International Journal of Coercion, Abuse, and Manipulation Volume 8 2025 4
30 in the seven-day workshop, 12 did not continue. Of
the 18 remaining in the twelve-day workshop, 9 did
not continue. Of the remaining nine, six were active
church members six months later. The example of the
Moonies illustrates a conversion process to different
degrees over time. Converts undertake a sequence
of small decisions concerning the acceptance of
authority. Ultimately, due to this sequence of decisions
of obedience rather than rebellion, converts develop
beliefs and values that differ from those they had at the
beginning of the process.
We can assume that this willingness to acquiesce to
authority is facilitated by self-selection. Since most with
doubts leave, the dissent necessary to resist the escalation
of the commitment to the group does not develop.
Thus creating isolation from external influences, such
as in Milgram’s laboratory, and conformity to the
ideas of others, as in Asch’s experiment. This is also
an example of preference shifting, where preferences
change depending on choices induced by previous
preferences, as Elster (1984) pointed out.
The theory of referent information influence (Turner,
1987 Hogg &Turner, 1987) explains this process of
conforming. People expect to agree with in-group
members and, through self-categorization, conform
to the norms that define the in-group as part of
their self-identity in the salient social comparative
frame of reference. Polarization is the shift toward
extreme positions and occurs when members distance
themselves from out-group members’ norms, beliefs,
and behaviors. This occurs because the group is situated
towards one extreme of the salient comparative context
or social frame of reference (Turner, 1989).
Researchers’ general lack of access to such contexts in
a cult means that changes in salience and meaning still
need to be better understood. Evidence is potentially
provided by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who
found that humans often do not rationally choose the
strategy that maximizes the probability of winning in
the long run (the expected utility of economists) but are
interested in current wins and losses. As Elster (1984)
points out, this alters the rationality of the choices
because the principle of transitivity is lost. If one prefers
A to B and B to C, one should also prefer A to C, but
it does not always happen (so the farmer goes home
with a basket of rotten apples). Not only that, they fear
loss more than they are attracted by gain and react in
opposite ways if the same problem is posed negatively
or positively. This last phenomenon is known as the
framing or context effect. This means that our decisions
are influenced by how information is presented (as
Lifton [2012] and others have noted occurs in cults
with concepts such as “loaded language”).
Similar information can be more or less attractive,
and our choices differ depending on the highlighted
features (another way of defining salience in context).
One of the shortcuts in decision-making, known as
heuristics, that contributes to the framing effect is
the affect heuristic. This is a phenomenon whereby we
rely heavily upon our emotional state during decision-
making rather than taking the time to consider the
long-term consequences of a decision. This may be why
we favor information and options framed to elicit an
immediate emotional response. Marketing and political
propaganda make extensive use of this heuristic. In
marketing, framing is used to focus the content of the
message on the potential gains associated with using
the product or, better, on the potential losses resulting
from not buying it. Furthermore, the use of framing
strategies is often at the basis of the creation of news
stories containing biased information favoring certain
perspectives, points of view, or ideologies (Tankard,
2009), a process well documented in cults (Singer,
2003).
The importance of framing and emotional reasoning
in manipulation and propaganda is particularly
emphasized by Lakoff (2001), who focuses on language
as a tool that can change people’s worldviews and,
consequently, their decisions. He pays particular
attention to using metaphors as an element of narratives
that convey messages that can change an individual’s
perceptions and decisions through reframing.
These mechanisms play a role in a wide range of
persuasion types, including benign forms, but this
does not mean that there are no forms of undue or
coercive persuasion, as claimed by some (Introvigne
et al., 2018). What is arguably reprehensible in
conversion work in harmful cults is not the technique
used but its end. Sometimes, the end is fraudulent
and exploitative, as in damaging cults. Pursuing
a secret agenda to exploit those persuaded to

ISSN: 2710-4028 DOI: https://doi.org/10.54208/0008 5
make choices contrary to their interests can be defined
as “manipulation.” Humans are seemingly prone to
systematic errors that can lead to counterproductive
choices, and this can be seen as helpful to those who
intend to be maliciously persuasive (Singer, 2003).
Charismatic cult leaders can lead their followers into a
frame in which their irrational decisions make perfect
sense to them (Lalich, 2000).
Instead of The Manchurian Candidate, another
Hollywood production may better help illustrate the
emerging psychological model from this literature
analysis: The Truman Show (1998). In this movie, the
protagonist is not an other-directed automaton who
has been magically brainwashed but a deceived man
who lives in a world created especially for him, where
he is monitored, filmed, and broadcast 24 hours a day.
In this pleasant, warm town, Seahaven, Truman acts
based on the limited information he receives and makes
choices he considers to be free, such as never leaving
the town because of his fear of the outside world that
was induced in him.
The apparent paradox is that some sociologists and
religious scholars have routinely defended every type
of cult, even totalitarian cults, from the charge of
coercive persuasion (Barker, 1984 Bromley, 2001
Introvigne, 2022 Melton, 2000 Richardson, 1993
Shupe, 2004) and appear to show great faith in human
rationality instead. The main theory they refer to
is the Theory of Religious Economy (TER), which
applies the classic Rational Choice Theory to the
religious field. This reading (Stark, 2007) supposes that
the religious field is like a market of goods. The various
faiths would be products offered by religious firms in
competition, and the faithful would be consumers who
make choices based on their rational calculation. This
has great practical relevance to an analysis of influence
processes. Affirming rational choice implies denying
manipulation. It is the rhetoric of free choice. It follows
that the mass suicide of Jonestown, carried out by the
faithful of the political-spiritual cult of the Reverend
Jim Jones, which led to the deaths of almost a thousand
people in 1978, would have been accomplished by the
simultaneous cost-benefit calculation of more than
900 people who concluded that death maximized their
utility. It is strange that a conception that sees faith
as a marketable product does not consider the basic
marketing concepts mentioned above (such as the
affective heuristic and framing), does not contemplate
misleading or manipulative advertising and takes the
absolute honesty of each seller for granted.
In studies on bounded rationality, the idea of an
individual being able to make fully rational choices
has long ago been struck down, for example, by
Simon (1957). This reduced capacity is due to the
computational limits of the brain, which means
that our choices are always suboptimal. Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) showed beyond a doubt how
human choices systematically violate the principles
of economic rationality, not only for computational
deficits but also for real computational errors.
Working while using these computational deficits and
errors within organized and sealed frames allows for
manipulating the orientation of individual choices,
especially if a charismatic figure leads this process. A
charismatic leader can take your horse and give you a
basket of rotten apples, and you would be lucky, too,
because malicious, sociopathic leaders poison apples
and take more than your horse. This ruinous endpoint
is akin to Lifton’s (2012) dispensing of existence in
thought reform.
The model proposed here, and emanating from
the above review of research in this area, is also
supported by the classic observations of Cialdini
(2009) on commitment and consistency, which shows
how humans have a fundamental need to feel consistent
with their ideas and decisions. Once we have chosen
or taken a position, we will encounter personal and
interpersonal pressures to behave consistently with
that commitment. He writes:
Psychologists have long understood the power
of the principle of consistency in directing
human action... The urge to be (and appear
to be) consistent constitutes a very powerful
weapon of social influence, often leading us to
act in ways that are clearly contrary to our own
self-interest. (Cialdini, 2009, pp. 52)
Commitment is key to reinforcing consistent behavior
(Cialdini, 2009 Beatty et al., 1988). Once a position
has been taken, there is a natural tendency to behave
in ways that are stubbornly consistent with it. The