 2017). The process may
target vulnerable individuals (Bhui et al., 2012 Borum,
2011a Weenink, 2015) who suffer from structural
unemployment and insecurity (Neumann, 2009),
depression and suicidal thoughts (Horgan, 2014), and
other psychological conditions (Gill, 2016). There are,
however, limited patterns or characteristics that cut
across all terror groups or mindsets.
Recruitment Similarities Between Cults and Terror
Organizations
Religious cults and terror organizations are related, and
sometimes they are identical. Some cults have committed
actions considered terroristic, as with the Rajneeshee
cult. Similarly, Aum Shinrikyo was initially considered
just a Japan-based religious cult until its members
conducted several sarin gas attacks 1995 (Raevskiy,
2014). These attacks, including the large-scale attack
on the Tokyo subway, moved the organization from
being perceived as a cult to being a terror organization.
Another example of a cult that turned into a terror
organization was the People’s Temple, where Jonestown
members attacked US Representative Leo Ryan and his
entourage in Guyana before cult members committed
suicide (Lalich, 2009). Paramount to this comparison
is the reality that most terrorist organizations have
religious foundations (Conway, 2015). Additionally,
religiously based terrorism can be more powerful than
other types as a result of the intent and purpose of the
group (Morehead, 2002).
Stein (2017a) and others have shown how the
process of cult recruitments leading to new recruits’
disengagement with their former lives parallels similar
experiences of new recruits to terror organizations.
Stein (2017) described this as a
three-fold process in setting the stage for the
creation of a disorganized attachment bond
to the group: the initial contact and gaining
access to the recruit, positioning the group
as a new perceived safe haven, and beginning
to detach the recruit from prior attachments.
(p. 43)
Similarly, Young (2012) generalized cult recruitment
as being a core component to cult membership, which
appears to mirror the recruitment and radicalization
process of terrorists (see Horgan et al., 2016 Mullins,
2009 Schwartz, 2001).
Numerous qualitative sources support Stein’s (2017)
similar depiction of the process of cult and terror-
organization recruitment. For example, a former
member of the Islamic Marxist organization Mujahedin-
e-Khalq (MEK) described how he was separated from
family, subjected to mind manipulation, and forced to
see things as black and white (Forrest, 2014). Other
researchers have noted how both types of groups will
lie to potential recruits and utilize coercive persuasion
techniques (Rodriguez-Carballeira et al., 2010).
Others, however, have argued that recruit for cult and
terror organizations differs. Mansfield (2002) suggested
that a terrorist recruit willing to go off to be trained
was different than a cult recruit who just happened
to commit an act of violence after being trained.
Deception in terror organizations may involve the end
result, or intended outcome of the training, such as
the 9/11 hijackers actually being on a suicide mission.
Sageman (2008) also echoed these same sentiments,
instead proposing that most Islamic terror recruits self-
select and willingly join terror organizations. Their
motivation often is fame and thrills, coupled with a
desire to create an Islamic utopia. These researchers
were unable to suggest that isolation is not a factor in
keeping a recruit.
Much earlier, Zimbardo and Hartley (1985) examined
the Contract- Indoctrination-Conversion model
for their study. This model has four distinct phases:
Precontact, Contact, Mediational Process, and Outcome.
Each phase includes several subelements (e.g., for
Contact Variables, there are both Strategies and
Tactics). The model is linear—an individual begins at
one end and then progresses through the stages until
the end. Recruitment, according to this model, begins